

# HUDSON INSTITUTE

## INCOMPLETE DRAFT

### THE MIDDLE EAST

Edited by

Edmund Stillman  
Cary Aminoff  
Edward Boylan

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Quaker Ridge Road  
Croton-on-Hudson  
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## SOME GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

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### ① SOME GENERAL (AND PERHAPS SUPERFICIAL) COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE TRADITIONAL MIDDLE EAST AND THE TRADITIONAL FAR EAST

#### I. MIDDLE EAST

- A. RELIGIOUSLY UNITED OR CLOSELY RELATED
- B. LINGUISTICALLY UNITED (WITHIN ARAB AREA--BUT ARABIC THE CULT LANGUAGE EVEN IN TURKEY AND IRAN)
- C. POLITICALLY UNITED OR RELATED
- D. ETHNICALLY RELATED (IN MOST CASES)
- E. HIGHLY TRADITIONAL SOCIETY; VERY RESISTANT TO CHANGE
- F. STRONG MESSIANIC AMBITIONS
- G. USUALLY MILITARISTIC
- H. RELIGIOUS SOCIETY WITH RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS GENERALLY DOMINATING TEMPORAL INSTITUTIONS
- I. JURISDICTION OF THE STATE ALWAYS A MATTER OF DISPUTE WITH THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT
- J. RELIGIOUS BELIEFS: RIGID AND DOCTRINAIRE
- K. LOW PRIORITY ON SECULAR KNOWLEDGE
- L. COMMERCE AND TRADE ACCORDED INFERIOR STATUS
- M. POLITICAL POWER WAS DYNASTIC, DISCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUAL STATE INSTITUTIONS
- N. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE NATIONALISM DISCOURAGED BY MAJOR ARAB DYNASTIES AND OTTOMAN TURKS.
- O. VILLAGE LIFE GENERALLY UNAFFECTED BY MOST MAJOR POLITICAL AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS
- P. HIGHLY INTOLERANT OF MINORITIES, ALIEN CULTURES AND RIVAL RELIGIONS
- Q. LITTLE INTEREST IN EXTERNAL CONTACTS
- R. GENERALLY CHAUVINISTIC, BUT RACIALLY TOLERANT
- S. FOREIGN CULTURE NEVER FULLY ASSIMILATED, ONLY SUPERFICIALLY ACCEPTED AND EXPLOITED (IN MOST CASES)
- T. HAD SIGNIFICANT CULTURAL INFLUENCE ON THE WEST
- U. HAD SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS WITH THE WEST EARLY IN ITS HISTORY
- V. HAD LONG HISTORY OF CONTACT WITH AND COMPETITION WITH WEST (AND EXPULSION OF INTRUSIVE CRUSADER KINGDOM)
- W. DESIRE FOR REGIONAL UNITY: HISTORIC, TRADITIONAL, AND PROFOUND
- X. WITHIN LIVING MEMORY MOSLEMS HAVE RULED OVER EUROPEANS
- Y. IN ARABIC REGIONS A LONG HISTORY (SINCE 11-12TH CENTURIES) OF POLITICAL SUBORDINATION

#### II. THE FAR EAST

- A. RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE
- B. LINGUISTICALLY DIVERSE
- C. POLITICALLY DIVERSE
- D. ETHNICALLY DIVERSE
- E. FEW MESSIANIC AMBITIONS
- F. OFTEN MILITARISTIC
- G. GENERALLY CHAUVINISTIC AND XENOPHOBIC
- H. TRADITIONALIST, MONARCHIST SOCIETIES; GENERALLY RESISTANT TO CHANGE AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES (CHINA) BUT ASSIMILATIVE (JAPAN)
- I. TEMPORAL POWER DOMINANT
- J. SOMEWHAT MORE TOLERANT OF MINORITIES, ALIEN CULTURES AND RIVAL RELIGIONS
- K. RELIGIOUS BELIEFS: WEAK AND NOT AS DOCTRINAIRE AS ISLAM
- L. NATIONALISM AND SENSE OF NATIONAL PRIDE DEVELOPED EARLIER THAN IN MIDDLE EAST BECAUSE OF MORE SECURE INDEPENDENT STATUS OF INDIVIDUAL STATES
- M. LITTLE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO 19TH CENTURY
- N. STRONG TRADITIONAL APPLIED TECHNOLOGY THOUGH LITTLE INTEREST IN THEORETICAL SCIENCES
- O. TRADE AND COMMERCE ENJOYED LITTLE STATUS DESPITE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE (CHINA), CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE (JAPAN)
- P. LITTLE INTEREST IN EXTERNAL CONTACTS
- Q. SOME SECULAR RULERS FAR MORE AMENABLE TO CULTURAL CHANGE THAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST
- R. VILLAGE LIFE GENERALLY UNAFFECTED BY NEW CULTURAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
- S. SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS WITH THE WEST DID NOT BEGIN UNTIL THE 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES WHEN INTRUSIONS CAME AS A VAST SHOCK TO PRIDE
- T. HAD LITTLE CULTURAL INFLUENCE ON THE WEST
- U. BROADLY-BASED CULTURAL RENAISSANCE IS YET TO COME
- V. USED TO THINKING OF ITSELF AS CENTER OF WORLD (THE CAUSE OF CULTURAL ISOLATION)
- W. DESIRE FOR REGIONAL UNITY: RELATIVELY RECENT

### ② SOME OF THE MAJOR HISTORICAL DIFFERENCES (AND SIMILARITIES) BETWEEN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE FAR EAST

1. MUCH GREATER RACIAL, RELIGIOUS, LINGUISTIC AND POLITICAL DIVERSITY IN THE FAR EAST
2. SENSE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY WAS STRONGER IN THE FAR EAST, E.G. THAILAND OR JAPAN
3. SENSE OF REGIONAL IDENTITY WAS STRONGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, I.E. ARAB HEGEMONY
4. FAR EASTERN NATIONS WERE GENERALLY MORE WILLING TO ADJUST AND COEXIST WITH WESTERN POWER AND CULTURE
5. ALTHOUGH BOTH AREAS WERE RESISTANT TO CHANGE, STRUCTURAL BARRIERS AGAINST OUTSIDE INFLUENCES WERE FAR MORE SOPHISTICATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST (WITH IMPORTANT EXCEPTIONS)
6. FAR EASTERN CULTURE WAS AND IS FAR MORE FLEXIBLE THAN MIDDLE EASTERN CULTURE (AGAIN WITH EXCEPTIONS)
7. MIDDLE EAST AND CHINA BOTH HIGHLY INTROVERTED
8. IN NINETEENTH CENTURY FAR EASTERN NATIONS LAGGED BECAUSE OF RELATIVE ISOLATION FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD AND FROM EACH OTHER
9. MIDDLE EAST ACHIEVED CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL GROWTH EARLY, BEFORE DEGENERATING INTO LONG PERIOD OF STAGNATION. RECOVERY FROM THESE DARK AGES IS ONLY A RELATIVELY RECENT PHENOMENON, IF AT ALL
10. FAR EAST EXPERIENCED MUCH MORE STEADY GROWTH
11. DEVELOPMENT OF MIDDLE EAST SEEMINGLY FAR MORE DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF NECESSITY OF OVERCOMING AND ELIMINATING SOLIDLY ENTRENCHED, BUT ANACHRONISTIC, RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND TRADITIONS
12. PROSPECTS FOR FAR EASTERN DEVELOPMENT SEEMS MORE OPTIMISTIC BECAUSE OF GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN INDIGENOUS CULTURES AND SOCIETIES (LESS SO IN CHINA)
13. PROSPECTS ALSO SEEM BRIGHTER BECAUSE OF GENERALLY MORE TOLERANT CULTURES AND FAR FEWER PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL INHIBITIONS TO CHANGE (AGAIN LESS SO IN CHINA)
14. FAR EAST HAD FAR MORE DIVERSIFIED ECONOMY THAN MIDDLE EAST

### ③ CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC REGIONS OF THE MOSLEM WORLD

1. TURKIC: TURKEY, SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA (UZBEKISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, E.K.)
2. IRANIC: IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, WEST PAKISTAN
3. PRIMITIVE ARABIC: EAST JORDAN, SOUTHERN IRAQ, SAUDI ARABIA, TRUCIAL STATES, MOROCCO<sup>2</sup>, LIBYA, NORTHERN SUDAN
4. DEVELOPED ARABIC: SYRIA, LEBANON, U.A.R., TUNISIA, ALGERIA, KUWAIT
5. SOUTH-SOUTHEAST ASIAN MOSLEM: EAST PAKISTAN, MALAYSIA, INDONESIA, SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES, SOUTHERN INDIA

<sup>2</sup>IN MAGHREB (WEST ARAB STATES) PRIMITIVE POPULATION OFTEN BERBER RATHER THAN PURE ARAB.

### 1 SOME RELATIVELY CONSTANT TRENDS IN MIDDLE EASTERN HISTORY

1. HIGHLY INTROVERTED AND INFLEXIBLE SOCIETIES
  - A. GENERALLY RESISTANT TO CHANGE
  - B. SUSPICIOUS OF THE OUTSIDE WORLD
  - C. LITTLE INTEREST IN ALIEN CULTURES
  - D. GREAT DIFFICULTY IN ABSORBING OR ASSIMILATING ALIEN CULTURAL INFLUENCES
  - E. VIEWED (VIEWS?) THE OUTSIDE WORLD LARGELY IN THE CONTEXT OF MESSIANIC AMBITIONS
  - F. DOMINATED BY ROMANTIC TRADITION OF UNIVERSAL STATE UNITING (A) ARAB (B) MOSLEM WORLD
  - G. INFATUATED WITH POLITICAL RHETORIC
2. HIGHLY TRADITIONAL CULTURE WITH WEAK TECHNOLOGY BASED ALMOST COMPLETELY ON INHERITED RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
3. HISTORIC TENSIONS:
  - A. BETWEEN RELIGIOUS POWERS AND TEMPORAL POWERS
  - B. BETWEEN DYNASTY AND STATE
  - C. BETWEEN STATE AND INDIGENOUS MINORITIES (ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS)
  - D. BETWEEN ARAB MUSLIM AND NON-ARAB MUSLIM
  - E. BETWEEN ARAB (MOSLEM) UNIVERSALISM AND PARTICULARISM (POLITICAL, RELIGIOUS, DYNASTIC)
  - F. BETWEEN ASCETISM AND OSTENTATION
4. DURING THE FIRST 800 YEARS OR SO OF ISLAMIC HISTORY THE STATE WAS GENERALLY SUBORDINATE TO, AND IN CONFLICT WITH, THE MAJOR RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND INSTITUTIONS; CONSEQUENTLY
  - A. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT WAS DISCOURAGED
  - B. NATIONALISM WAS SUBSERVIENT TO ARAB UNITY
  - C. STUDY OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS WAS IGNORED
5. RELIGIOUS SCHOLARSHIP COMPLETELY DOMINATED SECULAR SCHOLARSHIP
  - A. CONTEMPORARY TECHNOLOGY WAS NOT VALUED HIGHLY
  - B. SECULAR SCHOLASTIC ACHIEVEMENTS WERE, FOR THE MOST PART, IGNORED (WITH SIGNIFICANT EXCEPTIONS)
6. MOSLEM TECHNOLOGY LARGELY ADOPTED FROM AND APPLIED BY ALIENS

### 3 EGYPT AND THE WEST

THE ANCIENT EGYPTIAN MIND IS NOT AN EASTERN MIND, IF WE UNDERSTAND BY THE EAST CHINA, JAPAN, INDIA, AND THE ADJOINING REGIONS. IT DEVELOPED IN EGYPT AS A RESULT OF THE CONDITIONS, NATURAL AND HUMAN, THAT PREVAILED THERE. IT ONLY EXERTED INFLUENCE ON AND WAS IN TURN INFLUENCED BY THE NEIGHBORING NON-EGYPTIAN PEOPLES, PRINCIPALLY THE GREEKS.

FROM THESE CLEAR AND LONG SINCE PROVEN FACTS, EGYPTIANS HAVE DEDUCED THE WEIRD AND ILLOGICAL CONCLUSION THAT THEY ARE EASTERNERS NOT MERELY IN THE GEOGRAPHICAL SENSE OF THE TERM, BUT IN MENTALITY AND CULTURE. THEY REGARD THEMSELVES AS BEING CLOSER TO THE HINDUS, CHINESE, AND JAPANESE THAN TO THE GREEKS, ITALIANS, AND FRENCHMEN. I HAVE NEVER BEEN ABLE TO UNDERSTAND OR ACCEPT THIS SHOCKING MISCONCEPTION....

IF IT IS TRUE THAT CHRISTIANITY DID NOT TRANSFORM THE EUROPEAN MIND OR ELIMINATE EITHER ITS INHERITED HELLENISM OR MEDITERRANEAN QUALITIES, IT MUST BE EQUALLY TRUE THAT ISLAM DID NOT CHANGE THE EGYPTIAN MIND OR THE MIND OF THE PEOPLES WHO EMBRACED IT AND WHO WERE INFLUENCED BY THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA....

THE DOMINANT AND UNDENIABLE FACT OF OUR TIMES IS THAT DAY BY DAY WE ARE DRAWING CLOSER TO EUROPE AND BECOMING AN INTEGRAL PART OF HER, LITERALLY AND FIGURATIVELY. THIS PROCESS WOULD BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT IS IF THE EGYPTIAN MIND WERE BASICALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE EUROPEAN.

TAHA HUSSEIN, "THE FUTURE OF CULTURE IN EGYPT" IN THE POLITICAL AWAKENING OF THE MIDDLE EAST, PRENTICE-HALL, 1970, (PP. 107-109).

### 2 THE REACTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AGAINST WESTERN CULTURE

THE SUCCESS OF THE INVASION OF WESTERN INSTITUTIONS AND VALUES, AND THE INABILITY OF THE OLD SOCIETY TO PUT UP AN EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION, MUST BE IMPUTED TO SOME HIDDEN WEAKNESS WITHIN MUSLIM SOCIETY ITSELF. ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST MANAGED TO CREATE, DOWN THE CENTURIES, A SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM WHICH WAS REMARKABLE FROM EVERY POINT OF VIEW, BUT IT WAS NEVER ABLE TO ACHIEVE A TRUE CULTURAL UNITY. THE ORGANS OF POWER AND THE GOVERNING CLASSES PRACTICED FOR CENTURIES A MORALITY BASED ON VALUES DRAWN FROM THE ANCIENT IMPERIAL TRADITIONS OF WESTERN ASIA AND FAR REMOVED FROM THE ISLAMIC VALUES. AGAINST THIS "INVERTED CULTURE" THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ISLAMIC CULTURE STRUGGLED UNCEASINGLY BUT UNAVAILINGLY. TO PUT IT BRIEFLY, THE DEFECTS WHICH EASTERN CRITICS NEVER TIRE OF POINTING OUT IN THE WESTERN WORLD UNDER THE HEADING OF "MATERIALISM" WERE ALREADY DEEPLY ROOTED IN THE RULING CLASSES OF THE MUSLIM WORLD, AND HAD FOUND NOT A FEW ADHERENTS AMONG THE SO-CALLED MIDDLE CLASSES, AMONG BUSINESSMEN, AND EVEN AMONG THE MUSLIM JURISTS.

IT WAS THUS INTO A SOCIETY ALREADY CHARACTERIZED BY THIS HALF-HIDDEN INTERNAL CONFLICT THAT THE WEST FORCED ITS WAY. THE RULING CLASSES, FAR FROM ATTEMPTING TO RESIST THE INTRUSION, ENCOURAGED IT. IT WAS NOT NAPOLEON WHO INTRODUCED MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL TECHNIQUES INTO EGYPT, IT WAS MUHAMMAD ALI WHO ASKED FOR THEM. IT WAS NOT WESTERNERS WHO ADVOCATED THE ADOPTION OF LEGAL CODES, PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS, COMPULSORY EDUCATION, AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS; ALL THESE INSTITUTIONS WERE DEMANDED BY THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST THEMSELVES.

SIR HAMILTON A. R. GIBB IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST, NEW YORK, 1965, (PP. 135-136).

### 4 THE DYNAMICS OF WESTERNIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THE MIDDLE EASTERNERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WERE IN THE POSSESSION OF A CULTURE STILL SUFFICIENTLY SIMILAR IN SEVERAL BASIC ASPECTS TO THE ONE BROUGHT TO THEM BY THE WESTERNERS TO BE ABLE TO RECOGNIZE WITHOUT TOO MUCH DIFFICULTY THAT IN CERTAIN FIELDS THE WEST WAS DEFINITELY AHEAD OF THEM. HAVING FOR CENTURIES USED WATER FOR IRRIGATION, CLAY FOR VESSELS, IRON FOR UTENSILS, WOOL AND COTTON FOR CLOTHING, STONE AND BRICKS FOR BUILDINGS, SHIPS FOR WATER TRANSPORT, ETC., IT WAS MUCH EASIER FOR THEM TO APPRECIATE THE WESTERN IMPROVEMENTS IN THESE AND OTHER SUCH ACTIVITIES THAN FOR THE CARRIERS OF A CULTURE COMPLETELY LACKING THESE ELEMENTS.

GENERALLY SPEAKING, HOWEVER, WESTERNIZATION, IN ITS IMPACT UPON THE TRADITIONAL MIDDLE EASTERN SOCIAL STRUCTURE, RESULTED IN A WIDENING OF THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE TOP AND THE BOTTOM LAYERS OF SOCIETY. PRIOR TO ITS INCEPTION, THE STYLE OF LIFE OF THE NATIVE UPPER CLASS REPRESENTED THE HIGHEST CULMINATION OF WHICH THE LOCAL CULTURE WAS CAPABLE.

ANOTHER CHANGE DUE TO WESTERNIZATION WHICH RESULTED IN AN INCREASED MIGRATION OF VILLAGERS TO THE CITIES WAS THE SLOWLY BUT PERCEPTIBLY IMPROVING SANITARY AND HYGIENIC CONDITIONS, ESPECIALLY IN VILLAGES NOT TOO DISTANT FROM URBAN CENTERS. THESE IMPROVEMENTS ENABLED A LARGER PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN BORN TO SURVIVE AND REACH MATURITY, WITHOUT, FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST, AFFECTING THE TRADITIONALLY HIGH BIRTHRATE OF THE AREA. THIS RESULTED IN A RURAL POPULATION PRESSURE NOT EXPERIENCED BY PREVIOUS GENERATIONS. SOME OF THE SURPLUS POPULATION, UNABLE TO FIND A LIVELIHOOD IN THE VILLAGES, HAD TO MIGRATE TO THE TOWNS, AND FOR LACK OF SKILLS OR OTHER OPPORTUNITIES, SWELLED THE NUMBERS OF THE URBAN PROLETARIAT.

THUS A SOCIAL CLASS CAME INTO BEING WHICH WAS CHARACTERIZED BY A GREATER DISSATISFACTION WITH ITS OWN STATUS THAN ANY POPULATION ELEMENT UNDER TRADITIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. ONE OF THE CAUSES OF THIS PROLETARIAN RESENTMENT HAS BEEN DISCOVERED BY TOYNBEE: THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF BEING DISINHERITED FROM ONE'S ANCESTRAL PLACE IN SOCIETY. ANOTHER IS THE SPATIAL PROXIMITY TO HIGHER SOCIAL CLASSES AND THE FAMILIARITY WITH THEIR STYLE OF LIFE. THE TENSIONS CREATED IN ROOTLESS UNDER-PRIVILEGED GROUPS AS A RESULT OF THIS PROXIMITY--KNOWN FROM MANY OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD--IS AGGRAVATED IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY THE CULTURAL GULF WHICH SEPARATES THE TWO ELEMENTS.

RAPHAEL PATAI IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST, NEW YORK, 1965 (PP. 122-123, 125-126).

1 ISLAMIC DOGMA

"CORRECTNESS AS THE BASIC PURPOSE OF LIFE MAKES FOR AUTHORITARIANISM. DUTIES AND DOCTRINE CAN BE ACCEPTED AS BINDING ONLY WHEN IMPOSED BY, OR DERIVED FROM, A SOURCE THAT IS BEYOND HUMAN QUESTIONING....

"...ISLAM HAS ALWAYS BEEN TRADITIONALIST. THE EXAMPLES TO BE FOLLOWED BELONG TO THE EVER MORE REMOTE PAST. MUHAMMAD'S EARLY FOLLOWERS WERE THE BEST GENERATION; THEIR SUCCESSORS, THE SECOND BEST. FROM THEN ON, THE WORLD HAS BEEN DETERIORATING AND WILL CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE UNTIL IT COMES TO ITS APPOINTED END. THE LIVING GENERATION IS NOT PERMITTED TO CHANGE THE INHERITED WAYS--FOR CHANGE MUST NEEDS BE FOR THE WORSE. INNOVATION IN RELIGIOUS MATTERS (AND RELIGION COVERS EVERYTHING RELEVANT TO THE GOOD LIFE) IS TO BE REJECTED, THE INNOVATOR LIABLE TO PUNISHMENT. THE REFORMER THEREFORE EITHER ADDUCES PROPHETIC OR KORANIC WITNESS FOR HIS PROPOSAL OR ADVOCATES THE RETURN TO THE GOLDEN AGE OF PRIMITIVE ISLAM. THE PATTERN MAY NOT BE ABANDONED OR EVEN MODIFIED; IT MAY ONLY BE STRIPPED OF ACCRETIONS AND FREED OF DISTORTIONS THAT HAVE ACCUMULATED IN THE COURSE OF TIME. THE HEROIC, THE CREATIVE, AGE IS PAST...THE CRITICS FIGHT HARD, IF UNSUCCESSFULLY, TO CONTAIN POETRY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE PRE-ISLAMIC TRADITION AND PREVENT IT FROM ADAPTING TO CHANGED CONDITIONS AND CHANGED EMOTIONS. ONLY IN THE NINTH AND TENTH CENTURIES IS THERE A FEELING OF YOUTHFULNESS IN THE INTELLECTUAL WORLD, A FEELING THAT THE ANCIENTS CAN BE EQUALED AND SURPASSED. FATIMID PROPAGANDA IN AFRICA STRESSES THE YOUTH OF THE DYNASTY AS OPPOSED TO THE DECREPIT REGIME OF THE ABBASID HOUSE IN BAGHDAD. BUT THIS SELF-CONFIDENCE IS FAR FROM BEING SHARED BY ALL AND IT WANES IN THE ELEVENTH CENTURY WITHOUT HAVING AFFECTED THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF LOOKING BACKWARD FOR THE GUIDING IDEALS."

G.E. VON GRUNEBAUM  
ISLAM IN A HUMANISTIC EDUCATION  
THE JOURNAL OF GENERAL EDUCATION,  
IV (1949)

3 ISLAM AND ARAB SOCIETY

"...THE AGE HAD BEGUN TO BE CONCERNED WITH THE HEREAFTER. IT WAS THE FEAR OF THE END, THE TREMBLING BEFORE THE JUDGMENT TO WHICH MUHAMMAD GAVE EXPRESSION IN HIS FIRST INSPIRED UTTERANCES. BY TURNING AWAY FROM THE IDOLS THAT ARE BUT WOOD OR STONE AND ACCEPTING THE TRUTH OF THE ONE AND ONLY GOD, THE CREATOR AND LORD OF HEAVEN AND EARTH, MAN COULD WIN RESCUE FROM THE HORRORS OF THE DAY AND THE ETERNAL PUNISHMENT THAT WAS TO BE METED OUT SOON; FOR IT WAS RESCUE RATHER THAN SALVATION THAT THE AGE CRAVED AND THAT MUHAMMAD OFFERED....

"THE IMMEDIATE MEANS OF ATTAINING THIS RESCUE AND OF MEETING THIS EMERGENCY OF THE IMPENDING CATASTROPHE WAS THE ACCEPTANCE OF MONOTHEISM UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF THE LORD'S AUTHORIZED MESSENGER...SO IT BECAME THE TASK OF THE COMMUNITY TO EVOLVE A COMPREHENSIVE PATTERN FOR A LIFE UNDER GOD, COVERING EVERY PHASE OF HUMAN EXISTENCE FROM CONCEPTION TO BURIAL AND ELIMINATING ANY DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE ASPECTS OF LIFE BY MAKING EVERY INSTANT OF IT RELIGIOUSLY RELEVANT AND REQUIRING RITUALISTIC PERFECTION FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY ACTION WHATSOEVER. IN THIS MANNER BEHAVIOR WAS STEREOTYPED TO A POINT, BUT THE WHOLE OF LIFE, DOWN TO ITS MOST REPULSIVE DETAIL, WAS GIVEN THE SUPREME DIGNITY OF RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE. AND NOT ONLY THE LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO BE TRANSFORMED INTO A SEQUENCE OF DIVINELY REQUIRED ACTS, BUT MUSLIM SOCIETY AS A WHOLE WAS TO BE EQUALLY TRANSFORMED: THE STATE, THE ARMY, THE TREASURY BECAME IN THE TERMINOLOGY OF THE EARLY BELIEVERS THE STATE OF GOD, THE ARMY OF GOD, THE TREASURY OF GOD."

G. E. VON GRUNEBAUM  
ISLAM IN A HUMANISTIC EDUCATION  
THE JOURNAL OF GENERAL EDUCATION,  
IV (1949)

2 SOME REASONS FOR THE GRADUAL STAGNATION OF MIDDLE EASTERN (ARAB-ISLAMIC) SOCIETY


1. SOCIETY BASED ALMOST COMPLETELY ON RELIGION THAT GRADUALLY STAGNATED UNTIL IT BECAME OSSIFIED
  - A. AFTER DEVELOPMENT OF BASIC ISLAMIC DOGMA, RELIGIOUS LEADERS GRADUALLY REFUSED TO TOLERATE CHANGES, REFORM OR EVEN (IN SOME CASES) CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATION OF BASIC DOGMA
  - B. IN SHORT, RELIGIOUS LEADERS OPPOSED MODERNIZATION OF ISLAMIC RELIGION OR SOCIETY
  - C. THE CREATIVE IMPULSES OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION WERE DESTROYED OR EXHAUSTED IN THE PROCESS
2. NEVERTHELESS RELIGION COMPLETELY DOMINATED THE SOCIETY, WHICH IN TURN HAD THE FOLLOWING CONSEQUENCES
  - A. DISCOURAGED DEVELOPMENT OF SECULAR CULTURE
  - B. DISCOURAGED ASSIMILATION OF ANY ASPECT OF ALIEN CULTURE UNRELATED TO CONDUCT OF WAR
  - C. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS GRADUALLY DEGENERATED
3. ULTIMATELY DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF ARAB-ISLAMIC SOCIETY
  - A. STOPPED WHILE WESTERN WORLD ADVANCED
  - B. AND ARAB WORLD BECAME INCREASINGLY ISOLATED FROM SIGNIFICANT CULTURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE REST OF THE WORLD


4 THE ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE

"THE ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE SUFFERED, ON THE OTHER HAND, FROM SERIOUS WEAKNESSES. IT WAS A CULTURE AND A CIVILIZATION OF THE CITY, WHICH CONFIRMED THE ALREADY MARKED URBAN CHARACTER OF THE ORTHODOX CULTURE, ARISING OUT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE ORTHODOX INSTITUTION WITH GOVERNMENT. THE IMMENSE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE CITIES COMPLETED THIS PROCESS BY THE CONCENTRATION OF WEALTH AND INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITIES IN THEM, TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE COUNTRYSIDE, WHICH HAD LITTLE OR NO SHARE IN THE DEVELOPING CIVILIZATION, AND REMAINED DIVIDED FROM THE CITIES BY A WIDENING SOCIAL GULF. FURTHERMORE, EVEN WITHIN THE CITIES, THE INSTABILITY AND INORGANIC CHARACTER OF THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, AND THE SOCIAL TENSIONS WHICH PREVENTED THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS, OFFERED A CONSTANT THREAT TO CULTURAL ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE RANGE OF ORTHODOXY, WHICH ITSELF MAINTAINED AN AMBIGUOUS ATTITUDE TOWARDS THEM. HENCE, WITH ALL THE REMARKABLE INTELLECTUAL ACHIEVEMENT OF THE ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE, ITS FOUNDATIONS REMAINED SHALLOW, ROOTED NEITHER IN THE DEEP SOIL OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT NOR IN STRONG SOCIAL ORGANISMS. IT WAS CONFINED TO A NARROW (IF FOR THE TIME BEING WIDESPREAD AND PROSPEROUS) LAYER OF URBAN SOCIETY, AND DEPENDENT ON TEMPORARY FACTORS. SO LONG AS A FLOURISHING URBAN CIVILIZATION EXISTED, LOCAL RETRACTIONS IN ONE REGION MIGHT BE COUNTERBALANCED BY EXPANSION IN ANOTHER, BUT ITS SURVIVAL WAS BOUND UP WITH THE SURVIVAL OF THE TEMPORARY FACTORS TO WHICH IT OWED ITS EXISTENCE.

"FOR SOME CENTURIES HOWEVER, THE INFLUENCES OF THE ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE REMAINED ACTIVE WITHIN THE ORTHODOX INSTITUTION, AND WERE NOT ENTIRELY CRUSHED OUT BY THE PROCESS OF STANDARDIZATION. INTELLECTUAL ENERGIES FOUND NEW OUTLETS IN PLACE OF PHILOSOPHICAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND SECULAR STUDIES. IT IS INSTRUCTIVE TO OBSERVE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SUNNI REVIVAL MOVEMENT IN SYRIA AND EGYPT UNDER NURADDIN AND SALADIN AND THEIR SUCCESSORS (UNDER WHOM A POWERFUL ORTHODOX BUREAUCRACY MAINTAINED AN EXCEPTIONALLY CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE RULERS). AFTER THE GENERAL DECAY OF CULTURAL LIFE IN THE LATER FATIMID PERIOD, THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ORGANIZED NIZAMIYA TYPE OF EDUCATION BROUGHT AN OUTBURST OF INTELLECTUAL LIFE, LITERATURE AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES OF MANY KINDS, INCLUDING A REVIVAL OF ART AND ARCHITECTURE. FOR TWO CENTURIES THEY REMAINED AT A HIGH LEVEL BEFORE BEGINNING TO BE AFFECTED BY THE GERMS OF DECAY FROM STANDARDIZATION AND THE INCREASING SUBORDINATION OF THE ORTHODOX INSTITUTION TO THE MAMLUK MILITARY ARISTOCRACY."

H.A.R. GIBB  
AN INTERPRETATION OF ISLAMIC HISTORY  
THE MUSLIM WORLD





## GENERAL ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

1 THE MIDDLE EAST: GNP AND POPULATION  
(1966)

	G.N.P. (MILLIONS)	POPULATION (MILLIONS)	G.N.P. PER CAPITA
AFGHANISTAN	1,355	15.4	88
ALGERIA	2,662	12.1	220
IRAN	6,724	25.3	266
IRAQ	2,235	8.3	269
ISRAEL	3,896	2.6	1,482
JORDAN	575	2.0	263
KUWAIT	1,700	0.5	3,400
LEBANON	1,250	2.6	481
LIBYA	1,402	1.7	836
MOROCCO	2,455	13.7	179
SAUDI ARABIA	1,670	4.4	380
SUDAN	1,457	13.9	106
SYRIA	1,101	5.5	200
TUNISIA	931	4.5	209
TURKEY	10,500	31.9	313
U.A.R.	5,075	30.1	169
TOTAL I (EXCLUDING AFGHANISTAN, ISRAEL, KUWAIT, SUDAN, TURKEY, AND THE MAGHREB)	18,630	78.2	238
TOTAL II (EXCLUDING ISRAEL, TURKEY AND THE MAGHREB)	21,685	94.1	231
TOTAL III (JUST ALGERIA, LIBYA, MOROCCO AND TUNISIA-THE MAGHREB)	7,450	32.0	233
TOTAL IV (EXCLUDING SUDAN AND THE MAGHREB)	36,081	128.6	281
TOTAL V (ALL 16 COUNTRIES)	44,988	174.5	258

SOURCE: AID ECONOMIC DATA BOOKS: NEAR EAST AND SOUTH  
ASIA AND AFRICA. DECEMBER, 1968

2 THE MIDDLE EAST: SOME BASIC ECONOMIC DATA

	GNP/ PER CAPITA (1967) (US\$)	AGRICULTURAL LAND PER CAPITA (1969) (ACRES)	LIFE EXPECTANCY (1969) (YEARS)
KUWAIT	3,952	N.A.	N.A.
ISRAEL	1,500	1.1	72
LIBYA	909	14.9	37
LEBANON	633	0.3	N.A.
SAUDI ARABIA	444	44.8	30-40
TURKEY	324	3.8	53
IRAN	285	1.6	N.A.
JORDAN	282	1.5	52
IRAQ	265	3.3	N.A.
ALGERIA	239	7.6	44
TUNISIA	208	5.1	N.A.
SOUTHERN YEMEN	200	18.9	N.A.
SYRIA	200	4.8	30-40
MOROCCO	188	2.5	47
U.A.R.	186	0.2	53
YEMEN	110	N.A.	30-40
SUDAN	110	5.1	40
AFGHANISTAN	85	2.1	N.A.

SOURCE: NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA: ECONOMIC GROWTH  
TRENDS A.I.D., JANUARY, 1970



1 THE MIDDLE EAST POPULATION

	MID-1970 POPULATION (EST.) (IN MILLIONS)	CURRENT POPULATION GROWTH (%)	1985 POPULATION PROJECTION (IN MILLIONS)
AFGHANISTAN	17.0	2.5	25.0
ALGERIA	14.0	3.2	23.9
IRAN	28.4	3.0	45.0
IRAQ	9.7	3.4	16.7
ISRAEL	2.9	2.4	4.0
JORDAN	2.3	3.3	3.9
KUWAIT	0.7	8.3	2.4
LEBANON	2.8	3.0	4.3
LIBYA	1.9	3.1	3.1
MOROCCO	15.7	3.2	26.2
SAUDI ARABIA	7.7	2.8	12.2
SUDAN	15.8	3.2	26.0
SYRIA	6.2	3.3	10.5
TUNISIA	5.1	3.0	8.3
TURKEY	35.6	2.7	52.8
U.A.R.	33.9	2.8	52.3
TOTALS:	199.6		316.6

SOURCE: 1970 WORLD POPULATION DATA SHEET POPULATION  
REFERENCE BUREAU, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C. APRIL, 1970

2 THE MIDDLE EASTERN ECONOMICS  
(RANKED BY 1966 GNP)

1. TURKEY
2. IRAN
3. U.A.R.
4. ISRAEL
5. ALGERIA
6. MOROCCO
7. IRAQ
8. KUWAIT
9. SAUDI ARABIA
10. SUDAN
11. LIBYA
12. AFGHANISTAN
13. LEBANON
14. SYRIA
15. TUNISIA
16. JORDAN

3 THE MIDDLE EASTERN ECONOMICS  
(RANKED BY 1966 POPULATION)

1. TURKEY
2. U.A.R.
3. IRAN
4. AFGHANISTAN
5. SUDAN
6. MOROCCO
7. ALGERIA
8. IRAQ
9. SYRIA
10. TUNISIA
11. SAUDI ARABIA
12. LEBANON
13. ISRAEL
14. JORDAN
15. LIBYA
16. KUWAIT

4 THE MIDDLE EASTERN ECONOMICS  
(RANKED BY 1966 GNP PER CAPITA)

1. KUWAIT
2. ISRAEL
3. LIBYA
4. LEBANON
5. SAUDI ARABIA
6. TURKEY
7. IRAQ
8. IRAN
9. JORDAN
10. ALGERIA
11. TUNISIA
12. SYRIA
13. MOROCCO
14. U.A.R.
15. SUDAN
16. AFGHANISTAN

1 MAJOR EXPORTS OF THE NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA  
1967-1968

(\$ MILLIONS)	
PETROLEUM & PRODUCTS	5,835
COTTON	884
JUTE	649
FRUITS & NUTS	488
TEA	404
TOBACCO	241
POLISHED DIAMONDS*	230

\*ENTIRELY FROM ISRAEL.

2 MAJOR NEAR EASTERN & SOUTH ASIAN PRODUCTS  
(IN PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL FREE WORLD PRODUCTION)

RAW JUTE	90
MICA	80
TEA	71
RAW COTTON	52
RICE	47
WHEAT	37
PETROLEUM	36
TOBACCO	27
OLIVE OIL	24

SOURCE: NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA:  
ECONOMIC GROWTH TRENDS  
U.S.A.I.D. JANUARY, 1970

3 NEAR EAST PETROLEUM PRODUCTION & RESERVES - 1968

	PRODUCTION (MILLION METRIC TONS)	RESERVES (BILLION METRIC TONS)
SAUDI ARABIA	140.8	10.4
KUWAIT	122.0	9.3
IRAN	140.5	7.3
IRAQ	73.8	3.8
TRUCIAL COAST	24.3	2.6
NEUTRAL ZONE	22.9	2.0
QATAR	16.2	0.5
U.A.R.	9.0	0.3

SOURCE: NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA:  
ECONOMIC GROWTH TRENDS  
U.S.A.I.D. JANUARY, 1970

4 FREE WORLD PETROLEUM PRODUCTION & RESERVES - 1968

	(IN PERCENTAGES)	
	PRODUCTION	RESERVES
SAUDI ARABIA	9	19
KUWAIT	9	17
IRAN	8	13
IRAQ	5	7
OTHER NEAR EAST	4	8
U.S.	29	8
NEUTRAL ZONE	4	4
OTHER	35	24

SOURCE: NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA:  
ECONOMIC GROWTH TRENDS  
U.S.A.I.D. JANUARY 1970

1 TOTAL OFFICIAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE RECEIVED BY SELECTED COUNTRIES IN THE NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

(MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

	1967	1968
ALGERIA	103.3	96.1
IRAN	57.1	71.4
ISRAEL	65.8	53.0
JORDAN	50.6	43.3
LIBYA	2.1	2.6
MOROCCO	69.7	108.9
TUNISIA	104.7	75.9
TURKEY	199.9	216.3
U.A.R.	27.2	40.2

SOURCE: DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE  
1969 REVIEW  
OECD, 1969 (PP. 170-171)

NOTE: THIS COVERS ASSISTANCE RECEIVED FROM ALL INTERNATIONAL DONORS NOT JUST THE U.S.

2 SIGNIFICANCE OF OFFICIAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE RECEIVED BY SELECTED NEAR EASTERN AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

	AID AS A PERCENTAGE OF IMPORTS	AID AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP
ALGERIA	16.5	4.2
IRAN	3.8	0.7
ISRAEL	6.7	2.3
JORDAN	30.8	11.8
LIBYA	0.5	0.2
MOROCCO	14.6	3.5
TUNISIA	32.1	8.2
TURKEY	25.6	2.0
U.A.R.	5.1	0.7

SOURCE: DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE  
1969 REVIEW  
OECD 1969 (PP. 168-169)

NOTE: THIS COVERS ASSISTANCE RECEIVED FROM ALL INTERNATIONAL DONORS NOT JUST THE U.S.

3 U.S. AID TO THE NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 1946-1967

(U.S. MILLIONS)

	ECONOMIC AID	MILITARY AID	TOTAL
AFGHANISTAN	341.6	3.3	
ALGERIA	191.7	-	344.9
IRAN	761.1	1,087.3	1,848.4
IRAQ	52.1	46.7	98.8
ISRAEL	754.2	16.4	770.6
JORDAN	556.8	65.9	622.7
KUWAIT	50.0	-	50.0
LEBANON	75.3	8.8	84.1
LIBYA	200.1	16.5	216.6
MOROCCO	535.7	53.4	589.1
SAUDI ARABIA	25.1	192.8	217.0
SOUTHERN YEMEN	-	-	-
SYRIA	62.5	0.1	62.6
TUNISIA	509.5	21.9	531.4
TURKEY	2,246.5	2,879.9	5,126.4
U.A.R.	925.4	-	925.4
YEMEN A.R.	43.9	-	43.9

NOTE: 1. U.S. AID PROGRAM TO KUWAIT ONLY BEGAN IN 1967  
2. ALL STATISTICS REPRESENT CUMULATIVE TOTALS  
LESS REPAYMENT AND INTEREST

SOURCE: U.S. AID ECONOMIC DATA BOOKS FOR  
AFRICA AND THE NEAR EAST

4 U.S. ECONOMIC AID TO THE NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, 1969-1971

(U.S. THOUSANDS)

	FY 1969	FY 1970 (EST.)	FY 1971 (PROPOSED)
AFGHANISTAN	8,773	6,568	6,728
JORDAN	1,491	1,621	1,886
MOROCCO	9,524	8,702	15,944
TUNISIA	9,052	14,241	7,679
TURKEY	43,510	43,700	54,220

NOTE: THIS COVERS ONLY NEW U.S. A.I.D. COMMITMENTS AND DOES NOT INCLUDE FUNDS ORIGINATING FROM PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS. THUS U.S. AID TO JORDAN IN FY 1969 TOTALLED NEARLY \$40 MILLION

SOURCE: NEW YORK TIMES, MARCH 20, 1970

5 MAJOR RECIPIENTS OF U.S. ECONOMIC & MILITARY AID IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE NEAR EAST, 1946-1967 (RANKED BY AID TOTALS)

ECONOMIC	MILITARY
1. TURKEY	1. TURKEY
2. U.A.R.	2. IRAN
3. IRAN	3. SAUDI ARABIA
4. ISRAEL	4. JORDAN
5. JORDAN	5. MOROCCO
6. MOROCCO	6. IRAQ
7. TUNISIA	7. TUNISIA
8. AFGHANISTAN	8. ISRAEL
9. LIBYA	
10. ALGERIA	

THE MIDDLE-EASTERN CONFLICT AND ISRAEL

### 1 CURRENT DIPLOMATIC GOALS ISRAEL

1. FORCE ARAB STATES TO RECOGNIZE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL
  - A. DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ARE SEEN AS AN ADMISSION OF ITS EXISTENCE
  - B. WRITTEN PEACE TREATIES NECESSARY TO INSURE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS
2. OBTAIN DEFENSIBLE BORDERS WITHOUT SIGNIFICANTLY RELINQUISHING LAND HELD PRIOR TO 1967
3. RETAIN SOVEREIGNTY OVER JERUSALEM
4. PREVENT REMILITARIZATION OF GOLAN HEIGHTS AND GAZA STRIP
5. REACH A SOLUTION TO REFUGEE PROBLEM WITHOUT NECESSITY OF ACCEPTING LARGE NUMBER OF ARABS
6. OBTAIN POLITICAL AND MILITARY SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES SO THAT CONQUERED TERRITORIES CAN BE HELD UNTIL A SATISFACTORY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT CAN BE REACHED
7. FACILITATE EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS

### 3 CURRENT DIPLOMATIC GOALS JORDAN

1. RETURN OF THE WEST BANK, ESPECIALLY JERUSALEM
2. PRESERVATION OF THE HASHEMITE THRONE
3. CONTROL OF ACTIONS BY PALESTINIAN GUERRILLAS
4. PRESERVATION OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AGAINST CLAIMS OF ISRAELIS, PALESTINIANS AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES
5. MAINTAIN REASONABLY NORMAL RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AND, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, SYRIA AND IRAQ
6. MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES
7. MINIMIZE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD

### 5 CURRENT DIPLOMATIC GOALS UNITED STATES

1. ATTAINMENT OF TRANQUILITY (IF NOT "PEACE") IN GENERAL MIDDLE EAST REGION
2. REDUCE SOVIET INFLUENCE AND PRESTIGE IN ARAB NATIONS
3. PREVENT RISE OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN COUNTRIES WHERE IT IS NOT NOW PRESENT (E.G., JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA)
4. PRESERVE AMERICAN INFLUENCE AND PRESTIGE IN ARAB COUNTRIES
5. AVOID CONFRONTATION WITH SOVIET UNION
6. PRESERVE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL WITHOUT SERIOUSLY AFFECTING AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES
7. ASSURE SAFETY OF AMERICAN INVESTMENTS IN ARAB COUNTRIES
8. ASSURE SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN SOURCES OF CRUDE OIL

### 2 CURRENT DIPLOMATIC GOALS EGYPT

1. REGAIN CONQUERED TERRITORIES
2. RETAIN LEADERSHIP ROLE VIS-A-VIS OTHER ARAB NATIONS
3. OBTAIN "JUSTICE" FOR PALESTINIAN ARABS
4. GAIN SUFFICIENT POLITICAL AND MILITARY SUPPORT FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO GAIN THESE GOALS (ESPECIALLY 1) WITHOUT CONCESSIONS TO ISRAEL
5. REOPEN SUEZ CANAL
6. RECOVER LOST POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESTIGE
7. AVOID "SATELLITE" STATUS WHILE RECEIVING MASSIVE SOVIET AID

### 4 CURRENT DIPLOMATIC GOALS ARAB TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

1. CONTINUED FREEDOM TO OPERATE AGAINST ISRAEL FROM ARAB SOIL
2. PREVENTION OF ANY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD LEAVE ISRAEL IN EXISTENCE

### 6 CURRENT DIPLOMATIC GOALS SOVIET UNION

1. FORCE ISRAEL TO AGREE TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT FAVORABLE TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES, FOR WHICH THE SOVIET UNION CAN TAKE CREDIT
2. INCREASE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN COUNTRIES WHERE IT IS NOW ESTABLISHED (E.G., EGYPT, SYRIA)
3. REDUCE UNITED STATES INFLUENCE IN GENERAL MIDDLE EAST REGION
4. EXTEND RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN OTHER ARAB STATES, ESPECIALLY OIL-PRODUCING STATES
5. OPEN SUEZ CANAL
6. AVOID CONFRONTATION WITH UNITED STATES
7. SECURE NEW SOURCES OF CRUDE OIL
8. ENGENDER GROWTH OF LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTIES IN VARIOUS ARAB STATES
9. ESTABLISH SECURE SOVIET MILITARY BASES ALONG THE ENTIRE MEDITERRANEAN
10. FOSTER SOVIET INFLUENCE IN PERSIAN GULF AND INDIAN OCEAN AREAS

①

U.N. STATEMENTS ON:ARAB REFUGEES

REFUGEES WISHING TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND LIVE IN PEACE WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO DO SO AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE, AND THAT COMPENSATION SHOULD BE PAID FOR THE PROPERTY OF THOSE CHOOSING NOT TO RETURN.

ARTICLE 11, RESOLUTION 194 (III)  
OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
DECEMBER 11, 1948

THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE SITUATION PREVAILING IN JERUSALEM AS A RESULT OF THE MEASURES TAKEN BY ISRAEL TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF THE CITY,

1. CONSIDERS THAT THESE MEASURES ARE INVALID;
2. CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO RESCIND ALL MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN AND TO DESIST FORTHWITH FROM TAKING ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD ALTER THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM;
3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE SITUATION AND ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION NOT LATER THAN ONE WEEK FROM ITS ADOPTION.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION  
JULY 4, 1967

THE PRE-1967 BOUNDARIES

"THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE IS NOT TO BE CONSTRUED IN ANY SENSE AS A POLITICAL OR TERRITORIAL BOUNDARY AND IS DELINEATED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND POSITIONS OF EITHER PARTY AS REGARDS THE ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM."

1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

④

ONE SUGGESTED FIRST STEP

NEED FOR FACTUAL SURVEY: THE FIRST STAGE IN ANY FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM WILL HAVE TO BE A THOROUGH FACTUAL SURVEY, THAT WILL REVEAL HOW MANY BONA-FIDE REFUGEES THERE ACTUALLY ARE AND WHAT THE REAL EXTENT IS OF THEIR ABSORPTION. ONLY THEN CAN ANY SERIOUS AND PRACTICAL PLANNING BE DONE TO REHABILITATE THOSE THAT STILL NEED IT, AND TO START WINDING UP A TWENTY-YEAR RELIEF OPERATION.

ISRAEL POLICY BACKGROUND STATEMENT  
NOVEMBER 29, 1969

②

THE CORE OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE

1. ISRAEL REFUSES TO ACCEPT ANY SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE ITS EXISTENCE AS AN INDEPENDENT, JEWISH STATE
2. ARAB COUNTRIES REFUSE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL UNTIL THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE QUESTION HAS BEEN RESOLVED
3. PALESTINIAN REFUGEE LEADERS REFUSE TO ACCEPT ANY SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL NOT RESULT IN AN ARAB PALESTINE CONTAINING ALL OF WHAT IS NOW ISRAEL

③

THE MAIN ISSUES IN DISPUTE

1. PEACE TREATY VS. NON-BELLIGERENCE
2. RESETTLEMENT (WITH COMPENSATION) VS. REPATRIATION (FOR ARAB REFUGEES)
3. WITHDRAWAL TO "SECURE BOUNDARIES" VS. TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FROM CONQUERED TERRITORIES
4. "JEWISH" JERUSALEM VS. "ARAB" JERUSALEM VS. INTERNATIONALIZATION

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A PEACE TREATY

"NASSER PERHAPS VISUALIZES A RELATION WITH ISRAEL SIMILAR TO THAT PREVAILING BETWEEN WEST GERMANY AND EAST GERMANY. THERE IS NO BELLIGERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES; THERE IS MOVEMENT OF MEN AND GOODS BETWEEN THEM; THERE IS SOME KIND OF DE FACTO MUTUAL RECOGNITION, BUT LEGALLY, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN AND COULD PRESUMABLY BE SETTLED ONE DAY TO THE SATISFACTION OF WEST GERMANY IF DIPLOMATIC CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD PERMIT. IN THE MEANTIME, WEST GERMANY'S REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMACY OF EAST GERMANY PERMITS IT TO LIMIT THE DEALINGS OF THIRD PARTIES WITH ITS ANTAGONIST (THE HALLSTEIN DOCTRINE, FOR INSTANCE) AND THUS TO RESTRICT ITS DEVELOPMENT AND DENY IT GENERAL ACCEPTANCE BY THE WORLD. TO REALIZE HOW CRUCIAL THIS LAST POINT COULD BE IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONTEXT, ONE NEED ONLY CONSIDER HOW GREATLY A FORMAL PEACE WOULD FACILITATE THE PROSPECTS OF A MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL (OTHERWISE RULED OUT BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE IMPLICATED IN A LEGALLY OPEN DISPUTE), AND HOW MUCH EASIER IT WOULD MAKE IT FOR RUSSIA TO ALLOW ITS JEWS TO EMIGRATE TO ISRAEL.

IT CAN BE SEEN FROM ALL THIS THAT THE QUESTION OF A PEACE TREATY AS AGAINST SOME OTHER TYPE OF SETTLEMENT IS NOT A MATTER OF FORM BUT IS RATHER A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE, NOT LESS, IF NOT MORE, IMPORTANT THAN THE CONTENT OF THE SETTLEMENT ITSELF. THIS IS WHY ISRAEL HAS CONTINUED TO INSIST ON A FORMAL PEACE TREATY..."

"THE ALTERNATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST"  
NADAV SAFRAN  
COMMENTARY, MAY 1969

① WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORIES  
THE ARAB VIEW

1. ALL CONQUERED TERRITORIES MUST BE RETURNED
2. NO NEGOTIATIONS CAN TAKE PLACE WITH ISRAEL AS LONG AS IT RETAINS CONQUERED TERRITORY
3. NO LONG TERM DEMILITARIZED ZONES IN SINAI OR THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

③ THE ARAB REFUGEES  
THE ARAB VIEW

1. ARAB REFUGEES OF 1948 LEFT BECAUSE OF THREATS BY JEWISH TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND TO ESCAPE THE HAZARDS OF WAR, WITH EVERY EXPECTATION OF RETURNING WHEN THE FIGHTING STOPPED
2. ASSETS LEFT BEHIND BY THE REFUGEES SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THEM, WITH INTEREST
3. PALESTINIAN ARABS HAVE A RIGHT TO THEIR OWN LAND, AND THAT LAND IS ALL OF ISRAEL
4. THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES IS OVER ONE AND A HALF MILLION PEOPLE, AND THOSE WHO ARE OFFSPRING OF THE REFUGEES OF 1948 HAVE NOT LOST THEIR BIRTHRIGHT
5. THOSE WHO HAVE JOBS, OR WHO ARE IN CAMPS, STILL CLAIM THE RIGHT TO RESIDE IN PALESTINE
6. PALESTINIAN GROUPS FIGHTING ISRAEL ARE INDEPENDENT GROUPS, OFTEN OPPOSING THE POLICIES OF MANY ARAB GOVERNMENTS
7. ARAB STATES DO NOT HAVE THE ECONOMIC RESOURCES TO ABSORB THE REFUGEES

⑤ JERUSALEM  
THE ARAB VIEW

1. JERUSALEM IS THE THE THIRD HOLIEST CITY IN ISLAM AND ARABS WHO DO NOT WISH TO ACKNOWLEDGE ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE ARE EFFECTIVELY DENIED ACCESS TO THEIR HOLY PLACES
2. ARAB CONTROL OF THE OLD SECTOR OF JERUSALEM MUST BE RESTORED
3. ONCE PEACE IS REACHED, JERUSALEM WILL BE OPEN TO ALL
4. JORDAN REJECTS ANY INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE OLD SECTOR OF JERUSALEM, BUT THE POSITION OF OTHER COUNTRIES IS NOT THAT CLEAR
5. ONLY ARAB CONTROL CAN GUARANTEE THAT ISLAMIC SHRINES WILL BE SATISFACTORILY MAINTAINED AND DEFENDED FROM SENSELESS ATTACK.

② WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORIES  
THE ISRAELI VIEW

1. THE PRE-1967 BORDERS WERE NOT MILITARILY SECURE. THE NOVEMBER 22, 1967 U.N. RESOLUTION, WHICH CALLS FOR SECURE BORDERS, THUS DOES NOT OBLIGATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL TERRITORIES
2. WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORIES IS POSSIBLE ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, WHICH MUST BE REACHED BEFORE ANY WITHDRAWALS OCCUR
3. FOR SECURITY REASONS SHARM EL SHEIKH, GOLAN HEIGHTS AND CERTAIN AREAS OF THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN MUST REMAIN IN ISRAELI CONTROL. (CONCEIVABLY, DEMILITARIZED STATUS WITH A U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR SHARM EL SHEIKH AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS)

THE ARAB REFUGEES  
THE ISRAELI VIEW

1. ARAB REFUGEES OF 1948 LEFT UPON THE URGING OF ARAB LEADERS, DESPITE JEWISH PLEAS THAT THEY STAY
2. ASSETS LEFT BEHIND BY THE REFUGEES ARE BALANCED BY ASSETS LEFT BEHIND BY JEWISH REFUGEES FROM ARAB LANDS
3. REPATRIATION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF ARAB REFUGEES IS IMPOSSIBLE BOTH FOR SECURITY REASONS AND BECAUSE SUCH REPATRIATION WOULD THREATEN THE JEWISH CHARACTER OF THE STATE
4. THE NUMBER OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES HAS BEEN INFLATED BY ARAB PROPAGANDISTS, WITH DECEASED PALESTINIANS CARRIED ON THE REFUGEE ROLLS
5. MOST OF THE REFUGEES HAVE GAINFUL OCCUPATIONS AND THOSE IN CAMPS SHOULD (FOR THE MOST PART) BE RESETTLED IN OTHER ARAB LANDS
6. ARAB TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ARE A CREATION OF THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND WOULD SOON WITHER AWAY IF GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT WERE WITHDRAWN
7. ARAB STATES HAVE THE LAND TO ABSORB THE REFUGEES AND ISRAEL IS WILLING TO PROVIDE COMPENSATION WHICH WILL ALLOW ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES TO BE OVERCOME
8. ARAB STATES HAVE USED REFUGEE CAMPS FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES AND HAVE NOT REALLY ATTEMPTED TO ABSORB THE REFUGEES AND ELIMINATE THE CAMPS.

⑥ JERUSALEM  
THE ISRAELI VIEW

1. JEWS WERE DENIED ENTRANCE TO THEIR HOLY PLACES FOR NEARLY TWENTY YEARS. THIS MUST NEVER HAPPEN AGAIN
2. JERUSALEM UNTIL 1948 WAS ALWAYS A UNITED CITY, AND MUST REMAIN ONE IN THE FUTURE
3. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF A CITY HAS NEVER BEEN SUCCESSFUL
4. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE ENTIRE CITY WOULD MEAN ACTUAL LOSS TO ISRAEL OF TERRITORY, NAMELY THE NEW SECTOR OF JERUSALEM, WHICH HAS BEEN UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL SINCE 1948
5. JEWS HAVE CONSTITUTED A MAJORITY OF JERUSALEM'S RESIDENTS FOR MORE THAN 70 YEARS, AND A PLURALITY FOR DECADES BEFORE THAT
6. UNDER JORDANIAN CONTROL JEWISH SHRINES WERE NOT CARED FOR AND JEWISH CEMETARIES AND SYNAGOGUES WERE DESECRATED

## THE ISSUES DEBATED

1

A MODERN JEWISH PROPHET

"IT IS NOT ABSURD TO IMAGINE ARAB LEADERS EVIDENTLY URGING 'A RETURN TO THE FRONTIER OF 1966 OR 1967,' JUST AS THEY NOW WAGE A RETURN TO THE FRONTIER OF 1947 WHICH THEY ONCE SET ASIDE BY FORCE."

ABBA EBAN, "REALITY AND VISION IN THE MIDDLE EAST,"  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JULY 1965

2

AN ARAB OFFER

"CONSIDER THIS, FOR EXAMPLE: IF, BEFORE THE WAR, ON THE FIRST OF JUNE, 1967, THE ARABS HAD AGREED TO TERMINATE THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY WITH ISRAEL, TO PROVIDE HER WITH GUARANTEED ACCESS TO SHARM EL-SHEIK AND THE SUEZ CANAL, TO RECOGNIZE HER RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY, AND TO AGREE TO PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD FINALLY SOLVE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM--IF THE ARABS HAD AGREED TO SUCH TERMS ON THE FIRST OF JUNE, 1967, SUCH A MOVE WOULD HAVE BEEN SO DRAMATIC AND SUCH A CONCESSION ON THE PART OF THE ARABS THAT ISRAEL WOULD VERY LIKELY HAVE FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE NOT TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE MAGNANIMITY OF THE OFFER; AND SO WOULD EVERYONE ELSE IN THE WORLD.

"THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT THE ARABS ARE MAKING ISRAEL THAT SAME OFFER TODAY, AND THE ISRAELIS ARE REJECTING IT."

KING HUSSEIN, SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB,  
APRIL 10, 1969.

AN ISRAELI REPLY

"WE READ THESE WORDS (HUSSEIN'S OFFER) IN BEWILDERMENT. ACCORDING TO CONCEPTS CUSTOMARY AMONG CIVILIZED NATIONS, PEACE IS NOT A FAVOR BESTOWED BY ONE PARTY UPON THE OTHER. EVEN BY THE LIGHTS OF HUSSEIN, WE MUST ASK: WHY DID HE NOT MAKE THIS PROPOSAL TO US? THE ANSWER IS WELL KNOWN: ON JUNE 1, 1967, THE ARAB RULERS WERE THOROUGHLY OCCUPIED IN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, HOPING THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO DESTROY US ONCE AND FOR ALL, AS THEY HAVE THEMSELVES DECLARED.... NO ONE CAN TURN THE WHEEL BACK TO THE POSITION OF JUNE 1, 1967, JUST AS NO ONE CAN BRING BACK TO LIFE OUR DEAR ONES WHO WERE KILLED IN JUNE, 1967, IN A WAR WHICH THE ARAB LEADERS--HEADED BY NASSER, JOINED BY THE JORDANIAN KING--FORCED UPON ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES...."

PREMIER GOLDA MEIR, SPEECH TO THE KNESSET, MAY 5, 1969.

3

NASSER'S VIEWS:  
THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM

JERUSALEM IS A HOLY CITY OF MOSLEMS, CHRISTIANS, AND JEWS. NO ONE SHOULD BE DEPRIVED OF HIS RELIGIOUS RIGHTS. IN ANY INTERNATIONALIZATION, THE JEWS, WITH A WELL-ORGANIZED AND RICH WORLDWIDE COMMUNITY, MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF US. WE ARE FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM ARAB JERUSALEM. WITHOUT THAT, THERE CAN BE NO PEACE.

ON DEMILITARIZATION OF THE SINAI

ON THE PERMANENT DEMILITARIZATION OF SINAI, WE  
REFUSE.

THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL

I ACCEPT THE REALITY OF ISRAEL, AND SO WILL MY PEOPLE, IF THERE IS A HUMANITARIAN SOLUTION, CALL IT ISRAEL, OR WHATEVER THEY WANT TO CALL IT, AND I WILL RECOGNIZE IT.

PRESIDENT GAMAL NASSER  
INTERVIEW, TIME  
MAY 16, 1969



## ① "ARAB JERUSALEM"

"MOREOVER, ANY PLAN FOR WITHDRAWAL MUST INCLUDE OUR GREATEST CITY--OUR SPIRITUAL CAPITAL, THE HOLY CITY OF JERUSALEM. TO US--CHRISTIAN AND MOSLEM ARAB ALIKE--JERUSALEM IS AS SACRED AS IT IS TO THE JEWS. AND WE CANNOT IMAGINE ANY SETTLEMENT THAT DOES NOT INCLUDE THE RETURN OF THE ARAB PART OF THE CITY OF JERUSALEM TO US WITH ALL OUR HOLY PLACES."

KING HUSSEIN, SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, APRIL 10, 1969.

"ARAB JERUSALEM": ISRAEL'S ATTITUDE

"HUSSEIN... (TALKS) ABOUT ARAB JERUSALEM. SINCE WHEN HAS THE CITY BEEN UNDER ARAB RULE? JORDANIAN RULE WAS IMPOSED ON PART OF JERUSALEM BY VIOLENCE. THE JORDANIAN ARMY EXPELLED JEWS FROM THE OLD CITY, DESECRATED JEWISH SHRINES, AND DESTROYED SYNAGOGUES AND CEMETERIES. THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IT SIGNED. JEWS WERE DEPRIVED OF THE RIGHT TO WORSHIP AT THE HOLY SITES THAT ARE DEEPLY ANCHORED IN JEWISH HISTORY, LONG BEFORE THE ARABS CAME TO THE LAND."

PREMIER GOLDA MEIR, SPEECH TO THE KNESSET, MAY 5, 1969.

③ NASSER ON "DIRECT" NEGOTIATIONS

"NO ARAB CAN NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL WHEN THEY OCCUPY ONE SEVENTH OF OUR TERRITORY, OUR EGYPTIAN TERRITORY. EVERY ARAB KNOWS THAT ISRAEL WANTS TO NEGOTIATE NOW DIRECTLY AS THE VICTORIOUS POWER, STILL IN POSSESSION OF OUR ARAB TERRITORY. TO ACCEPT NEGOTIATIONS UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS IS NOT TO NEGOTIATE, BUT TO CAPITULATE."

PRESIDENT GAMAL NASSER  
INTERVIEW, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT  
MAY 18, 1970

⑤ "LAND AND 'PEOPLE'"

IF ISRAEL AGREES ON TWO MAIN POINTS, THIS WILL SOLVE THE PROBLEM. THE POINTS ARE LAND--WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORY--AND PEOPLE--THE PALESTINIANS MUST HAVE THE CHOICE OF RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES.

PRESIDENT GAMAL NASSER  
INTERVIEW, TIME  
MAY 16, 1969

② THE POPULATION OF JERUSALEM THROUGH THE YEARS

YEAR	JEWS	MOSLEMS	CHRISTIANS	TOTAL
1844	7,120	5,000	3,390	15,510 <sup>1</sup>
1876	12,000	7,560	5,470	25,030 <sup>2</sup>
1896	20,112	8,440	8,760	37,312 <sup>3</sup>
1904	40,000	7,000	13,000	60,000 <sup>4</sup>
1913	48,400	10,505	16,750	75,200 <sup>5</sup>
1922	33,921	13,413	14,699	62,033 <sup>6</sup>
1931	51,272	19,894	19,335	90,501 <sup>7</sup>
1948	100,000	40,000	25,000	165,000 <sup>8</sup>
1967	195,700	54,963	12,646	263,309 <sup>9</sup>
1968	210,000	55,000	13,000	278,000 <sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup>ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, EIGHTH EDITION (1853-1860)

<sup>2</sup>LIEVIN DE HAMME, PERE: GUIDE INDICATEUR DES SANCTUAIRES ET LIEUX-HISTORIQUES DE LA TERRE-SAINTE, 1876

<sup>3</sup>CALENDAR OF PALESTINE FOR THE YEAR 5656 (1895/6)

<sup>4</sup>ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, ELEVENTH EDITION (1910-1911)

<sup>5</sup>CALENDAR OF PALESTINE FOR THE YEARS 5673-74 (1912/13, 1913/14)

<sup>6</sup>GOVERNMENT CENSUS OF PALESTINE 1922

<sup>7</sup>GOVERNMENT CENSUS OF PALESTINE 1931

<sup>8</sup>Z. VILNAY: JERUSALEM--THE OLD CITY, 1962

<sup>9</sup>ISRAEL CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS

<sup>10</sup>JERUSALEM MUNICIPALITY

④ THE SIGNIFICANCE OF "DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS"

"THERE ARE SOME WHO OBJECT AND ATTEMPT TO REFUTE OUR ATTITUDE ON THE QUESTION OF PEACE. THEY ASK: WHY INSIST ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AND MUTUALLY SIGNED PEACE TREATIES? WHY PLACE SO MUCH TRUST IN SIGNATURES OF ARAB RULERS AFTER THEY HAVE VIOLATED AGREEMENTS ALL THESE YEARS?...WE ARE WELL AWARE HOW ARAB PEOPLES ARE BEING EDUCATED TO HATRED AND TO ASPIRATIONS OF VENGEANCE AND DESTRUCTION. IT IS JUST BECAUSE OF THIS POISONOUS EDUCATION THAT HAS BEEN CONTINUING FOR TWENTY YEARS THAT WE ATTRIBUTE EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FIRST RANK TO THE VERY FACT OF DIRECT CONVERSATIONS, LEADING TO THE MUTUAL SIGNATURE OF PEACE TREATIES."

PREMIER GOLDA MEIR, SPEECH TO THE KNESSET, MAY 5, 1969.

⑥ ISRAEL'S ATTITUDE REGARDING REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES

"...THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED SINCE ISRAEL OFFERED TO ACCEPT 100,000 ARAB REFUGEES AS PART OF A GENERAL PEACE SETTLEMENT. THAT OFFER HAD BEEN MADE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE WAR OF LIBERATION. CHILDREN WHO WERE FIVE OR TEN YEARS OLD THEN WOULD NOW BE 18 AND 23. TO ADMIT THEM NOW WOULD BE TO ADMIT AN ARMY THAT HAD BEEN BROUGHT UP WITH A SINGLE AIM: TO DESTROY THIS STATE AND THE PEOPLE LIVING IN IT."

--GOLDA MEIR  
JERUSALEM POST, MARCH 22, 1961

## THE OPPOSING FORCES: JUNE 1967

	ISRAEL	EGYPT	EGYPT, SYRIA AND JORDAN	(EGYPT+SYRIA+JORDAN) (ISRAEL)
ARMED FORCES UPON MOBILIZATION	275,000	210,000	335,000	1.2 : 1
TANKS AND ASSAULT GUNS	1,050 <sup>1</sup>	1,300	2,100	2.0 : 1
SUPERSONIC FIGHTER-BOMBERS AND INTERCEPTORS <sup>2</sup>	116	258	298	2.6 : 1
SUBSONIC FIGHTER-BOMBERS <sup>3</sup>	150	100	168	1.1 : 1
LIGHT BOMBERS <sup>4</sup>	24	43	47	2.0 : 1
MEDIUM BOMBERS <sup>5</sup>		30	45	(45.0 vs. 0)
DESTROYERS	2	6	6	3.0 : 1
SUBMARINES	4	9	9	2.3 : 1

<sup>1</sup> INCLUDING 150 LIGHT TANKS, NOT FOUND IN ARAB COUNTRIES.

<sup>2</sup> MIG-21, SUKHOI-7; MIG-19; MIRAGE-III; SUPER-MYSTERE.

<sup>3</sup> MIG-15/17; HAWKER-HUNTER; MYSTERE IVA; OURAGAN; AS WELL AS 60 ISRAELI FOUCA MAGISTER TRAINERS.

<sup>4</sup> IL-28; VAULTOUR IIA.

<sup>5</sup> TU-16.

TABLE 21  
"FROM WAR TO WAR: THE ARAB-ISRAELI  
CONFRONTATION 1948-1967"  
NADAV SAFRAN

3

## ISRAELI ARMED FORCES

## 1. A "PEOPLE'S ARMY"

- A. ALMOST ENTIRE ADULT POPULATION PERFORMS MILITARY SERVICE
- B. FEW "CLASS" DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN
- C. HIGH MORALE

## 2. A MODERN FIGHTING FORCE

- A. HIGHLY ADAPTIVE--WEAPONS ARE MODIFIED TO MAKE THEM MORE APPROPRIATE FOR USE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
- B. HEAVY USE OF MODERN SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY
- C. STRESS IS ON MOBILITY AND OFFENSIVE TACTICS

5

## THE "BALANCE OF POWER"

BY EARLY 1967 THE BALANCE WAS BEING TIPPED IN FAVOUR OF THE ARABS, AND IN ANY EVENT CONFERRED NO STABILITY. ON BOTH HER SINAI AND WEST BANK FRONTIERS, ISRAEL HAD NO NATURAL DEFENSES; AND HER AIRFIELDS, FEW IN NUMBER, WERE ONLY MINUTES AWAY FROM THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE. FOR THESE REASONS, THE ARMS 'BALANCE' PROVED PERHAPS THE SINGLE MOST DESTABILIZING FACTOR IN THE WHOLE CRISIS: THIS INSTABILITY GAVE ISRAEL NO CHOICE BUT TO LAUNCH A PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK IN THE FACE OF EGYPTIAN ARMOUR MASSES IN THE SINAI DESERT; AND IT HELPED MAKE THE OUTCOME OF THE INITIAL AIR BATTLE DECISIVE FOR THE WAR AS A WHOLE, BY PERMITTING THE DESTRUCTION OF THREE ARAB AIR FORCES THROUGH SWIFT SURPRISE ATTACK WITH HIGH-PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT. THROUGH THE SOVIET UNION WAS FELT IMPULSED FOR HER OWN REASONS TO REARM THE ARABS, THE CONCEPT OF AN 'ARMS BALANCE' IN AN AREA AS SMALL AND VOLATILE AS THE MIDDLE EAST IS AN ILLUSION. AND THIS THE SOVIET UNION KNOWS.

ROBERT HUNTER  
THE SOVIET DILEMMA IN THE MIDDLE EAST

PART I: PROBLEMS OF COMMITMENT  
ADELPHI PAPER # 59, SEPTEMBER 1969

ISRAELI BOUNDARIES:  
BEFORE AND AFTER JUNE 1967

## ARAB ARMED FORCES

## 1. MORE CLASSIC FIGHTING FORCE

- A. MANY MEN OF THE UPPER SOCIAL STRATA ARE ABLE TO AVOID MILITARY SERVICE
- B. GREAT "CLASS" DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN
- C. UNCERTAIN MORALE (ESPECIALLY IN DEFEAT)

## 2. A MORE TRADITIONAL FIGHTING FORCE

- A. VERY UNADAPTIVE--SOVIET TANK CAPTURED IN DESERT FIGHTING STILL CONTAINED HEATERS BUILT FOR USE DURING EUROPEAN WINTERS
- B. SOVIET TECHNICIANS ARE NECESSARY TO USE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY, ARAB PILOTS CANNOT FLY MODERN MIG FIGHTERS VERY WELL
- C. STRESS IS ON STATIC DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE TACTICS

6

## A CAUSE FOR ARAB MILITARY INEFFECTIVENESS

"MODERN SOCIAL SCIENCE HAS LONG SINCE DISPROVED THE EFFICACY OF SUCH TRADITIONAL MARTIAL VIRTUES AS FIERCENESS, HATRED, CRUELTY, AND MANHOOD; RATHER, THE ROOTS OF MODERN MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS HAVE BEEN LOCATED IN FACTORS LIKE SOCIAL COHESION, AFFECTIVE INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS, DIFFUSION OF TRUST, INTEGRATION IN THE LARGER SOCIETY, AND CO-OPERATIVE ABILITY. NO AMOUNT OF MILITARY HARDWARE CAN ALTER THE FACT THAT THE ARABS ARE STILL EXCEEDINGLY INSECURE, LIVING IN DISINTEGRATING SOCIETIES SUFFUSED WITH VIOLENCE, HOSTILITY, AND MUTUAL DISTRUST OF FELLOW ARABS. LARGE AMOUNTS OF HARDWARE MAY ACTUALLY AGGRAVATE THIS CONDITION: RECENT REPORTS FROM CAIRO SPEAK OF A GRIM DETERMINATION BY THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY TO WELD ITS BACKWARD MANPOWER TO THE SOPHISTICATED SOVIET EQUIPMENT BY AN UNPRECEDENTED RESORT TO INTIMIDATION AND PHYSICAL ASSAULT.

GIL CARL ALROY, "THE PROSPECTS OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST," COMMENTARY, MARCH 1969

① SOVIET MILITARY AID IN THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE JUNE 1967

	COMBAT AIRCRAFT	TANKS	GUNS*	MISSILE BOATS
EGYPT	500	1300	1200	8
SYRIA	205	650	800	0
IRAQ	≈205	100	300	0

\* MAINLY 120 MM. AND 160 MM. HEAVY MORTARS.

(AS REPORTED IN AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY,  
JUNE 1, 1970.)

② CHANGES IN AIRCRAFT INVENTORIES  
(BOMBERS AND FIGHTER BOMBERS)  
JUNE 11, 1967 - JUNE 1, 1970

	JUNE 11, 1967	JUNE 1, 1970
SOVIET UNION*	0	100
EGYPT	100	600
SYRIA	55	260
IRAQ	≈ 25	230
JORDAN	0	40
ISRAEL	280	330

(AS REPORTED IN AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY,  
JUNE 1, 1970.)

\* FIGURES REPRESENT SOVIET AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED IN  
MIDDLE EAST REGION.

③ THE MILITARY BALANCE--JULY 1969

	TOTAL ARMED FORCES (REG./MOBILIZED*)	ARMY	COMBAT AIRCRAFT	TANKS
ISRAEL	22,500/290,000	11,500/268,000	275	1020
EGYPT	207,000 (INCLUDING MOBILIZED RESERVES)	180,000	400	830
JORDAN	55,000	53,000	11	330
SYRIA	70,500	60,000	145	450
TOTAL ARAB	332,500	293,000	556	1610

\* MOBILIZATION IS COMPLETED WITHIN 48-72 HOURS.

FROM THE MILITARY BALANCE 1969-70, INSTITUTE FOR  
STRATEGIC STUDIES.

④ COMMENTS ON THE PREVIOUS CHARTS

1. ISRAELI RESERVISTS ARE ROUGHLY COMPARABLE, IN FIGHTING ABILITY, WITH THE REGULAR FORCES. THIS IS NOT CLEARLY TRUE FOR EGYPTIAN RESERVISTS.
2. FIGURES ON THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT POSSESSED BY EACH SIDE ARE MISLEADING.
  - A. ISRAELIS HAVE MANY MORE PILOTS CAPABLE OF FLYING PLANES IN COMBAT (SOME 800 AS COMPARED TO 50 FOR THE EGYPTIANS).
  - B. SPEED WITH WHICH PLANES CAN BE SERVICED, REFUELED AFTER COMBAT IS ALSO SIGNIFICANT. HERE, TOO, ISRAEL APPEARS ABLE TO SERVICE ITS AIRCRAFT MUCH MORE READILY THAN THE ARABS.
3. FIGURES FOR JORDAN DO NOT INCLUDE 10,000 IRAQI TROOPS NOW STATIONED ON JORDANIAN SOIL, NOR THE INDETERMINANT NUMBER OF ARAB FEDAYEEN OPERATING FROM JORDAN.
4. MANY ISRAELI AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN USED 15-20 YEARS, AND ARE IN NEED OF PROMPT REPLACEMENT.

⑤ A NEW ELEMENT

"IN TALKING ABOUT THE FORCES OF THE ARAB STRUGGLE, I MUST STRESS THE GLORIOUS ACTIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE FORCES. THE RISE OF THESE RESISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS, THE CRYSTALLIZING OF THEIR OBJECTIVES AND THE EXPANSION OF THEIR ACTIVITIES ARE ONE OF THE CONSPICUOUS FEATURES OF THE PERIOD AFTER JUNE 1967. THESE ORGANIZATIONS RAISED A FLAMING TORCH AT A TIME OF DARKNESS AND DESPAIR... THEY FULFILL A VITAL TASK IN SAPPING THE ENEMY'S STRENGTH AND SPILLING HIS BLOOD."

PRESIDENT GAMAL NASSER  
SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL  
ASSEMBLY OF THE UAR  
JANUARY 20, 1969

## THE MILITARY IN ISRAEL

### ① GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MILITARY

1. SIZE OF THE STANDING ARMY IS (RELATIVELY) SMALL
2. SIZE OF THE RESERVE FORCES, HOWEVER, IS LARGE
3. IN TIMES OF CRISIS MOBILIZATION OF RESERVES IS QUITE RAPID (A FEW DAYS)
4. WOMEN ARE DRAFTED AS WELL AS MEN. (BUT THOSE WHO DO NOT WISH TO SERVE, FOR RELIGIOUS REASONS, MAY PERFORM ALTERNATE CIVILIAN SERVICE)
5. NO ARABS ARE ACCEPTED INTO THE MILITARY, BUT CHRISTIANS AND DRUZE CAN (AND DO) VOLUNTEER

### ③ INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY

1. ALMOST THE ENTIRE ADULT JEWISH POPULATION ENTERS MILITARY SERVICE
2. RESERVE UNITS ARE ON ACTIVE DUTY AT LEAST ONE MONTH A YEAR
3. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF MANY JEWS OF ORIENTAL ORIGIN HAS BEEN RAISED IN THE COURSE OF THEIR MILITARY SERVICE
4. SUCCESSFUL MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE ACHIEVED HIGH GOVERNMENTAL POSTS:
  - A. M. DAYAN - CURRENT MINISTER OF DEFENSE
  - B. E. WEIZMAN - CURRENT MINISTER OF TRANSPORT
  - C. I. RABIN - CURRENT AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES
5. DEFENSE COSTS ARE A MAJOR FACTOR IN UNFAVORABLE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
6. EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO MAKE ISRAEL LESS DEPENDENT UPON OUTSIDE SOURCES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT

### ⑤ ISRAEL'S ABILITY TO FIGHT A LONG WAR

"THE FACT IS THAT ISRAEL CANNOT REMAIN AT FULL MOBILIZATION FOR A LONG PERIOD WITHOUT SERIOUSLY DAMAGING ITS ECONOMY. 'EGYPT HAS A LARGE STANDING ARMY AND CAN AFFORD TO REMAIN MOBILIZED FOR A LONG TIME. WE, ON THE OTHER HAND, CAN'T,' SAYS A HIGH OFFICIAL OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT.

"IN ISRAEL, FULL MOBILIZATION MEANS THAT MORE THAN 25% OF THE WORK FORCE MUST BE CALLED TO SERVE IN THE ARMY, PUTTING SUCH A DRAG ON THE ECONOMY THAT IT SLOWS TO A CREEP. ALREADY IN TEL AVIV AND ELSEWHERE, SOME BANKS AND OTHER FACILITIES HAVE LOST SO MANY PEOPLE IN THE RESERVE CALL-UP THAT THEY HAVE BEEN FORCED TO SHUT THEIR DOORS.

"THOSE LEFT AT HOME CAN FILL SOME OF THE OPENINGS CREATED BY MOBILIZATION, OF COURSE, BUT NOT AS MANY AS MIGHT ORDINARILY BE EXPECTED. FOR ONE THING, ISRAEL HAS MADE A POINT OF DEVELOPING INDUSTRIES BASED ON BRAINPOWER AND HIGHLY SPECIALIZED SKILLS, AND WHILE A STUDENT CAN PICK FRUIT IN PLACE OF A RESERVIST CALLED FOR DUTY, HE CAN HARDLY STEP INTO THE SHOES OF A DIAMOND CUTTER OR POLISHER (ONE OF ISRAEL'S MOST LUCRATIVE EARNERS OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE) OR A SCIENTIST. THUS, THE 'BRAINPOWER' SEGMENT OF ISRAELI INDUSTRY WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HARD-HIT BY AN EXTENDED WAR.

#### "TOURISM HURT

"SO WOULD TOURISM...THE LONGER THE WAR, THE LESS ISRAEL WILL BE GETTING FROM THIS SOURCE."

### ② GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS ( CONTO. )

1. NAVAL FORCES ARE SMALL
2. AIR FORCE HAS PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN PAST MILITARY SUCCESSSES
3. QUALITY OF OFFICERS IS QUITE HIGH
4. OFFICERS LEAD THEIR TROOPS INTO BATTLE MORE OFTEN THAN IS DONE BY MOST OTHER ARMIES
5. AS A RESULT, IN ACTUAL MILITARY ENCOUNTERS THE PERCENTAGE OF OFFICERS KILLED OR WOUNDED IS RELATIVELY HIGH
6. RELATIONS BETWEEN OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN IS VERY INFORMAL

### ④ THE MILITARY IN ISRAEL'S SOCIETY

"THE ISRAELI ARMY HAS REMAINED NOT ONLY THE ONE COMPLETELY EFFICIENT INSTITUTION IN ISRAELI SOCIETY, BUT THE ONE THAT MOST FULLY PRESERVES THE EGALITARIAN AND PIONEER IDEALS OF THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENTS IN WHICH IT ORIGINATED DURING THE MANDATE PERIOD AS AN UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATION OF SELF-DEFENSE; AND IN A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS, IT CONTINUES TO PLAY A UNIQUELY IMPORTANT ROLE IN CIVIC--NOT MILITARY--EDUCATION, IN HEBREW-LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION, IN CAREER-TRAINING, AND IN OTHER PROCESSES OF CONSTRUCTIVE ACCULTURATION.

ROBERT ALTER  
"ZIONISM FOR THE 70's"  
COMMENTARY, FEBRUARY 1970

### ⑥ ISRAELI ARMED FORCES

1. A "PEOPLE'S ARMY"
  - A. ALMOST ENTIRE ADULT POPULATION PERFORMS MILITARY SERVICE
  - B. FEW "CLASS" DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN
  - C. HIGH MORALE
2. A MODERN FIGHTING FORCE
  - A. HIGHLY ADAPTIVE--WEAPONS ARE MODIFIED TO MAKE THEM MORE APPROPRIATE FOR USE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
  - B. HEAVY USE OF MODERN SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY
  - C. STRESS IS ON MOBILITY AND OFFENSIVE TACTICS

ISRAEL'S NEED FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY

"PREMIER GOLDA MEIR SAID ISRAEL IS STRIVING FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN AVIATION AS A MEANS 'TO STAND FIRM IN A GRAVE, SAVAGE AND PERHAPS LONG WAR' WITH THE ARABS. IT IS CONSIDERED LIKELY HERE (TEL AVIV) THAT IF THE U.S. DOES NOT RECONSIDER ITS DECISION TO WITHHOLD FURTHER DELIVERIES OF THE McDONNELL DOUGLAS F-4 AND A-4 BY 1972, ISRAEL WILL TAKE THIS AS JUSTIFICATION TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THE MIRAGE-BASED FIGHTER."

AVIATION WEEK, MAY 11, 1970.

ISRAEL AND "THE BOMB"

1. ISRAEL HAS PLEDGED IT WILL NOT BE THE FIRST STATE TO INTRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE MIDDLE EAST.
2. NEWSPAPER REPORTS PERSIST, HOWEVER, CLAIMING THAT ISRAEL DOES, OR WILL SOON, HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (E.G., THE NEW YORK TIMES, JULY 18, 1970).
3. NUCLEAR REACTOR AT DIMONA IS A SOURCE OF PLUTONIUM, BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ISRAEL HAS BUILT SEPARATION PLANT TO EXTRACT PLUTONIUM FROM THE RADIOACTIVE FUEL RODS.
4. RICHARD HELMS, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, IS REPORTED TO HAVE STATED THAT ISRAEL HAS THE TECHNICAL CAPACITY TO MAKE ATOMIC WEAPONS.
5. AMONG REASONS FOR BELIEVING THAT ISRAEL IS (AT LEAST) DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE:
  - A. AN ISRAELI REQUEST THAT SOME PHANTOM JETS BE DELIVERED TO IT EQUIPPED WITH RACKS FOR NUCLEAR BOMBS.
  - B. AN ISRAELI SURFACE MISSILE PROGRAM WHICH DOES NOT "MAKE SENSE" MILITARILY UNLESS NUCLEAR WARHEADS ARE USED.
  - C. REPORTS AS EARLY AS 1963 THAT ISRAEL WAS DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
  - D. REFUSAL BY ISRAEL TO APPROVE THE NPT (NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY).
  - E. PRE-JUNE 1967 COOPERATION BETWEEN FRENCH AND ISRAELI SCIENTISTS ON THE FRENCH NUCLEAR PROGRAM.
6. ISRAELI PLEDGE (SEE #1) IS INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TO EITHER TEST OR USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
7. A FEW CAVEATS TO THE ARGUMENTS IN #6 ARE:
  - A. NEWSPAPER REPORTS AND HINTS MAY BE FALSE BUT DELIBERATE LEAKS BY ISRAELIS TO INTIMIDATE ARABS.
  - B. NO EVIDENCE HAS EVER BEEN FOUND OF WEAPONS-RELATED RESEARCH AT DIMONA (THOUGH INSPECTION HAS BEEN LIMITED).
  - C. ISRAEL HAS NOT YET REJECTED THE NPT.
  - D. PART (AT LEAST) OF ISRAEL'S RELUCTANCE TO RATIFY THE NPT IS A FEAR THAT VERIFICATION PROCEDURES, NOT YET FIXED, MIGHT JEOPARDIZE NATIONAL SECURITY BY OPENING MANY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS TO OUTSIDE INSPECTION.
  - E. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS ISRAEL HAS DEPLOYED ANY OF ITS SURFACE MISSILES.
  - F. EXCEPT FOR "DIRE EMERGENCIES," ISRAELI USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOES NOT SEEM STRATEGICALLY SOUND.

THE UTILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

"IF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ENTERED THE MIDDLE EAST AS A RESULT OF INDIGENOUS EFFORT, THE PROSPECT FOR LONG-TERM STABILITY WOULD REMAIN UNCERTAIN. PERHAPS AN ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME WOULD HAVE SUCH AN IMPORTANT LEAD-TIME OVER ANY POSSIBLE INDIGENOUS EGYPTIAN PROGRAMME, THAT AN ERA OF MILITARY STABILITY MIGHT ENSUE, BASED ON ISRAEL'S ABILITY TO DETER EGYPTIAN OR COMBINED ARAB AGGRESSION. THIS WOULD SEEM TO BE A DUBIOUS ARGUMENT. WHAT WOULD ISRAEL CONSIDER CONSTITUTED ARAB 'AGGRESSION'? WOULD SHE THREATEN TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF TERRORIST ACTIVITY CONTINUES; AND IF SO, AGAINST WHOM? IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER A NUCLEAR WEAPON DEVELOPED IN THE NEAR FUTURE WOULD BUY ISRAEL ANY MORE SECURITY THAN SHE AT PRESENT ENJOYS, AND IT WOULD CERTAINLY INCREASE HER ALREADY HIGH DEFENCE BUDGET AND WEAKEN HER CASE INTERNATIONALLY."

GEOFFREY KEMP, ARMS AND SECURITY: THE EGYPT-ISRAEL CASE, ADELPHI PAPER NO. 52, INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES.

THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY IN ISRAEL

1. IAI (ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES) CURRENTLY PRODUCES THE COMMANDER, A SMALL JET PLANE, ORIGINALLY DEVELOPED BY NORTH AMERICAN, AND A VTOL PLANE.
2. SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF AERONAUTICAL ENGINEERS HAVE EMIGRATED IN RECENT YEARS TO ISRAEL FROM THE UNITED STATES.
3. ANY ISRAELI-PRODUCED FIGHTER PLANE IS LIKELY TO BE MODELED AFTER THE MIRAGE 3/5 AND DESIGNED FROM BLUE-PRINTS OBTAINED BY SURREPTITIOUS MEANS.
  - A. ONE ENGINEER, ALFRED FRAUNHOF, HAS ADMITTED SELLING COMPLETE PLANS OF THE SNECMA ATAR 9C ENGINE TO ISRAEL FOR \$200,000.
  - B. OTHER REPORTS INDICATE THAT BLUEPRINTS FOR THE SNECMA ATAR 9B (WHICH POWERS THE ISRAELI MIRAGE 3C), AND AIRFRAME PLANS FOR THE MIRAGE 3 AND 5 ARE IN ISRAELI POSSESSION.
  - C. ISRAEL HAS RE-ENGINEED THE MIRAGE 3CJ SO THAT IT CAN BE POWERED BY OTHER ENGINES.
4. ISRAEL CURRENTLY PERFORMS THE MAINTENANCE FOR ALL ITS AIRCRAFT.
5. ISRAEL WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE THE AVIONICS AND AIRFRAME EXPERTISE NECESSARY TO PRODUCE A MODERN JET FIGHTER.
6. MAJOR UNCERTAINTY IS IN THEIR ABILITY TO PRODUCE SUFFICIENTLY POWERFUL ENGINES.
  - A. CONSTRUCTION OF A FORGING PLANT IS A MAJOR CAPITAL INVESTMENT.
  - B. MACHINING OF TITANIUM (REQUIRED FOR HIGH-SPEED ENGINES) REQUIRES CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE.

POSSIBLE UNKNOWN IN ISRAEL'S FUTURE WITH DEMURRERS

- |   |  |  |  |
|---|--|--|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. RISE OF ISOLATIONIST TENDENCIES IN THE U.S. MAY REDUCE POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID BY THE U.S. TO ISRAEL.</li> </ol> | <p>BUT LARGE-SCALE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT, BY THE U.S. OR AT LEAST LARGE-SCALE MILITARY AID FORING ON THE BASIS OF SIGNIFICANT ASIAN DISSENT, MAY LEAD AS WELL TO VERY CONSIDERABLE ANTI-ISRAELISM IN THE UNITED STATES, GIVEN PRESENT LEVEL OF "ISOLATIONISM."</p>    | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. EXTENDED BY INCONCLUSIVE MILITARY EXHAUSTION WITH RISE IN CASUALTIES MAY RESULT IN NEW HOSTILE CLIMATE.</li> </ol> | <p>BUT ACTUAL EXISTENCE OF PHYSICAL SECURITY THREAT TO ISRAEL PRESENTS GROUND OF BASICALLY PREEXISTING FOR NEW HOSTILITY, PRO-ARAB SENTIMENTS.</p>   |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. CONTINUED SOVIET MILITARY AID TO ARAB STATES MAY ALTER CURRENTLY FAVORABLE MILITARY SITUATION.</li> </ol>                     | <p>BUT U.S. EXPERIENCE IN THAILAND, SOMER VETERANS, THAIAN POWER, ETC., UNDERLIES DIFFICULTY OF CONCENTRATING RELATIVELY ISOLATED MILITARY FORCES THROUGH MEDIUM OF ADVISERS AND LARGE-SCALE SOVIET PHYSICAL PRESENCE MAY GIVE RISE TO CONSIDERABLE ANTI-RUSSIAN</p> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. AS PEACE SETTLEMENT MAY ENABLE ISRAEL TO DEVOTE GREATER RESOURCES TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.</li> </ol>              | <p>BUT PEACE MAY ALSO REQUIRE A CERTAIN DEGREE OF APATHY AMONG ISRAEL'S OUTCAST FRIENDS RESIDING IN A "SHAKENING OF OVERSEAS GITS AND DONATIONS"</p> |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. ISRAEL MAY FIND ITSELF CLOSE TO POLITICAL CRISIS WHEN FACED WITH THE NECESSITY OF ACHIEVING COMPROMISE.</li> </ol>            | <p>BUT PEACE EFFORTS BY THIRD PARTIES MAY PROVE ILLUSORY</p>   |  |  |

### 1 RECENT SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1. OPERATION OF 3 EGYPTIAN AIRFIELDS (INCHAS, JIYANKLIS AND AL MANSWIA) AND DEPLOYMENT OF 100 MIG 21J PLANES AND 150 PILOTS.
2. SALE TO LIBYA OF 25 MIG 21 MONGOL TRAINERS.
3. DELIVERY TO LIBYA OF OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT.
4. DISPATCH OF 15,000 AIRMEN AND GROUND TROOPS TO EGYPT, AS WELL AS 5,000 TECHNICIANS AND ADVISERS.
5. DELIVERY OF 80 SA-3 LAUNCHERS AND 160 SA-3 MISSILES TO EGYPT.
6. DEPLOYMENT OF SA-3 MISSILE SITES BOTH AROUND CAIRO AND ALEXANDRIA, AS WELL AS SITES CLOSER TO THE SUEZ CANAL.
7. DEPLOYMENT OF FOUR TUPOLEV TU-16 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT TO ASWAN, TO KEEP WATCH ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RED SEA REGION.
8. DEPLOYMENT OF A PICKET DESTROYER OFF THE SINAI COAST TO FURNISH EARLY WARNING DATA TO EGYPT OF ISRAELI AIR ACTIVITY.
9. RECONNAISSANCE OF THE U.S. SIXTH FLEET AND THE MEDITERRANEAN, USING SEVEN TU-16'S (WITH EGYPTIAN MARKINGS, BUT RUSSIAN CREWS).
10. DELIVERY TO EGYPT OF AMPHIBIOUS LANDING CRAFT.

### 3 SOVIET NEED FOR MIDDLE EASTERN OIL

"AS DOMESTIC DEMAND SOARS, AND AS THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMECON COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO GROW, IT MAY WELL BE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE HARD-PRESSED TO CONTINUE OIL EXPORTS TO THE WEST AND MAY FOR A TIME TURN NET IMPORTER.

"THE BIG PROBLEM EAST OF THE URALS NOW IS NOT AVAILABILITY OF CRUDE--SOVIETS CLAIM VAST OIL FIELDS IN WESTERN SIBERIA--BUT THE COST OF PRODUCING IT. AVERAGE COST OF SIBERIAN OIL IS REPORTED BY WESTERN SOURCES TO BE BETWEEN \$2 AND \$3 PER BARREL HIGHER THAN LAID-DOWN COST OF IMPORTED PERSIAN GULF CRUDE.

"ECONOMIES, NOT SUPPLY DEFICIENCY, WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR RUSSIA BECOMING A NET IMPORTER....

"RUSSIA HAS REVEALED THAT 41 OIL FIELDS HAVE NOW BEEN FOUND IN TYUMEN, AND THAT ONLY 15% OF THE PROSPECTIVE AREA HAS BEEN EXPLORED. SO IT IS DOUBTFUL THE U.S.S.R. WILL BE A NET IMPORTER OVER THE LONG HAUL."

HOUSTON POST, APRIL 19, 1970 (REPORT OF AN ARTICLE IN THE OIL AND GAS JOURNAL).

### 5 ESTIMATED ANNUAL COST OF CANAL CLOSURE TO U.S.S.R. 1966-1980 (EXCLUDING TANKERS)

	1966		1973		1980	
	VOYAGE DAYS	\$ MILLION	VOYAGE DAYS	\$ MILLION	VOYAGE DAYS	\$ MILLION
CANAL CLOSED	32,800	33-82	131,200	132-330	369,000	370-925
CANAL OPEN	12,800	18-40	51,200	70-150	144,000	200-360
DIFFERENTIAL	20,000	15-42	80,000	62-180	225,000	170-565

FROM: "RUSSIAN AND THE WEST IN THE MEDITERRANEAN", BY GARY SICK  
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW,  
June, 1970

### 2 RECENT RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1. RUSSIA HAS REARMED EGYPT AND SYRIA, MORE THAT COMPENSATING LOSSES INCURRED IN JUNE 1967
2. RUSSIAN PILOTS HAVE BEGUN FLYING COMBAT MISSIONS IN EGYPT
  - A. ORIGINAL ROLE WAS TO ENGAGE ISRAELI PLANES MAKING DEEP PENETRATIONS OVER CAIRO AND ALEXANDRIA
  - B. RECENT NEWS REPORTS INDICATE RUSSIAN PILOTS ARE FLYING OVER THE SUEZ CANAL REGION AS WELL
3. SAM II AND SAM III MISSILES HAVE BEEN INSTALLED
  - A. ORIGINAL DEPLOYMENTS WERE AROUND CAIRO AND ALEXANDRIA
  - B. DEPLOYMENTS CLOSER TO THE SUEZ CANAL REGION HAVE RECENTLY BEEN MADE
4. RUSSIAN FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN HAS BEEN INCREASED

### 4 ONE EXPLANATION FOR SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF SAM-3 MISSILES

"ESCALATION NEARED A MORE PERILOUS STAGE WHEN THE SOVIET SAM-3 MISSILES AND PILOTS APPEARED IN EGYPT. ISRAEL'S CHIEF OF STAFF ADMITTED IN A SPEECH MAY 7 THAT 'THE RUSSIANS MIGHT NOT HAVE COME ON THE SCENE' BUT FOR ISRAEL'S AIR ATTACKS ON CAIRO. THESE, IT WAS FOOLISHLY HOPED IN ISRAEL, WOULD CREATE SUCH PANIC AS TO TOPPLE NASSER. THE RUSSIANS, IF THEY HAD NOT COME TO HIS DEFENSE, WOULD HAVE LOOKED LIKE A PAPER TIGER...."

--I.F. STONE  
I.F. STONE'S BI-WEEKLY, JUNE 15, 1970

### 6 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUEZ CANAL

"SO LONG AS THE CANAL REMAINS CLOSED, THE SOVIETS ARE HAMPERED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE AT THE MOUTH OF THE RED SEA, WHERE THEY CAN STIR UP GREATER TROUBLE IN SUCH AREAS OF DISCONTENT AS THE YEMEN AND SOUTHERN YEMEN. BY CREATING SUCH A PRESENCE THEY COULD NOT ONLY COMMAND THE ISRAELI SUPPLY ROUTE THROUGH THE GULF OF AQABA, BUT WOULD HAVE AVAILABLE A LAND BRIDGE TO THE HORN OF AFRICA AND--EVEN MORE IMPORTANT--A PASSAGE ROUND THE ARABIAN PENINSULA TO MUSCAT AND OMAN AND THE OIL-RICH SHEIKDOMS ON THE PERSIAN GULF. BY SUBVERTING THOSE TERRITORIES, THE SOVIET UNION COULD ACHIEVE THE ENCIRCLEMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA AND ENHANCE IRAN'S CLAUSTROPHOBIA. IN ADDITION, A REOPENED CANAL WOULD FACILITATE RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A MORE POWERFUL POSITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, WHERE MOSCOW COULD WORK MISCHIEF WITH A WEAKENING INDIA AND A NON-AYUB PAKISTAN."

GEORGE BALL  
"SUEZ IS THE FRONT TO WATCH"  
NEW YORK TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE  
JUNE 28, 1970

1 AMERICAN MEDITERRANEAN (SIXTH) FLEET

1. STRENGTH OF THE SIXTH FLEET FLUCTUATES FROM 40 TO 50 SURFACE SHIPS AND SUBMARINES.
2. BACKBONE OF THE FLEET ARE TWO AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, THE FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE FORRESTAL, TOGETHER WITH THEIR FIGHTERS AND BOMBERS (SOME 400 PLANES).
3. NEARLY 60% OF THE FLEET CONSISTS OF SHIPS HAVING MORE THAN 20 YEARS SERVICE.
4. SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET SUBMARINES IS ONE IMPORTANT MISSION OF THE FLEET.
5. MAIN AMERICAN THREAT IS FROM THE NAVAL AIR POWER, THERE ARE NO SHIP-TO-SHIP MISSILES COMPARABLE TO THOSE ON SOVIET SHIPS.
6. MAIN WEAKNESS IS A SHORTAGE OF FRIENDLY PORTS OF CALL AND UNCERTAIN VULNERABILITY TO SOVIET MISSILE ATTACK.
7. AMERICAN REINFORCEMENTS ARE THOUSANDS OF MILES AWAY, BUT BRITISH, ITALIAN, GREEK AND TURKISH FLEETS IN THE REGION COOPERATE WITH THE SIXTH FLEET.

3 STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

"ADMITTEDLY, MAPS ARE NO LONGER READ IN TERMS OF SEA POWER, AND NO ONE SPEAKS ANY MORE OF THE 'LIFELINE OF EMPIRE.' BOTH KIPLING AND ADMIRAL MAHAN ARE DEAD, AND JET PLANES MAKE NONSENSE OF OLD STRATEGIC CONCEPTS. YET THE SOUTH AND EAST COASTS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN REMAIN CRITICAL TO WESTERN SURVIVAL, AND A DOMINANT SOVIET POSITION THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD WOULD THREATEN OUR MOST VITAL INTERESTS--CHALLENGING THE ANCIENT CONCEPT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AS A SAFE INLAND SEA; SHATTERING NATO'S RIGHT-FLANK DEFENSES BY THREATENING THE INDEPENDENCE OF TURKEY AND GREECE; DRIVING YUGOSLAVIA TOWARD SOVIET DEPENDENCY; STIRRING THE HUGE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN ITALY AND FRANCE TO NEW ACTIVITY; ISOLATING IRAN, AND IMPERILING THE AIR PASSAGE TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN. THESE ARE ONLY SOME OF THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES; SOONER OR LATER ONE COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, EXPECT THE DOWNFALL OF THE MODERATE ARAB STATES, ERECTING A BARRIER BETWEEN EUROPE AND AFRICA, AND THE IMPACT ON THE GREAT NON-ARAB NATIONS OF ISLAM--PARTICULARLY PAKISTAN--WOULD BE PROFOUND."

GEORGE BALL  
"SUEZ IS THE FRONT TO WATCH"  
NEW YORK TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE  
JUNE 28, 1970

2 SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN FLEET

1. STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET FLEET FLUCTUATES FROM 40 TO 60 VESSELS.
2. IN MARCH 1970 (FOR EXAMPLE) THE SOVIET FLEET CONSISTED OF ROUGHLY 60 VESSELS: 30 COMBAT SURFACE VESSELS, INCLUDING BOTH OF RUSSIA'S HELICOPTER CARRIER-CRUISERS, THE MOSKOVA AND THE LENINGRAD, 20 AUXILIARY SURFACE VESSELS, INCLUDING ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (ELINT) SHIPS, AS WELL AS EIGHT TO TEN SUBMARINES.
3. MOST OF THE FLEET ARE MODERN SHIPS, RELATIVELY FEW OLDER THAN 15-20 YEARS.
4. CURRENT ROLE OF THE HELICOPTER CARRIER-CRUISERS IS SUBMARINE SURVEILLANCE.
5. MAIN SOVIET THREAT COMES FROM THE SUBMARINES AND ADVANCED SHIP-TO-SHIP MISSILES.
6. MAIN WEAKNESS IS LACK OF AIR COVER BUT THIS COULD BE REMEDIED IN THE FUTURE:
  - A. VTOL AIRCRAFT CAN BE FLOWN FROM HELICOPTER CARRIER-CRUISERS
  - B. SOVIET PLANES COULD USE EGYPTIAN LAND AIR BASES
7. SOVIET FLEET MAKES VERY FEW PORT CALLS, BUT DOCK FACILITIES FOR REPAIRS ARE AVAILABLE AT PORT SAID AND ALEXANDRIA.

4 THE MILITARY THREAT OF THE SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN FLEET

"THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A NAVAL BATTLE BETWEEN MASSES MISSILE STRIKING FORCES AND AN ATTACK CARRIER FORCE, AND THE OUTCOME OF SUCH AN ENCOUNTER WOULD REVOLVE ABOUT SUCH FACTORS AS MISSILE RELIABILITY, READINESS CONDITION OF THE TWO FORCES, AND THE WHOLE PANOPLY OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE. THE POINT HERE IS SIMPLY THAT THE SOVIET FORCES IN AT LEAST THE EASTERN END OF THE MEDITERRANEAN REPRESENT A MILITARY THREAT WHICH CANNOT BE LIGHTLY DISCOUNTED."

GARY SICK, "RUSSIA AND THE WEST IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 1970S," NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, JUNE 1970.

5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN FLEET: THE SOVIETS' VIEW

"UNTIL THE SOVIET SHIPS APPEARED THE AMERICAN SIXTH FLEET CONSTITUTED THE ONLY 'BALANCE OF FORCES'...ALREADY THE VERY PRESENCE OF THE SOVIET SHIPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN DOES NOT ALLOW THE AMERICAN SIXTH FLEET TO CARRY OUT THE AGGRESSIVE IDEAS OF THE PENTAGON WITH IMPUNITY. THEY CANNOT THROW THEIR WEIGHT AROUND SO UNCEREMONIOUSLY AS BEFORE. THE PRESENCE OF OUR SHIPS SERVES AS A DEFINITE GUARANTEE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THAT AREA."

ADMIRAL N.I. SMIRNOV, "SOVIET NAVY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN," SURVIVAL, FEBRUARY 1969.



## I THE BASIC CASE

1. THE RUSSIAN AIR FLEET AND THE SAM MISSILES IN EGYPT POSE A THREAT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY, UPSETS THE MILITARY BALANCE ALONG SUEZ, AND PRESENTS A STRONG OBSTACLE TO PEACE
2. THE RUSSIAN MEDITERRANEAN FLEET SEVERELY LIMITS U.S. FREEDOM OF ACTION IN THE REGION, BOTH DIPLOMATICALLY AND MILITARILY. MORE SPECIFICALLY IT POSES A DEFINITE THREAT TO THE U.S. SIXTH FLEET.
3. WITHOUT THE HUGE AMOUNTS OF RUSSIAN MILITARY AID GIVEN TO THE ARABS, THERE WOULD BE NO MAJOR CONFLICT TODAY IN THE REGION
4. THE STRONG RUSSIAN PRESENCE GIVES THE KREMLIN TREMENDOUS INFLUENCE OVER THE ARABS, AND THIS CLEARLY TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE U.S.
5. IN ADDITION, THIS FORMIDABLE RUSSIAN PRESENCE INCREASES THE POSSIBILITY OF A COMMUNIST STATE ARISING IN THE ARAB WORLD
6. AND FINALLY, THE SOVIET PRESENCE INCREASES THE PROBABILITY OF A GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

## II THE DISSENTING VIEW

1. POINT ONE: THREAT OF RUSSIAN AIR FLEET
  - A. ISRAELIS ARE AT LEAST THE EQUALS OF THE RUSSIANS IN AIR COMBAT IF NOT THEIR MASTERS
  - B. ISRAELIS HAVE DEMONSTRATED AS MUCH IN THE INITIAL ENCOUNTERS
  - C. SAM MISSILES ARE A MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEM BUT WITH EXPERIENCE THE ISRAELIS SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTEND WITH THEM
  - D. RUSSIAN AIR CAPABILITY WILL ESSENTIALLY HAVE LITTLE EFFECT EITHER WAY ON THE MILITARY STATUS
  - E. YET THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE MAY BE ENHANCED BECAUSE THE RUSSIANS WILL BE LESS THAN EAGER TO PUBLICLY DEMONSTRATE THEIR INFERIORITY TO THE ISRAELIS AND RISK THE DESTRUCTION OF VALUABLE MILITARY HARDWARE
  - F. RUSSIANS MAY THUS BE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT PREVENTING EGYPT'S DEFEAT THAN SUPPORTING A LOSING VENTURE AGAINST ISRAEL
2. POINT TWO: THREAT OF RUSSIAN MEDITERRANEAN FLEET
  - A. RUSSIAN FLEET HAS NO AIR COVER BEYOND SEVERAL HELICOPTER SQUADRONS
  - B. NEAREST RUSSIAN FIGHTERS TOO FAR AWAY TO BE OF MUCH HELP AGAINST A SURPRISE ATTACK
  - C. U.S. SIXTH FLEET HAS OBVIOUS AIR SUPERIORITY BECAUSE OF ITS AMPLE SUPPLY OF FIGHTERS
  - D. SOVIET SHIPS THEREFORE VERITABLE SITTING DUCKS FOR ALMOST ANY AIR ATTACK

3. POINT THREE: SIGNIFICANCE OF U.S.S.R. MILITARY AID
  - A. ADMITTEDLY LACK OF SOVIET AID WOULD HAVE BEEN A SIGNIFICANT HANDICAP BUT NOT AN INSURMOUNTABLE ONE
  - B. LIBYAN PURCHASE OF MIRAGE JETS HAS DEMONSTRATED EXISTENCE OF OTHER POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS
  - C. IN ANY EVENT, ARABS HAVE BEEN FIGHTING ISRAEL SINCE 1948; LITTLE REASON TO THINK THEY WOULD STOP COMPLETELY BECAUSE OF A TEMPORARY SHORTAGE OF ARMS
4. POINT FOUR: RUSSIAN INFLUENCE OVER THE ARABS
  - A. HOW MUCH OF AN ADVANTAGE THIS GIVES THE RUSSIANS OVER THE U.S. IS CERTAINLY OPEN TO QUESTION
  - B. TO WHAT EXTENT THE ARABS WILL TAKE ADVICE FROM ANY FOREIGN POWER IS ALSO QUESTIONABLE
  - C. ESTABLISHED FACT THAT THE ARABS HAVE NEVER REALLY LIKED THE RUSSIANS OR COMPLETELY TRUSTED THEM, AND WITH GOOD REASON!
  - D. THE INITIAL "SUCCESS" OF THE RODGERS PEACE INITIATIVE DEMONSTRATES THE ARABS ARE STILL CAPABLE OF INDEPENDENT DECISION
  - E. IT ALSO DEMONSTRATES THE ARABS HAVE A WELL DEFINED CONCEPT OF THEIR OWN BEST INTERESTS AND ARE UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT ANY OTHER VERSION, ESPECIALLY FROM A MAJOR FOREIGN POWER
  - F. DESPITE THE STRONG RUSSIAN PRESENCE IN SEVERAL ARAB STATES, THE U.S. STILL HAS REASONABLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH MUCH OF THE ARAB WORLD
5. POINT FIVE: POSSIBILITY OF THE ARABS GOING COMMUNIST
  - A. NASSER IS A SELF-PROCLAIMED ANTI-COMMUNIST (AS DISTINCT FROM BEING ANTI-RUSSIAN)
  - B. ARABS HAVE RESISTED ALL FOREIGN IDEOLOGIES FOR AT LEAST THE LAST 1500 YEARS, THERE IS LITTLE REASON TO BELIEVE THEY WILL NOT SUCCEED IN RESISTING COMMUNISM
  - C. THE RUSSIANS HAVE HAD ALMOST NO SUCCESS IN THE PAST IN EXPORTING THEIR IDEOLOGY TO THE UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD
  - D. THE STRONG IDENTIFICATION BETWEEN COMMUNISM AND MOSCOW AND PEKING SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT INCENTIVE FOR THE ARABS TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN IDEOLOGIES
  - E. EVEN IF AN INDIGENEOUS COMMUNIST MOVEMENT DEVELOPED IN ONE OF THE ARAB STATES IT WOULD HAVE TO OVERCOME THE FORMIDABLE OBSTACLES OF THE MILITARY AND AN ENTRENCHED POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT--AN UNLIKELY PROSPECT AT BEST
6. POINT SIX: THE POSSIBILITY OF A GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION
  - A. THE RUSSIANS HAVE NEITHER THE DESIRE OR THE CAPABILITY
  - B. THE AMERICAN MILITARY SUPERIORITY IN THE REGION IS INDESPUTABLE
  - C. THE RUSSIANS HAVE NEVER SHOWN ANY INCLINATION FOR A "HIGH-RISK" POLICY THAT WOULD ENDANGER THEIR POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
  - D. INDEED A HUMILIATING CONFRONTATION WITH U.S., OR THE U.S. AND ISRAEL, IS ALMOST CERTAINLY THE LAST THING THE RUSSIANS WOULD WANT
  - E. FURTHERMORE, THE PRINCIPAL RUSSIAN INTEREST IS DEVELOPING THEIR POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD, NOT DEFEATING OR DESTROYING THE ISRAELIS. THIS AUTOMATICALLY REDUCES THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S.

ISRAEL VS. THE U.S.S.R.

"...AMERICAN SOURCES SAY THEY ARE NOW CONVINCED THAT THREE OR FOUR PLANES REPORTED DOWNED BY ISRAELI FIGHTERS ON JULY 31 WERE FLOWN BY RUSSIANS. EARLIER, SOME OFFICIALS SAID THEY BELIEVED THE PILOTS WERE RUSSIANS, BUT OTHER OFFICIALS TERMED THE EVIDENCE TOO FLIMSY.

"THE SOURCES NOW SAY THAT MONITORED CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PILOTS HAVE PERSUADED AMERICAN OFFICIALS THAT THEY WERE RUSSIANS."



### 1 SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE-EAST

IZVESTIA SAID THE HEAVY SOVIET MILITARY AID TO EGYPT HAD CREATED THE PROPER CLIMATE FOR A SETTLEMENT BY EQUALIZING THE MILITARY BALANCE.

"WE KNOW THAT THE STRONGER THE INDEPENDENCE OF ARAB COUNTRIES THE MORE RELIABLE WILL BE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE-EAST AND IN THE WORLD," THE IZVESTIA COMMENTARY SAID.

"IT IS CLEAR TO EVERYONE NOW THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S SUPPLYING OF DEFENSIVE WEAPONS TO THE ARMED FORCES OF THE U.A.R. HAS FACILITATED THE CREATION OF AN ATMOSPHERE FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BECAUSE IT SHOWED THE AGGRESSORS THE FUTILITY OF THEIR ATTEMPTS TO REVERSE THE HISTORY OF ARAB PEOPLES BACK TO THE WORST DAYS OF THE UNDIVIDED DOMINATION OF COLONIALISTS," IT SAID.

NEW YORK TIMES,  
AUGUST 19, 1970

"MEANWHILE, THE AIMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST POLICY PROMOTED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE WELL KNOWN. THE CONSISTENT PROMOTIONS OF A LINE AIMED AT THE SPEEDIEST ATTAINMENT OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE RENDERING OF ALL-AROUND AID TO VICTIMS OF THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION AND THE PREVENTION OF ISRAELI EXTREMISTS FROM IMPOSING FROM THE POSITIONS OF STRENGTH ON ARAB COUNTRIES SUCH A SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS THAT WOULD SIGNIFY RECOGNITION OF THE AGGRESSOR'S RIGHT TO THE SEIZURE OF ARAB COUNTRIES."

TASS,  
MAY 21, 1970

### 3 ADVANTAGES OF A GREAT POWER SETTLEMENT

1. NATIONS DIRECTLY INVOLVED ARE UNABLE TO MAKE PEACE BETWEEN THEMSELVES
2. A SETTLEMENT MAY BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE RESIDENTS OF THE COUNTRIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED IF VIEWED AS "IMPOSED" FROM THE OUTSIDE
3. COMMITS ALMOST EVERYONE, ESPECIALLY THE GREAT POWERS THEMSELVES, TO WORK FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE SETTLEMENT
4. A GREAT POWER COMMITMENT TO SEE THE SETTLEMENT IS HONORED BY ALL SIDES REDUCES LIKELIHOOD OF ANY COUNTRY DIRECTLY INVOLVED ATTEMPTING TO OVERTHROW THE SETTLEMENT BY FORCE
5. OBLIGES THE GREAT POWERS TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT AND ADMINISTER THE SETTLEMENT, E.G., REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT

### 2 U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

"THE MIDDLE EAST IS IMPORTANT. WE ALL KNOW THAT 80 PER CENT OF EUROPE'S OIL AND 90 PER CENT OF JAPAN'S OIL COMES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST. WE KNOW THE MIDDLE EAST, THIS AREA IS THE GATEWAY TO AFRICA, THE GATEWAY TO THE MEDITERRANEAN, THE HINGE OF NATO, AND IT IS ALSO THE GATEWAY THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL DOWN INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN.

"...WHAT SHOULD U.S. POLICY BE? I WILL SUMMARIZE IT IN A WORD.

"ONE, OUR INTEREST IS PEACE AND THE INTEGRITY OF EVERY COUNTRY IN THE AREA.

"TWO, WE RECOGNIZE THAT ISRAEL IS NOT DESIROUS OF DRIVING ANY OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES INTO THE SEA. THE OTHER COUNTRIES DO WANT TO DRIVE ISRAEL INTO THE SEA.

"THREE, ONCE THE BALANCE OF POWER SHIFTS WHERE ISRAEL IS WEAKER THAN ITS NEIGHBORS, THERE WILL BE A WAR.

"THEREFORE, IT IS IN THE U.S.'S INTERESTS TO MAINTAIN THE BALANCE OF POWER, AND WE WILL MAINTAIN THAT BALANCE OF POWER. THAT IS WHY AS THE SOVIET UNION MOVES IN TO SUPPORT THE U.A.R. IT MAKES IT NECESSARY FOR THE U.S. TO EVALUATE WHAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES, AND ONCE THAT BALANCE OF POWER IS UPSET, WE WILL DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN ISRAEL'S STRENGTH VIS-A-VIS ITS NEIGHBORS, NOT BECAUSE WE WANT ISRAEL TO BE IN A POSITION TO WAGE WAR. THAT IS NOT IT, BUT BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT WILL DEFEAT ITS NEIGHBORS FROM ATTACKING IT. THEN WE GET TO THE DIPLOMACY. THE DIPLOMACY IS TERRIBLY DIFFICULT, BECAUSE ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS, OF COURSE, HAVE TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST.

"ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW TO BORDERS, BORDERS THAT ARE DEFENSIBLE, AND WHEN WE CONSIDER ALL THOSE FACTORS AND THEN PUT INTO THE EQUATION THE FACT THAT THE RUSSIANS SEEM TO HAVE AN INTEREST IN MOVING INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN, IT SHOWS YOU WHY THIS SUBJECT IS SO COMPLEX AND SO DIFFICULT."

PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON  
TELEVISION INTERVIEW  
JULY 1, 1970

### 4 SOME DISADVANTAGES OF A GREAT POWER SETTLEMENT

- I. SETTLEMENT WOULD PROBABLY BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO ENFORCE IF THE ISRAELIS ALREADY HAVE A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
- II. SETTLEMENT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ENFORCE ON THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS UNDER THE BEST OF CONDITIONS
- III. SETTLEMENT MIGHT ALSO INVOLVE CREATION OF A JOINT U.S.-SOVIET MILITARY PEACEKEEPING EFFORT OF SOME SORT, BUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANY SUCH EFFORT IS HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE SIMPLY BECAUSE SATISFACTORY COLLABORATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S. ARMY AND THE SOVIET ARMY IS RATHER DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE
- IV. ASSUMING THE ISRAELIS ALREADY HAVE A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, AN UNSATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT (FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW) MIGHT WELL PROVOKE THEM TO EXERCISE THEIR NUCLEAR OPTION.
- V. ANY GREAT POWER SETTLEMENT WOULD ALMOST INEVITABLY DRAG THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT DIRECTLY INTO THE COLD WAR AT SOME POINT.
- VI. AND EVEN IF THE GREAT POWERS COULD COME TO SOME SORT OF AGREEMENT (WHICH IS DOUBTFUL) IT SEEMS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE--IN LARGE PART BECAUSE OF THEIR OWN GLOBAL INTERESTS--THAT THEY COULD PRODUCE A "REALISTIC" SETTLEMENT IN TERMS OF THE VARIOUS INTERESTS AND AMBITIONS OF THE NATIONS DIRECTLY INVOLVED.
- VII. THUS THE PROBABILITY IS THAT A GREAT POWER SETTLEMENT WOULD INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF A GREAT POWER UNDERSTANDING ON OTHER ISSUES AS WELL AS THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT WOULD DECREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF A DURABLE "REALISTIC" UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE NATIONS DIRECTLY INVOLVED. AN UNDERSTANDING THAT MIGHT BE BETTER ACHIEVED IF THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS WERE LEFT TO SETTLE THE CONFLICT AMONG THEMSELVES.

# 1 THE NEED FOR A GREAT POWER SETTLEMENT

"THE BEGINNING OF WISDOM REGARDING THE MIDDLE EAST IS THE RECOGNITION THAT THE IMMEDIATE PARTIES TO THE STRUGGLE--ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES (WHICH IN PRACTICE MEANS THE U.A.R.)--ARE QUITE INCAPABLE OF REACHING A SETTLEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME--EXCEPT FOR THE REFUGEES AND, PERHAPS EVEN MORE CRITICAL, THE PROBLEM OF JERUSALEM...THE BASIC LINES OF A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT ARE NOT DIFFICULT TO DELINEATE. YET PASSION, MISTRUST AND INTERNAL DIFFERENCES WITHIN EACH CAMP PRECLUDE PROGRESS.

"...THERE IS NO NEED TO TRY TO ASSESS THE BLAME FOR THIS IMPASSE; IT IS ENOUGH TO RECOGNIZE IT AS A FACT TOO FORMIDABLE FOR THE PARTIES TO DISPOSE OF BY THEMSELVES. FOR THEIR OWN GOOD AS WELL AS FOR THE PEACE OF THE WORLD, SOME OUTSIDE AGENCY MUST BE FOUND TO MAKE THE PEACE.

"GIVEN THE REALITIES OF WORLD POLITICS--INCLUDING THE BLOC POLITICS OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY--THE ONLY COMPETENT AGENCY IS THE KIND OF GREAT-POWER CONSORTIUM CONTEMPLATED BY THE DRAFTERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, WHO IN DESIGNING THE SECURITY COUNCIL SOUGHT CONSCIOUSLY TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE BASIC CONCEPT OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE."

GEORGE BALL  
"SUEZ IS THE FRONT TO WATCH"  
NEW YORK TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE  
JUNE 28, 1970

# 2 THE BALFOUR DECLARATION, NOVEMBER 2, 1917

"I HAVE MUCH PLEASURE IN CONVEYING TO YOU, ON BEHALF OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT, THE FOLLOWING DECLARATION OF SYMPATHY WITH JEWISH ZIONIST ASPIRATIONS WHICH HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO AND APPROVED BY THE CABINET:--

"HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT VIEW WITH FAVOUR THE ESTABLISHMENT IN PALESTINE OF A NATIONAL HOME FOR THE JEWISH PEOPLE, AND WILL USE THEIR BEST ENDEAVOURS TO FACILITATE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS OBJECT, IT BEING CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT NOTHING SHALL BE DONE WHICH MAY PREJUDICE THE CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS RIGHTS OF EXISTING NON-JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN PALESTINE, OR THE RIGHTS AND POLITICAL STATUS ENJOYED BY JEWS IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY.

"I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD BRING THIS DECLARATION TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ZIONIST FEDERATION."

## ATTITUDES OF THE GREAT POWERS IN MIDDLE EASTERN CRISES

	1948	1956	1967
U.S.	PRO-ISRAEL	PRO-ARAB	PRO-ISRAEL
U.S.S.R.	PRO-ISRAEL	PRO-ARAB	PRO-ARAB
U.K.	PRO-ARAB	PRO-ISRAEL	PRO-ISRAEL
FRANCE	PRO-ARAB	PRO-ISRAEL	PRO-ARAB

# 4 ISRAEL'S VIEW OF A GREAT POWER SETTLEMENT

NO TALK OF FOUR-POWER INITIATIVE CAN DISCOUNT THE VERY REAL DANGER THAT THEIR INVOLVEMENT COULD, SOONER OR LATER, GLOBALIZE WHAT IS STILL A LOCAL CONFLICT. A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT INVOLVING THESE POWERS WOULD NOT SPELL PEACE. IT WOULD NOT REMOVE THE ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT. CONSEQUENTLY, THE ARRANGEMENT, IN WHATEVER FORM, WOULD INEVITABLY REQUIRE THE ACTIVE GUARANTEE OF THE POWERS. THE VERY TERM GUARANTEE IMPLIES COMMITMENT. IT WOULD MEAN INTENSIFICATION, NOT A DEESCALATION OF THEIR ROLE IN THE AREA. IT COULD BRING INTO VERY REAL FOCUS THE POTENTIAL THREAT OF SUPER-POWER CONFRONTATION, WITH EVERY SMALL BORDER INCIDENT (AS IN BERLIN) CONSTITUTING AN OBJECT OF WORLD ANXIETY. THE GUARANTEE, THEN, WOULD BECOME EITHER PARALYZED OR THE SOURCE OF POSSIBLE WORLD CONFLICT. GIVEN THE VOLATILE NATURE OF THE AREA, THE RISKS OF A BERLIN-TYPE SITUATION TRANSPLANTED INTO THE MIDEAST CAN HARDLY BE MINIMIZED.

THE NOTION OF GUARANTEEING A SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST HAS BEEN TESTED BEFORE WITH DISASTROUS RESULTS. THE 1950 TRIPARTITE GUARANTEE OF THE U.S., BRITAIN, AND FRANCE, ENDORSING THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE STATES OF THE REGION, FAILED TO PREVENT THE TWO MAJOR WARS OF 1956 AND 1967. THE 1957 COMMITMENT OF MAJOR MARITIME POWERS, LED BY THE UNITED STATES, LIKewise FAILED TO GRANT ISRAEL ITS RIGHTS IN THE REGION'S INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS WHICH WAS THE MAJOR INTENT OF THAT UNDERTAKING. NOT ONLY DID IT FAIL TO PREVENT NASSER FROM CONTINUING HIS BLOCKADE OF THE SUEZ CANAL; IT PROVED IMPOTENT WHEN, IN 1967, THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT REIMPOSED HIS BLOCKADE OF THE GULF OF AQABA.

STATE OF ISRAEL  
POLICY BACKGROUND STATEMENT  
MARCH 27, 1969

## 1 THE ROLE OF THE U.N. IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1. STATE OF ISRAEL LEGITIMIZED THROUGH PARTITION PLAN APPROVED BY THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
2. U.N. RESOLUTIONS HAVE LED TO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN 1949, 1956 AND 1967.
3. U.N. RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER 22, 1967 HAS FORMED THE BASIS FOR CURRENT PEACE INITIATIVE.
4. WITH ARAB REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, U.N. HAS BECOME A FORUM FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN BOTH PARTIES.

### ISRAEL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE U.N.

THE UNITED NATIONS HAS...TO BE DISCOUNTED AS AN EFFECTIVE GUARANTOR /OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT./ THE UN PROVED IMPORTANT AS AN EFFECTIVE KEEPER OF THE PEACE IN 1967. THERE ARE NO GROUNDS TO ASSUME THAT IT CAN PLAY A MEANINGFUL ROLE NOW, PRECISELY BECAUSE OF ITS PARLIAMENTARY IMBALANCE AND BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET VETO WHICH, IN THE COURSE OF YEARS, HAS BECOME AN AUTOMATIC INSTRUMENT OF ARAB POLICY. THE UN CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN MAKING AVAILABLE ITS GOOD OFFICES FOR THE PROMOTION OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AS EVINCED IN THE JARRING MISSION.

STATE OF ISRAEL  
POLICY BACKGROUND STATEMENT  
MARCH 27, 1969

## 5 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NOVEMBER 22, 1967

THE SECURITY COUNCIL, EXPRESSING ITS CONTINUING CONCERN WITH THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST; EMPHASIZING THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR AND THE NEED TO WORK FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN WHICH EVERY STATE IN THE AREA CAN LIVE IN SECURITY; EMPHASIZING FURTHER THAT ALL MEMBER STATES IN THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE UNDERTAKEN A COMMITMENT TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 2 OF THE CHARTER:

1. AFFIRMS THAT THE FULFILLMENT OF CHARTER PRINCIPLES REQUIRES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE THE APPLICATION OF BOTH THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:  
WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI ARMED FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE RECENT CONFLICT JUNE 1967 WAR  
TERMINATION OF ALL CLAIMS OR STATES OF BELLIGERENCY AND RESPECT FOR AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA AND THEIR RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES FREE FROM THREATS OR ACTS OF FORCE;
2. AFFIRMS FURTHER THE NECESSITY FOR GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN THE AREA; FOR ACHIEVING A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM; FOR GUARANTEEING THE TERRITORIAL INVIOABILITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA, THROUGH MEASURES INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMILITARIZED ZONES.
3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO DESIGNATE A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE (CONSEQUENTLY, GUNNAR JARRING) TO PROCEED TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH THE STATES CONCERNED IN ORDER TO PROMOTE AGREEMENT AND ASSIST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL AND ACCEPTED SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISION AND PRINCIPLES IN THIS RESOLUTION;
4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE PROGRESS OF THE EFFORTS OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

## 2 U.N. ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1. UNRWA - UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR THE PALESTINE REFUGEES-SUPERVISES RELIEF ACTIVITIES FOR THE PALESTINE REFUGEES.
2. UNEF - UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE-EFFECTIVELY SERVED AS BARRIER BETWEEN EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI TROOPS FROM 1956 TILL 1967.
3. UNTSO - UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION - HAS SUPERVISED THE VARIOUS TRUCES, ARMISTICES AND CEASEFIRES BETWEEN ISRAELI AND ARAB FORCES, VERIFIED WHEN VIOLATIONS OCCURRED AND (WHEN POSSIBLE) ASCERTAINED WHICH PARTY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE VIOLATIONS.

## 4 REASONS FOR U.N. INEFFECTIVENESS

1. U.N. HAS NO POWER TO ENFORCE ITS RESOLUTIONS.
2. EACH SIDE HAS DISREGARDED ANY RESOLUTIONS IT DISLIKES.
  - A. BECAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF ARAB COUNTRIES (AMONG OTHER REASONS) MOST OF THE RECENT RESOLUTIONS HAVE BEEN (RELATIVELY) UNFAVORABLE TO ISRAELI POSITION.
  - B. BECAUSE OF U.S. POSITION, MOST SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ARE NOT ENTIRELY FAVORABLE TO THE ARAB POSITION.
3. ONLY CONCERTED ACTION BY U.S. AND U.S.S.R. (SO FAR NOT FORTHCOMING) IN SUPPORT OF U.N. RESOLUTIONS OFFERS PROMISE OF COMPLIANCE BY BOTH SIDES TO U.N. RESOLUTIONS.

## 6 THE EFFECT OF U.N. INTERVENTION

...BUT WHY, THE READER MAY WONDER, CANNOT SOME COMPROMISE BE REACHED? AFTER ALL, PEACE HAS BEEN MADE BETWEEN PEOPLES WHO HAD GREATER DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM. THAT IS TRUE, BUT IN THE PALESTINE CONFLICT THERE IS A NEW ELEMENT. THAT IS THE INTERVENTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 'TO RESTORE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,' IN THE WORDS OF ARTICLE 39 OF THE CHARTER....

'WHILE THE CHARTER GIVES THE UNITED NATIONS, THROUGH THE AGENCY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, EXTENSIVE POWERS, EVEN TO THE USE OF MILITARY SANCTIONS, TO STOP FIGHTING OR ELIMINATE THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE, IT HAS ALMOST NO POWERS TO OBLIGE ANY NATION TO MAKE PEACE. MORE EXPLICITLY IT LACKS POWER TO IMPOSE TERMS OF PEACE OR A GENERAL SETTLEMENT. THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAN RECOMMEND ONLY....

"THE RESULT IS THAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAS OBLIGED THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS TO STOP THEIR WAR, BUT IT CANNOT OBLIGE THEM TO MAKE PEACE. USUALLY PEACE IS MADE WHEN ONE SIDE HAS WON SUCH VICTORIES IN THE WAR THAT ITS OPPONENT SEES THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO AGREE TO THE VICTOR'S TERMS RATHER THAN CONTINUE, AND FIND ITSELF IN WORSE PLIGHT. OR BOTH SIDES BECOME SO EXHAUSTED OR TIRED OF THE ARMED CONFLICT THAT THEY PREFER COMPROMISE OR A NEGOTIATED PEACE TO CONTINUED FIGHTING. NEITHER OF THESE CONDITIONS OBTAINED WHEN THE UNITED NATIONS SUCCEEDED IN STOPPING THE FIGHTING IN PALESTINE. BOTH SIDES CLAIM THAT THEY COULD HAVE DEFEATED THE OTHER AND HAVE ATTAINED THEIR OBJECTIVES BUT FOR THE INTERFERENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS. NOW, SETTLEMENT OF THE CONTRARY VIEWPOINTS BY TRIAL OF FORCE IS RULED OUT."

E.L.M. BURNS,  
BETWEEN ARAB AND ISRAELI.

## 1 CHARACTERISTICS OF ARAB TERRORIST GROUPS

1. LARGE NUMBER OF GROUPS, MOSTLY SMALL IN MEMBERSHIP
2. WIDE RANGE OF IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONS:
  - A. SOME ARE SUPPORTED BY COMPETING ARAB NATIONS
  - B. SOME ASPIRE TO OVERTHROW CONSERVATIVE REGIMES (E.G., JORDAN)
3. CAUSE RELATIVELY LITTLE MILITARY DAMAGE
  - A. LITTLE COOPERATION BETWEEN GROUPS
  - B. HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DEVELOP BASES IN ISRAEL. HENCE ALL ATTACKS MUST COME FROM OUTSIDE
  - C. ISRAEL CLAIMS 80% OF THE RAIDERS ARE INTERCEPTED
4. MAKE EFFECTIVE USE OF PROPAGANDA "VICTORIES" (OVER ISRAEL) IN THE ARAB WORLD
5. VIEW ALGERIA AND VIETNAM AS THEIR MODELS FOR ACTION
6. BELIEVE THAT THEIR "SUCCESS" WILL LEAD TO ARAB UNITY, NOT VICE VERSA
7. INSIST THAT ISRAEL MUST CEASE TO EXIST
8. ADVOCATE A FREE, DEMOCRATIC PALESTINIAN STATE WHERE ALL CITIZENS HOLD EQUAL RIGHTS--BUT INSIST PALESTINE MUST BE PART OF THE ARAB WORLD

## 3 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FEDAYEEN

"THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ROLE OF RESISTANCE IS NOT REDUCED, ON THE CONTRARY IT IS MULTIPLIED, RENDERING IT A NECESSITY, POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND HUMAN:

1. TO CONTINUE TO STRIKE DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE TWO BATTLES, THAT OF 5 JUNE IN WHICH THE ARAB WORLD WAS DEFEATED, AND THE INEVITABLE BATTLE TO RECTIFY IT... IN THIS PERIOD BETWEEN THE BATTLES THERE IS A NEED FOR FUEL SO THAT THE FLAME WILL NOT GO OUT.
2. THE CONTINUATION OF THE RESISTANCE HAS AN IMPORTANT EFFECT ON MORALE, AS IT ELIMINATES THE FEAR THAT THE ISRAELI ENEMY WANTS TO IMPLANT IN THE HEART OF ARAB FIGHTERS....
3. RESISTANCE IS CAUSING TO THE ENEMY MATERIAL INCONVENIENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BEWILDERMENT.
4. BY STRENGTHENING ITS POSITIONS, DESPITE ALL OBSTACLES, THE RESISTANCE MAY BE ABLE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE BATTLE WITH THE ENEMY BEHIND HIS LINES, WHEN THE DECISIVE HOUR COMES.
5. RESISTANCE, AND THIS IS THE HUMAN ASPECT OF ITS ROLE, WILL SYMBOLIZE THE PALESTINIAN ELEMENT, THE EXISTENCE OF WHICH PROPAGANDA HAS TRIED TO ELIMINATE AND WIPE OUT EVEN THE SHEER FEELING OF ITS EXISTENCE.
6. FINALLY, THE RESISTANCE--BY ITS BRAVERY AND SACRIFICE--PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF THE ENEMY'S OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY, WILL PROVIDE THE ARAB STRUGGLE WITH ITS FINEST LEGENDS AND EPICS. THIS WILL TOUCH THE HEARTS AND WILL INSTIGATE ZEAL WHICH WILL BE ABLE TO REVERSE THE CURRENT."

HASANEIN HEIKAL  
AL-AHRAM, AUGUST 18, 1968

## 5 A FEDAYEEN THEORY OF VICTORY

"THEY FIGHT WELL IN A REGULAR WAR, BECAUSE THERE A MILLION ZIONISTS BALANCE A HUNDRED MILLION ARABS. THE ONE WHO IS QUICKER AND HAS THE BETTER WEAPONS WINS. BUT THEY ARE NOT GOOD AT GUERRILLA WARFARE. WHY DO YOU SUPPOSE WE CHOSE THIS COURSE OF ACTION? THE FEDAYEEN WERE DEVELOPED BECAUSE WE UNDERSTOOD THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE DEFEATED IN A WAR OF ATTRITION, NOT IN A WAR WHERE THE FASTEST ONE WINS, WHO WILL LAST LONGER, US OR THE ISRAELIS? OBVIOUSLY, WE ARE GOING TO. NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF MILITARY REASONS, BUT BECAUSE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND, ABOVE ALL, ECONOMIC ONES AS WELL. IN 1968, ISRAEL HAD TO SPEND ABOUT A MILLION AND A HALF DOLLARS A DAY (FOR DEFENSE). IN 1969, THIS FIGURE DOUBLED TO ALMOST THREE MILLION A DAY. IF IT KEEPS GOING ON LIKE THIS, A SQUARE FOOT OF ISRAEL WILL BECOME MORE EXPENSIVE THAN THE WHOLE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. THE ISRAELIS, WHO ARE CERTAINLY NOT INSENSITIVE TO FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS, WILL HAVE TO FACE UP TO THESE FACTS."

ABU LOTUF (OF AL FATAH) AS QUOTED IN "HIDDEN LEADER OF THE ARAB GUERRILLAS,"  
ORIANA FALLACI

## 2 HISTORY OF FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT

1. OUTGROWTH OF ARAB PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT WHICH BEGAN AS EARLY AS 1918.
2. ORIGINAL "FEDAYEEN" GROUPS WERE ORGANIZED BY EGYPT IN 1955 TO CONDUCT TERRORIST ATTACKS ON ISRAEL.
3. WERE RELATIVELY INACTIVE AFTER 1956 SINAI CAMPAIGN UNTIL 1965, WHEN SYRIA GAVE IT SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT.
4. WERE OPPOSED BY UAR, JORDAN AND LEBANON UNTIL AFTER 1967 WAR.
5. BECAME POPULAR AFTER 1967 WAR BECAUSE REGULAR ARAB ARMIES WERE TOTALLY DISCREDITED AS A MEANS OF REGAINING ARAB LAND.
6. PRESTIGE ROSE GREATLY AFTER MARCH 20, 1968 ATTACK BY ISRAEL ON KARAMAH, A MAJOR GUERRILLA BASE IN JORDAN.
7. RISING POPULARITY IN ARAB WORLD HAS LED TO THE CREATION OF MANY SPLINTER GROUPS.
8. PRESENTLY ARE AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL FORCE AT LEAST IN JORDAN AND LEBANON.

## 4 WEAKNESSES OF THE FEDAYEEN

"THOSE WHO IMAGINE THAT THE RESISTANCE WILL HAVE THE DECISIVE ROLE IN MOPPING UP THE TRACES OF THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION ARE IN MY VIEW LAZY OR ILL-INFORMED. THEY ARE LAZY BECAUSE THEY WANT TO CHARGE OTHERS WITH THIS RESPONSIBILITY, SAVING THEMSELVES TROUBLE, SO AS TO BE ABLE TO STAY QUIESCENT. THEY ARE ILL-INFORMED AS THEY DO NOT KNOW THE TRUE FACTS ABOUT THE CONFRONTATION WITH THE ISRAELI ENEMY.

"AS FOR CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE ARAB WORLD, THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE IS HAMPERED, THOUGH NOT CONSTRICTED, BY FACTORS THAT CANNOT BE OVERCOME:

1. THE HUMAN RATIO BETWEEN RESISTANCE FORCES AND THE ENEMY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY IS NOT LIKE THE PRESENT RATIO IN VIETNAM OR ALGERIA... 40 MILLION VIETNAMESE, WHILE THE ENEMY IS HALF A MILLION AMERICAN SOLDIERS... IN PALESTINE INSIDE THE OCCUPIED AREA THE ARABS ARE LESS THAN A MILLION AND THE ENEMY ARE TWO MILLION WITH A QUARTER OF A MILLION UNDER ARMS.
2. THE NATURE OF THE PALESTINIAN TERRAIN IS DIFFERENT FROM VIETNAM'S WITH ITS THICK FORESTS, AND IS DIFFERENT FROM ALGERIAN TERRAIN WITH ITS RUGGED MOUNTAINS... IN PALESTINE THE PLAINS ARE EXPOSED AND THE MOUNTAINS ARE NOT SPACIOUS. FURTHERMORE, THE PALESTINIAN LAND IS LIMITED AND NARROW, IN PARTICULAR TAKING INTO ACCOUNT AN EXTENSIVE USE OF HELICOPTERS.
3. AROUND VIETNAM THERE ARE SANCTUARIES IN WHICH RESISTANCE CAN PREPARE ITSELF OUT OF THE ENEMY'S REACH, SUCH AS CHINA AND NORTH VIETNAM. THE SITUATION WAS SIMILAR IN ALGERIA... THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE DOES NOT HAVE SUCH SANCTUARIES IN WHICH IT CAN PREPARE ITSELF OUT OF REACH OF THE ENEMY. THE ENEMY IS PREPARED TO STRIKE AT ANY PLACE IN THE ARAB WORLD, WHICH IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IS DEFEATED AND HAS NOT YET RECOVERED ITS STRENGTH."

HASANEIN HEIKAL  
AL-AHRAM, AUGUST 18, 1968

## 6 THE "PALESTINIAN RESOLVE"

"IT IS THE PALESTINIAN RESOLVE THAT THE REVOLUTION WILL LAY DOWN ITS ARMS ONLY AFTER THE LIBERATION OF THE WHOLE OF PALESTINE."

YASSIR ARAFAT  
FEBRUARY-2, 1969

## PRINCIPAL PALESTINIAN GUERRILLA GROUPS

(JULY, 1970)

NAME	ESTIMATED FIGHTING STRENGTH	MAIN LEADERS	ARMS SOURCES	INCOME SOURCES	IDEOLOGY
AL FATAH, THE PALESTINE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT	15,000	YASIR ARAFAT SALAH KHALEF KHALAD AL-HASSAN MOHAMMED NAJJAR HANNI AL-HASSAN ZOUHEIR AL-ALAMI FAROUK KADDOMI	COMMUNIST CHINA OPEN MARKET CAPTURED ISRAELI ARMS ROCKETS OF OWN MANUFACTURE	MAINLY PALESTINIAN PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS CHANNELING PAYMENTS THROUGH GOVERNMENTS OF SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, LIBYA, ABU DHABI	NO POLITICAL IDEOLOGY EXCEPT LIBERATION OF PALESTINE THROUGH ARMED STRUGGLE AND CREATION OF A DEMOCRATIC, SECULAR PALESTINIAN STATE
PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY (PLA); POPULAR LIBERATION FORCES (PLF)	10,000	YASIR ARAFAT BRIG. GEN. ABDEL RAZZAK YAHIA SHAFIQ AL-HAWT ABU MAHMOUD	SAME AS AL FATAH; EAST EUROPE AND ARAB GOVERNMENTS	SAME AS AL FATAH, PLUS ARAB GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES DECIDED BY ARAB LEAGUE	SAME AS AL FATAH
POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP)	4,000	GEORGE HABBASH AHMED AL-YAMANI HEYTAM AYOUBI	EAST EUROPE IRAQ OPEN MARKET CAPTURED ISRAELI ARMS	IRAQ PRIVATE	MARXIST-LENINIST IN SENSE SIMILAR TO ASIAN PARTIES
POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PDF)	1,000	NAYEF HAWATMEH SALAH RA'AFAT ADIB ABD RABU BILAAD AL-HASSAN	SYRIA EAST EUROPE OPEN MARKET CAPTURED ISRAELI ARMS	EAST EUROPE PRIVATE	TROTSKYIST; COMMITTED TO TOTAL REVOLUTION IN ARAB POLITICS AND SOCIETY
POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE-GENERAL COMMAND	500	AHMAD JADRIL FADEL CHORROU	MISCELLANEOUS	MISCELLANEOUS	NONE EXCEPT MILITARY STRUGGLE
AL-SAIQA (THUNDERBOLT)	7,000	ZOUHEIR MOHSEN DAFI J'MANI AHMAD SHAHABI YUSUF AL-BERJI	SYRIA SOVIET UNION OPEN MARKET CAPTURED ISRAELI ARMS	SYRIA	BAATHIST (SYRIAN BRANCH)
ARAB LIBERATION FRONT (ALF)	3,000	ZAYD HAYDAR MUNIF AL-RAZZAZ	IRAQ	IRAQ	BAATHIST (IRAQI BRANCH)
POPULAR ORGANIZATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (POLP)	100	NOT AVAILABLE	COMMUNIST CHINA	MAINLY REFUGEES IN CAMPS IN SYRIA	MAOIST
POPULAR STRUGGLE FRONT (PSF)	200	BAJAT ABU GHARBIYA	PRIVATE	PRIVATE	FORMERLY BAATHIST; NOW DEVOTED ENTIRELY TO CLANDESTINE ACTION INSIDE ISRAELI- OCCUPIED LANDS
ARAB PALESTINE ORGANIZATION (APO)	100	AHMAD ZAROUR	UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC	UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC	NASSERITE SOCIALIST
ACTION GROUP	50	DR. ISAM SARTAWI	IRAQ EGYPT	EGYPT	NASSERITE SOCIALIST
ANSAR (PARTISANS)	50	FUAD NASR KHALED BAGDASH	SOVIET UNION	SOVIET UNION	SOVIET COMMUNIST

① PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN THE MIDDLE EAST



THE NEW YORK TIMES, AUGUST 9, 1970

② ARAB REFUGEES: SOME GENERAL FACTS

1. APPROXIMATELY 1,350,000 ARABS ARE REGISTERED AS PALESTINIAN REFUGEES (INCLUDING OFFSPRING OF ACTUAL REFUGEES FROM 1948)
2. SOME 550,000 REMAIN IN ISRAELI-HELD LAND CONQUERED IN JUNE 1967
3. ONLY 1/3 OF THE PALESTINIAN ARABS RESIDE IN CAMPS
4. AID TO REFUGEES IS CHanneled THROUGH UNRWA - UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES.
5. MANY PALESTINIANS HAVE BECOME SUCCESSFUL IN BUSINESS AND IN POLITICAL LIFE (ESPECIALLY IN JORDAN)

1 THE MAGNITUDE OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM:  
TWO FACETS

"MOST NEUTRAL EXPERTS MAINTAINED, AT LEAST BEFORE THE JUNE WAR, THAT 'PROBABLY LESS THAN 10 PERCENT' (OR ROUGHLY 100,000) OF THE REFUGEES WOULD ACTUALLY HAVE OPTED FOR REPATRIATION ONCE THEY WERE FACED WITH A CLEAR-CUT CHOICE BETWEEN REPATRIATION TO ISRAEL AND RESETTLEMENT WITH COMPENSATION; AND MOST OF THESE WOULD HAVE COME FROM THOSE WITH FAMILY TIES WITH ISRAELI ARABS AND WOULD GENERALLY HAVE BEEN THE LEAST LIKELY TO WANT TO CREATE TROUBLE..."

"UN AND OTHER NEUTRAL OBSERVERS REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED IN THEIR REPORTS THAT MOST OF THE REFUGEES HAD ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE DESIRED AND DEMANDED THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND THAT THIS DESIRE REMAINED 'UNABATED' OVER THE YEARS AND EVEN INCREASED AFTER THE JUNE WAR."

FRED J. KHOURI  
'ARABS IN EXILE'  
TRANSACTION, JULY 1970

3 JEWISH POPULATIONS IN MID-EAST ARAB COUNTRIES

	PRE 1948	MAY 1967
IRAQ	120,000	2,500
EGYPT	80,000	2,500
SYRIA	30,000	4,000
LEBANON	6,000	6,000
LIBYA	35,000	4,000
YEMEN	70,000	-
ADEN	9,000	133
TOTAL	350,000	19,138

FACT SHEET ISSUED BY STATE  
OF ISRAEL, OCTOBER 26, 1968

FRED J. KHOURI  
'ARABS IN EXILE'  
TRANSACTION, JULY 1970

4 ARAB "ZIONISM"

"HAVING KEPT ALIVE FOR 2,000 YEARS THEIR DESIRE TO RETURN TO ISRAEL, ISRAELI JEWS SHOULD NOT FIND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THE STRONG YEARNING OF THE PALESTINIAN ARABS TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND 'HOMELAND.'"

"SINCE 1948 NOBODY EVER HEARD ABOUT A PALESTINIAN ENTITY. WHERE HAVE THEY BEEN?"

PREMIER GOLDA MEIR, HA'ARETZ, FEBRUARY 10, 1970

"THE FIRST THING WE HAVE TO DO...IS TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE PALESTINIAN ARABS EXIST AS AN INFANT NATION. IT IS THERE. WE HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THEM. THE SOONER WE DO IT, THE BETTER IT WILL BE FOR US, FOR THEM, FOR EVENTUAL PEACE."

ARIE ELIAV, SECRETARY GENERAL, LABOR PARTY, IN AN INTERVIEW, TIME, JANUARY 26, 1970

4 ARAB "ZIONISM"

"WE ARE WORKING TOGETHER, FOR A REFORMED AND REVIVED NEAR EAST, AND OUR TWO MOVEMENTS COMPLETE ONE ANOTHER. THE JEWISH MOVEMENT IS NATIONAL AND NOT IMPERIALIST, AND THERE IS ROOM IN SYRIA I.E., THE REGION INCLUDING PALESTINE FOR BOTH. INDEED, I THINK THAT NEITHER CAN BE A REAL SUCCESS WITHOUT THE OTHER."

EMIR FEISAL, LATER KING OF IRAQ  
DECLARATION TO THE ZIONIST DELEGATION  
TO THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE IN 1919

5 ARAB REFUGEES REGISTERED WITH UNRWA--AGE GROUPS AND  
COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE, MAY 31, 1967

COUNTRY	1 YEAR & BELOW	1-15 YEARS	15 YEARS AND OVER	TOTAL	NO. OF FAMILIES
JORDAN	11,993	255,985	454,709	722,687	128,273
GAZA	8,984	120,941	186,851	316,776	55,617
LEBANON	3,481	64,432	92,810	160,723	36,998
SYRIA	3,794	59,620	80,976	144,390	33,359
TOTALS	28,252	500,978	815,346	1,344,576	254,247

SOURCE: REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL OF UNRWA FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST, 1 JULY 1966-30 JUNE 1967, GA, OR 22ND SES. SUPP. NO. 13 (A/6713), TABLE 2, 60.

6 POPULATION CHANGES RESULTING FROM THE JUNE WAR  
(ESTIMATES IN THOUSANDS BY UNRWA)

	FLIGHT AFTER JUNE WAR			REMAINING IN ISRAELI-OCCUPIED AREAS		
	REFU- GEES	REST- DENTS*	TOTAL	REFU- GEES	REST- DENTS*	TOTAL
JORDAN'S WEST BANK (INCLUDING JORDANIAN JERUSALEM)	110	120	230	270	500	770
EGYPT'S SINAI	---	60	60	---	90	90
GAZA STRIP	18	7	25	270	140	410
SYRIA'S GOLAN HEIGHTS	16	100	116	---	6	6
TOTALS	144	287	431	540	736	1,276

\*RESIDENTS ARE ARABS RESIDING IN CONQUERED TERRITORIES WHO ARE NOT CONSIDERED PALESTINIAN REFUGEES FROM 1948



1 AN ARAB VIEW OF THE  
U.N. RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER 22, 1967

"...THE UAR APPRECIATES THE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY THE PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS IN REJECTING THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 22 NOVEMBER 1967, THAT WAS ACCEPTED BY THE UAR. THEY ARE ENTITLED TO REJECT THIS RESOLUTION, WHICH MAY SERVE THE PURPOSE OF ELIMINATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE AGGRESSION CARRIED OUT IN JUNE 1967, BUT IS INADEQUATE FOR DETERMINING THE PALESTINIAN FATE."

PRESIDENT GAMAL NASSER  
SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL  
ASSEMBLY OF THE UAR  
JANUARY 20, 1969

4 AN ARAB "THEORY OF VICTORY"

"WE SHALL COMMIT A MISTAKE IF WE IMAGINE THAT THE FIRST VICTORY OVER THE ENEMY WILL BE THE VICTORY WHICH IS POSSIBLE--WILL NOT BE THE FINAL END. FOR THE ENEMY IT WILL BE ONLY THE BEGINNING OF THE END. EVEN AFTER ACHIEVING VICTORY, THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT PERMIT US TO LIQUIDATE ISRAEL. NEVERTHELESS, OUR FIRST VICTORY WILL MAKE US CONFRONT ANOTHER ISRAEL DIFFERING FROM THE PRESENT ONE."

"LOOKING BACK TO THE CRUSADERS' STATE AND ITS HISTORY WHICH IS ANALOGOUS TO ISRAEL'S, WE SHALL FIND THAT THIS STATE DID NOT END BY THE FIRST VICTORY OVER IT. RATHER, WITH THE PASSAGE OF LONG YEARS VICTORIES FOLLOWED ONE AFTER THE OTHER, UNTIL THE CRUSADERS REALIZED THAT THERE WAS NO ROOM FOR THEIR STATE IN THE MIDST OF THE ARAB EAST, AND SO THEIR STATE STARTED TO DISINTEGRATE."

HASANEIN HEIKAL  
AL AHRAH  
AUGUST 23, 1968

6 EGYPT'S ROLE IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

"IN REPLY TO THE SUDANESE DELEGATION'S SUGGESTIONS THAT ONLY THE PALESTINIANS HAD THE RIGHT TO SPEAK FOR PALESTINE, MR. HEIKAL SAID PRESIDENT NASSER TOLD THEM:

"...VERY EASY TO SAY, BUT HOW VERY FAR FROM THE TRUTH IT IS. IF I HAD BELIEVED THE ISSUE TO BE A TERRITORIAL ONE, I WOULD IMMEDIATELY HAVE ENDED THE PROBLEM AS IT APPLIES TO SINAI AND WOULD HAVE TAKEN A BACK SEAT LIKE OTHERS, ENJOYING THE LUXURY OF COINING SLOGANS AND CIRCULATING THEM."

--THE NEW YORK TIMES, AUGUST 7, 1970

2 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY

"THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES OF EGYPTIAN POLICY ARE IMMUTABLE; ONE, NO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL; TWO, NO PEACE WITH ISRAEL; THREE, NO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL."

PRESIDENT GAMAL NASSER  
JULY 23, 1968

3 EGYPT'S "PREVENTIVE DEFENSE"

"THE EXECUTION OF PREVENTIVE DEFENSIVE ACTIONS MEANS THAT EGYPTIAN FORCES WILL NO LONGER MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE ENEMY TO ATTACK AND THAT EGYPTIAN FORCES WILL LAUNCH OFFENSIVE ACTIONS. THEY WILL SCRUTINIZE THE MOVEMENTS OF THE ENEMY (ISRAEL) AND THE REINFORCEMENT OF HIS TROOPS SO AS TO STRIKE AT HIM BEFORE HE ATTACKS...FROM NOW ON, THE INITIATIVE WILL BE ARAB."

UAR ARMED FORCES GENERAL COMMAND,  
SEPTEMBER 8, 1968

5 THE WAR OF ATTRITION

"WE ARE PREPARED FOR A LONG BATTLE TO EXHAUST THE ENEMY. THE POLICY OF ALL ARAB STATES SHOULD BE TO EXHAUST. A CONTINUOUS WAR BETWEEN US AND ISRAEL EXISTS. WE HAVE SUPERIORITY IN MANPOWER BUT WE MUST MOBILIZE EVERYTHING FOR THE BATTLE."

PRESIDENT GAMAL NASSER  
JULY 27, 1969

7 ISRAELI CASUALTIES AT THE SUEZ CANAL

MONTH		TOTAL CASUALTIES	KILLED	WOUNDED
JULY	'69	115	39	76

(AT THE END OF JULY, ISRAELI REPRISALS DEEP INSIDE EGYPT BEGAN)

AUGUST	'69	65	11	54
SEPTEMBER	'69	47	19	28
OCTOBER	'69	56	10	46
NOVEMBER	'69	39	12	27
DECEMBER	'69	30	12	18

(IN JANUARY THE SOVIET UNION AGREED TO EXPAND THE EGYPTIAN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM)

JANUARY	'70	39	7	32
FEBRUARY	'70	51	18	33
MARCH	'70	47	9	38

(IN APRIL SAM-III MISSILES WERE DEPLOYED AND SOVIET PLANES BEGAN FLYING COMBAT MISSIONS)

APRIL	'70	89	27	62
MAY	'70	94	31	63

POLICY BACKGROUND STATEMENT  
EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
JUNE 3, 1970



### 1 THE EFFECTS OF PROTRACTED WARFARE

"THE MAIN EFFECT OF ALL THIS HAS BEEN A GENERAL FEELING OF DEPRESSION AND SADNESS. YET IT COMES ALONGSIDE A CURIOUSLY CALM RESOLVE. WITH ALL THE SADNESS AND FRUSTRATION OF LIFE IN ISRAEL THESE DAYS, THE NERVES OF THE PUBLIC APPEAR REMARKABLY STEADY. IF ANYTHING, THE HEAVY TOLL OF CASUALTIES ONLY STRENGTHENS THE DETERMINATION TO HOLD OUT. YET IT HAS ALSO BRED FATALISM, WHICH FINDS EXPRESSION, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE MACABRE HUMOR OF HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES SALUTING ONE ANOTHER AS THEY PART WITH, 'WELL, AU REVOIR ON THE CASUALTIES LIST.'"

AMOS ELON, "ISRAELIS BELIEVE WAR IS INEVITABLE," LIFE, FEB. 6, 1970.

### 2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DISSENT

"...ACTUALLY, THE RISE OF DISSENT IN ISRAEL IS PROOF THAT THE WAR OF ATTRITION WAGED UPON ISRAEL BY THE ARABS AND THE SOVIET UNION HAS FAILED AT LEAST IN ONE RESPECT. AGAINST ALL ODDS, ISRAEL AT WAR RETAINS ALL THE FEATURES OF A PEACEFUL DEMOCRACY.

"THE VISUAL IMAGE OF ISRAELI DEMOCRACY IS THE FRANK, OFTEN EVEN WILD, DEBATE HEARD THROUGH THE SOUNDS OF WAR.... IT IS THE IMAGE OF CAPT. ISRAEL GUTTMAN, KILLED ON THE SUEZ FRONT ON MAY 19, THREE DAYS AFTER HE HAD WRITTEN A LETTER TO A CLASS OF BEERSHEBA PUPILS, IN WHICH HE ASSURED THEM THAT 'THE EGYPTIANS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE CANAL ARE HUMAN BEINGS WHO WANT TO LIVE LIKE US--AND TO RETURN SAFELY HOME TO THEIR WIVES AND CHILDREN,' AND URGED THEM NOT TO HATE THE ARABS...."

AMNON RUBINSTEIN, "AND NOW IN ISRAEL A FLUTTERING OF DOVES," THE NEW YORK TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE, JULY 26, 1970.

### 3 ZIONISM'S GOALS AND THE ARAB CONFLICT

"ELIAV ARGUES THAT OF ZIONISM'S THREE PRINCIPAL GOALS, ONLY ONE HAS BEEN ATTAINED--THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JEWISH STATE IN PALESTINE. THE OTHER TWO, PROVIDING A REFUGE FOR ALL JEWS WHO WANT OR NEED ONE AND CREATING A MODEL SOCIETY BASED ON THE JEWISH HERITAGE, HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLETELY FILLED. 'OUR ACHIEVEMENTS ARE MANY,' HE SAYS, 'BUT SO TOO ARE OUR FAILURES. THERE IS A LONG WAY TO GO. THE REAL DANGER, AS I SEE IT, IS THAT THE CONFLICT WITH THE ARABS MAY TAKE US FARTHER AWAY FROM BUILDING THE KIND OF JEWISH SOCIETY THAT WE ZIONISTS WANT TO HAVE IN THE LAND OF ISRAEL.'"

ARIE ELIAV, SECRETARY-GENERAL, LABOR PARTY, IN AN INTERVIEW, TIME, JANUARY 26, 1970.

### 4 THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ARABS

"ALTHOUGH ARAB RADIO AND TELEVISION, BOTH WIDELY FOLLOWED BY ISRAELIS, ARE FULL OF THREATS AND VITUPERATIONS, AND ALTHOUGH ARAB SABOTEURS HAVE NOT REFRAINED FROM BLOWING UP INHABITED APARTMENT HOUSES IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT AND PLACING EXPLOSIVE CHARGES IN A STUDENT CAFETERIA, A SUPERMARKET OR A TEEMING BUS STATION, ISRAELIS STILL EXPRESS LITTLE OVERT HATRED OF THE ARABS AS ARABS. INSTEAD, IN A KIND OF FURY WITHOUT HATE, ISRAELIS HAVE DEMANDS, INCREASINGLY, MORE REPRESSIVE MEASURES AGAINST THE POPULATION OF THE OCCUPIED AREAS AND HEAVIER ACTS OF RETALIATION AGAINST THE ARAB COUNTRIES THAT HARBOR THE SABOTEURS AND SUPPLY THEM WITH MONEY AND ARMS."

AMOS ELON, "ISRAELIS BELIEVE WAR IS INEVITABLE," LIFE, FEB. 6, 1970.

### 5 A POPULAR ISRAELI SONG

"LET THE SUN RISE  
LET THE MORNING LIGHT IN  
SING ONLY A SONG FOR PEACE  
DON'T WHISPER PRAYERS  
BETTER SING A SONG FOR PEACE  
FROM THE TOP OF YOUR VOICE  
SING A SONG FOR LOVE, NOT WAR  
DON'T SAY SOME DAY IT'LL COME.  
BRING US NOW THIS DAY  
BECAUSE IT'S NOT A DREAM  
AND IN EVERY STREET, HAIL ONLY PEACE."

"THIS SONG...COMES FROM...AN ARMY ENTERTAINMENT TROUPE... PERFORMED IN THE FRONT LINES BY UNIFORMED SOLDIERS."

AMNON RUBINSTEIN, "ISRAEL ASKS, 'MA IHIEH HASSOF? WHAT WILL BE THE END?'," THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, MAY 31, 1970.

### 6 JERUSALEM AND LOS ANGELES: A COMPARISON

"...WE FELT COMPLETELY AT HOME IN JERUSALEM, AND WALKED ITS STREETS AT NIGHT WITH A GREATER SENSE OF SECURITY THAN WE HAVE IN OUR CITY OF RESIDENCE, LOS ANGELES."

RABBI M. HEREMINSKY  
LETTER TO THE JERUSALEM POST  
MONDAY, JULY 27, 1970

### 7 THE RESULTS OF "PEACE"

1. ABSORPTION OF SIGNIFICANT MEMBERS OF ARAB REFUGEES WOULD CAUSE SOME ECONOMIC STRAIN:
  - A. DEPEND UPON ACTUAL NUMBER ABSORBED AND TIME SPAN OVER WHICH THEY ARE ABSORBED
  - B. WOULD BE OFFSET BY DECREASED DEFENSE COSTS
2. OPENING OF ARAB MARKETS WOULD IMPROVE ECONOMIC PICTURE
3. SOVIET UNION MIGHT PERMIT LARGE NUMBERS OF ITS JEWISH CITIZENS TO EMIGRATE TO ISRAEL, WHICH WOULD CAUSE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
4. BREAKOUT OF PEACE MIGHT LEAD TO ACTUAL POLITICAL CHAOS RESULTING FROM FAILURE OF ANY MAJORITY COALITION BEING AVAILABLE TO ACCEPT COMPROMISE. PEACE MIGHT LEAD TO LONG-RANGE DECLINE IN MORALE OF YOUNG AND SURFACING OF DISSIDENT AND CENTRIFUGAL TENDENCIES

### 1 CURRENT ARAB ALIGNMENTS

1. THE CONSERVATIVES - JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA
2. THE MODERATE REVOLUTIONARIES - EGYPT, SYRIA, SUDAN, LIBYA, AL FATAH
3. THE RADICALS - IRAQ, ALGERIA, MOST FEDAYEEN GROUPS, ADEN AND SOUTH YEMEN
4. THE NONALIGNED - TUNISIA, LEBANON

### 3 ISRAEL AS A BARRIER TO ARAB UNITY

AFTER 1958, HOWEVER, EGYPT'S CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL UNDERWENT A SUBTLE, MOSTLY UNOBSERVED, BUT CRITICAL TRANSFORMATION. ISRAEL'S GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION CONSTITUTED A WEDGE THAT SEPARATED EGYPT FROM THE ARAB COUNTRIES WITH WHICH IT WISHED TO UNITE AND BELIEVED IT COULD UNITE. IN THE FEW YEARS AFTER THE UNION WITH SYRIA, WHEN THE SPIRIT OF ARAB NATIONALISM RAN VERY HIGH, NASSER THOUGHT THAT THE OBSTRUCTING ISRAELI WEDGE COULD BE BYPASSED. BUT THE MORE HE TRIED AND FAILED IN THIS ENDEAVOR, THE MORE FIRMLY CONVINCED HE BECAME THAT ARAB UNITY COULD NEVER BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT THE PRIOR ELIMINATION OF ISRAEL.

THIS CONCLUSION FIRST SUGGESTED ITSELF TO HIM WHEN THE FEAR OF ISRAEL'S REACTION PREVENTED HIM FROM TRYING TO CRAWL AN UNWILLING JORDAN INTO THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, AND IT WAS DRIVEN HOME WITH GREAT FORCE BY THE SYRIAN SECESSION FROM THE UNION IN 1961. NOT ONLY DID THE ISRAELI WEDGE STAND IN THE PATH OF AN EGYPTIAN INVASION OF SYRIA TO RESTORE THE UNION, BUT THE EXISTENCE OF THAT WEDGE HAD IN THE FIRST PLACE PERMITTED THE SYRIANS TO SECEDE WITHOUT FEAR OF AN EGYPTIAN MILITARY RESPONSE. THE CONCLUSION THAT ISRAEL HAD TO BE ELIMINATED WAS FULLY AND FINALLY CONFIRMED FOR NASSER BY THE FAILURE OF HIS 1963 PROJECT OF UNITY WITH SYRIA AND IRAQ (WHICH WOULD HAVE TAKEN A DIFFERENT COURSE HAD NASSER POSSESSED DIRECT ACCESS TO THESE COUNTRIES), AND BY THE COSTLY FAILURE OF HIS ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT ISRAEL BY TAKING THE YEMEN DETOUR. THUS, THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL COLLIDED PHYSICALLY, NOT TO SAY EMOTIONALLY AND PHILOSOPHICALLY, WITH NASSER'S DREAM OF UNITING THE ARAB WORLD UNDER EGYPTIAN HEGEMONY, AND THIS MEANT THAT COEXISTENCE, EVEN IN THE STATUS OF NO-WAR-NO-PEACE, CEASED TO BE ACCEPTABLE IN PRINCIPLE AND HAD TO GIVE WAY SOONER OR LATER TO THE ARBITRATION OF WAR.

NADAV SAFRAN  
"THE ALTERNATIVES IN THE  
MIDDLE EAST" COMMENTARY  
MAY, 1969

### 2 INTRA-ARAB RIVALRIES

COUNTRIES	CAUSE
1. EGYPT VS. IRAQ	LEADERSHIP OF ARAB COUNTRIES
2. IRAQ VS. SYRIA	LEADERSHIP OF BA'ATH MOVEMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES
3. ALGERIA VS. MOROCCO	BORDER DISPUTE
4. IRAN VS. IRAQ	LEADERSHIP IN PERSIAN GULF AREA

### 4 ISRAEL'S CONTRIBUTION TO ARAB UNITY

"ON MAY 14, 1948, WITH ISRAEL'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE ARAB WORLD PRESENTED A STRONGLY UNITED FRONT IN ITS APPARENTLY UNANIMOUS DECISION TO 'DRIVE ISRAEL INTO THE SEA.' THIS WAS, IN REALITY, AN ENFORCED UNITY, MADE NECESSARY BECAUSE OF THE HATRED EXISTING BETWEEN THE ARAB NATIONS THEMSELVES. EACH NATION, DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF ALL ITS NEIGHBORS, COULD NOT AFFORD TO LET ANY ONE OTHER NATION INVADE ISRAEL ALONE ON THE RISK THAT IT MIGHT WIN PALESTINE AND THEREBY INCREASE ITS OWN POWER SUFFICIENTLY TO DOMINATE OTHER ARAB NATIONS. THE ONLY SELF-DEFENSE IN THIS SITUATION BECAME, PARADOXICALLY, A UNITED WAR AGAINST ISRAEL. EVEN LEBANON, PREDOMINANTLY CHRISTIAN AND BENEFITING ENORMOUSLY FROM TRADE WITH THE PALESTINE AREA, FOUND IT NECESSARY TO SEND A TOKEN FORCE INTO THE WAR."

--CAROL FISHER AND FRED KRINSKY  
MIDDLE EAST IN CRISIS

## 1 HISTORY

1. DESTRUCTION OF THE SECOND TEMPLE OCCURRED IN 70 A.D.
2. SERIES OF INVASIONS AND WARS RESULTED IN DISPERSION OF MOST OF THE JEWISH POPULACE, BUT AT LEAST A SMALL JEWISH COMMUNITY WAS ALWAYS PRESENT.
3. IN 1897 THEODORE HERZL ORGANIZED THE FIRST ZIONIST CONGRESS IN BASEL.
4. ON NOVEMBER 2, 1917 BALFOUR DECLARATION PLEDGED SUPPORT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "NATIONAL HOME" FOR THE JEWISH PEOPLE.
5. IN JULY 1922 PALESTINE WAS PLACED UNDER BRITISH MANDATE BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.
6. ON NOVEMBER 29, 1947, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTED TO PARTITION PALESTINE.
7. ON MAY 14, 1948, STATE OF ISRAEL WAS PROCLAIMED.
8. ON MAY 15, 1948, ARAB STATES DECLARED WAR.
9. IN FEBRUARY OF 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS WERE REACHED WITH THE ARAB STATES.
10. IN OCTOBER OF 1956 ISRAEL INVADED THE SINAI TO ELIMINATE TERRORIST BASES AND OPEN GULF OF AQUABA TO ISRAELI SHIPPING.
11. IN MARCH 1957 ISRAEL EVACUATED SINAI AFTER RECEIVING GUARANTEE OF FREE PASSAGE IN TIRAH STRAITS.
12. IN MAY 1967, EGYPT REOCCUPIED SINAI WITH MILITARY FORCES AND BLOCKADED TIRAH STRAITS.
13. IN JUNE 1967 ISRAEL ATTACKED INTO SINAI. COMPLETE AIR CONTROL RESULTED IN CONQUEST OF SINAI, WEST BANK TERRITORY OF JORDAN AND GOLAN HEIGHTS TERRITORY OF SYRIA BEFORE A CEASEFIRE WENT INTO EFFECT.

## 5 ARAB LIFE IN ISRAEL

1. NUMBER OF ARABS HAS GROWN FROM 140,000 IN 1949 TO 406,000 IN 1968. (ARABS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES EXCLUDED)
2. PRIOR TO JUNE 1967 WAR MANY ARABS VOLUNTEERED AS BLOOD DONORS AND AS REPLACEMENTS FOR FARM LABORERS CALLED UP FROM RESERVES
3. LITTLE ANTAGONISM IS SHOWN TOWARD ISRAELI ARABS CONCERNING ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.
  - A. AFTER A BOMB EXPLOSION IN A JERUSALEM SUPERMARKET, HOWEVER, AN ANTI-ARAB RIOT DID OCCUR
4. CURRENT KNESSET HAS SIX ARAB AND ONE DRUZE MEMBERS, INCLUDING A DEPUTY SPEAKER OF THE KNESSET
5. ARABS RECEIVE SAME PAY AS JEWS FOR EQUAL WORK, AND, IN GENERAL, ARE NOT DISCRIMINATED AGAINST UNDER ISRAELI LAW

## 2 THE VISIONARY

"IF I HAD TO SUM UP WHAT HAPPENED AT THE CONGRESS OF BASEL, I WOULD SAY THAT I FOUNDED THE JEWISH STATE. THIS WOULD PROVE UNIVERSAL LAUGHTER TODAY. BUT PERHAPS IN TWENTY YEARS AND CERTAINLY IN FIFTY, IT WILL BE THERE FOR ALL THE WORLD TO SEE."

THEODORE HERZL, ENTRY IN HIS DIARY AFTER MEETING OF THE FIRST ZIONIST CONFERENCE, AUGUST 29, 1897.

## 3 THE PURPOSE OF ISRAEL

"THIS COUNTRY (ISRAEL) WAS NOT MEANT SOLELY FOR ITS INHABITANTS BUT FOR EVERY JEW THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WHO HAS BEEN COMPELLED EITHER BY CIRCUMSTANCES OR BY AN INNER URGE TO RETURN AND LIVE IN HIS HOMELAND."

--DAVID BEN GURION  
JERUSALEM POST, OCTOBER 22, 1957

## 4 SOCIAL DIVISIONS IN ISRAEL

1. MAIN SOCIAL DIVISION IS BETWEEN JEWS OF ORIENTAL ORIGIN AND JEWS OF EUROPEAN-AMERICAN ORIGIN
2. THOUGH ORIENTAL JEWS FORM A LARGE SEGMENT OF SOCIETY, MOST POSITIONS OF LEADERSHIP ARE FILLED BY JEWS OF EUROPEAN ANCESTRY
  - A. AS A "NEW GENERATION" OF NATIVE ISRAELIS (SABRAS) GAINS LEADERSHIP THIS MAY NOT REMAIN TRUE
3. BECAUSE THEY EMIGRATED FROM ARAB COUNTRIES, DEVOTION OF SOME ORIENTAL JEWS TO ISRAEL WAS CONSIDERED SUSPECT. IN THE 1967 WAR, HOWEVER, ORIENTAL JEWS DISTINGUISHED THEMSELVES IN COMBAT, AND THIS ATTITUDE IS NO LONGER WIDELY HELD.
4. NEW GENERATION OF ORIENTAL JEWS IS BECOMING RAPIDLY "WESTERNIZED"

## 6 ARAB VITAL STATISTICS

	1948	1968
DEATH RATE (PER THOUSAND)	20	5-9
INFANT MORTALITY RATE (PER THOUSAND)	68	39
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE:		
MALE	65%	95%
FEMALE	15%	75%

ISRAEL: GENERAL BACKGROUND (CONT'D)

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GEOGRAPHY

1. BOUNDARIES OF ISRAEL HAVE BEEN A SUBJECT OF MUCH INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE
2. PRE 1967 BOUNDARIES WERE MILITARILY INSECURE AND CAUSE OF MUCH TENSION
3. POST 1967 BOUNDARIES ARE MUCH MORE DEFENSIBLE MILITARILY, BUT UNDOUBTEDLY WILL CHANGE IN THE EVENT OF ANY "SETTLEMENT" WITH ARAB STATES
4. MOST DENSELY POPULATED AREAS ARE FOUND IN THE COASTAL PLAIN
5. ARID NEGEV PROVIDES GREATEST POTENTIAL FOR DEVELOPMENT
6. PORT OF EILAT IS GATEWAY FOR TRADE WITH ASIA AND EAST AFRICA

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NATURAL RESOURCES

1. LACKING IN LARGE QUANTITIES OF NATURAL RESOURCES.
2. DOES POSSESS PHOSPHATE AND POTASH DEPOSITS NEEDED IN PRODUCTION OF FERTILIZERS.
3. MOST MINERAL RESOURCES LOCATED IN THE NEGEV.
4. DEAD SEA IS ALSO AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF MINERALS
5. COPPER IS FOUND AT TIMNA, NEAR EILAT. THE ORE IS LOW GRADE, BUT RISING PRICES FOR COPPER MAY INCREASE IMPORTANCE OF THE DEPOSIT.
6. SOME OIL IS PRODUCED, AND CONQUERED FIELDS IN SINAI ARE BEING DEVELOPED.

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EDUCATION

1. PRIMARY EDUCATION (GRADES 1-6) IS FREE AND COMPULSORY
2. THREE TYPES OF PRIMARY SCHOOLS:
  - A. GENERAL (SECULAR) STATE SCHOOLS (64% OF THE STUDENTS)
  - B. STATE RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS (29% OF THE STUDENTS)
  - C. INDEPENDENT (RELIGIOUS) SCHOOLS (7% OF THE STUDENTS)
3. SECONDARY EDUCATION (GRADES 7-12) IS NOT FREE BUT THERE ARE GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
4. THE NUMBER OF COLLEGES AND GRADUATE SCHOOLS IS SMALL, BUT THE NUMBER IS GROWING, AND THE QUALITY OF THE TEACHING IS HIGH

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MAJOR INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING

1. HEBREW UNIVERSITY (15,000 STUDENTS)
2. TECHNION - ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (7,350 STUDENTS)
3. TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY (9,700 STUDENTS)
4. BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY (4,500 STUDENTS)

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VITAL HEALTH STATISTICS (1968)  
(PER 1,000/ANN)

	<u>JEWS</u>	<u>NON JEWS</u>
CRUDE BIRTH RATE	21.5	44.9
CRUDE DEATH RATE	6.6	6.2
INFANT MORTALITY RATE	20.8	44.3
LIFE EXPECTANCY WAS 70.5 FOR MALES, 73.6 FOR FEMALES.		

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PRINCIPLE CITIES  
(POPULATION AS OF JANUARY 1, 1969)

- |                   |           |
|-------------------|-----------|
| 1. JERUSALEM      | (275,000) |
| 2. TEL AVIV-JAFFA | (384,700) |
| 3. HAIFA          | (212,200) |
| 4. RAMAT GAN      | (109,400) |
| 5. BEERSHEBA      | ( 72,000) |

① POPULATION OF ISRAEL  
(JANUARY 1969)

JEWISH	2,434,800
MOSLEM	300,800
CHRISTIAN	72,150
DRUZE & OTHERS	33,300
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>2,841,050</u>

③ JEWISH POPULATION, BY PLACE OF BIRTH  
(PERCENTAGES)

	1948	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968
BORN IN ISRAEL	35.4	25.2	21.1	37.4	39.4	44.0
BORN ABROAD:						
ASIA	8.1	20.6	18.4	15.7	13.8	12.8
AFRICA	1.7	7.0	9.6	11.9	14.9	14.4
EUROPE AND AMERICA	54.8	47.2	39.9	35.0	31.9	28.8

② MAJOR ORGANIZATIONS

1. GENERAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (HISTADRUT)
  - A. LABOR UNION WITH OVER 50% OF THE ADULT POPULATION AS MEMBERS
  - B. OWNS AND OPERATES SOME OF THE LARGEST FACTORIES IN THE COUNTRY
  - C. IN ADDITION TO UNION ACTIVITIES, IT PROVIDES SOCIAL INSURANCE AND SPONSORS A NUMBER OF EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES
2. WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS (WZO)
  - A. FOUNDED BY THEODORE HERZL IN 1897 TO CREATE "FOR THE JEWISH PEOPLE A HOME IN PALESTINE, SECURED BY PUBLIC LAW."
  - B. PRESENTLY COMPOSED OF INTERNATIONAL GROUPS OF ZIONIST ORGANIZATIONS WHO ARE REPRESENTED IN ITS SUPREME ORGAN, THE WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS
3. JEWISH AGENCY
  - A. FIRST ORGANIZED BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO REPRESENT JEWISH INTERESTS IN PALESTINE
  - B. CURRENTLY THE EXECUTIVE ARM OF THE WZO
  - C. MAIN INTEREST IS IN FOSTERING AND AIDING EMIGRATION TO ISRAEL
  - D. ORGANIZES FUND-RAISING ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE ISRAEL, SUCH AS UNITED JEWISH APPEAL IN THE UNITED STATES

④ IMMIGRATION

1. ACCOUNTS FOR 2/3 OF THE JEWISH POPULATION GROWTH SINCE CREATION OF THE STATE
2. FIRST LARGE SCALE IMMIGRATION CAME FROM WORLD WAR II REFUGEES FROM EUROPE
3. THESE WERE FOLLOWED BY JEWS FROM NEIGHBORING ARAB STATES
4. LATER SOURCES OF IMMIGRANTS WERE NORTH AFRICA AND EAST EUROPE
5. EARLY IMMIGRANTS WERE RELATIVELY UNSKILLED AND PLACED GREAT STRAIN ON THE ECONOMY
6. EXISTENCE OF LARGE IMMIGRATION WAS USED TO RAISE CAPITAL IMPORTS

⑤ JEWISH IMMIGRATION BY CONTINENT OF BIRTH

	AMERICA, EUROPE AND OCEANIA		ASIA & AFRICA		NOT STATED	TOTAL	
		%		%			
1919-14	5.48	385,006	89.6	44,809	10.4	53,042	482,857
15.5-48-1951		334,971	50.3	330,456	49.7	18,774	684,201
1952-1954		11,187	21.9	39,978	78.1	28	51,133
1955-1957		49,630	30.0	110,714	69.1	617	160,961
1958-1960		46,460	64.8	25,926	35.8	7	72,393
1961-1964		86,748	39.4	133,561	60.6	14	220,323
1965-1967		26,577	49.0	27,612	51.0	---	54,189
1948-1967		555,573	45.4	688,247	54.6	19,440	1,243,260

### 1 BASIC ECONOMIC PICTURE

1. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT HAS RISEN SHARPLY: 9% PER YEAR 1950-1968; 12% PER YEAR 1967-69
2. AMONG THE STRAINS ON THE ECONOMY ARE:
  - A. LACK OF MANY BASIC RAW MATERIALS
  - B. ARAB ECONOMIC BOYCOTT
  - C. HEAVY DEFENSE COSTS
  - D. (RELATIVELY) LOW PRODUCTIVITY DUE TO PRESENCE OF MANY SMALL ENTERPRISES
3. PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY HAS CONTINUED TO GROW MARKEDLY
4. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CONTINUES UNFAVORABLE
5. LARGE CAPITAL IMPORTS ARE VITAL TO THE ECONOMY. (ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC SUCCESS, IN GREAT MEASURE, IS DUE TO THE ABILITY TO FIND NEW SOURCES OF IMPORT CAPITAL AS OLD SOURCES GIVE OUT.)
6. ONLY 50% OF THE LABOR FORCE ARE IN "PRODUCTIVE" OCCUPATIONS, THE REST IN SERVICE OCCUPATIONS

### 3 AGRICULTURE

1. ZIONIST PHILOSOPHY PLACES GREAT EMPHASIS ON WORKING THE LAND
2. AT PRESENT 3/4 OF THE COUNTRY'S FOOD (BY VALUE) IS HOME GROWN
3. CHIEF IMPORTS ARE CEREALS, GRAIN FODDER AND FATS
4. MAJOR EXPORT ITEM IS CITRUS FRUITS
5. MAJOR FACTOR LIMITING PRODUCTION IS NOT LAND, BUT THE AVAILABILITY OF WATER

### 5 MAJOR BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES (1968)

1. NATIONAL SECURITY	37.5%
2. DEBT REPAYMENT	16.1%
3. EDUCATION	7.0%

### 2 INDUSTRY

1. GROWTH HAS BEEN RAPID:
  - A. OUTPUT INCREASED OVER 10% PER YEAR, 1950-1968
  - B. INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS INCREASED BY 20% PER YEAR, 1950-1968
  - C. EMPLOYMENT INCREASED FROM 89,000 (1950) TO 252,400 (1968)
2. BUT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF LIMITATIONS:
  - A. SCARCITY OF RAW MATERIALS AND SOURCES OF ENERGY
  - B. MANY SMALL PLANTS
  - C. LARGE DISTANCE AWAY FROM EXPORT MARKETS AND SOURCES OF RAW MATERIALS
3. MAJOR INDUSTRIES INCLUDE:
  - A. DIAMONDS
  - B. FOOD, BEVERAGE AND TOBACCO
  - C. TEXTILES AND CLOTHING
  - D. METALS AND MACHINERY
4. MANY NEW INDUSTRIES ARE BEING DEVELOPED, ESPECIALLY THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

### 4 FOREIGN TRADE

1. UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES AND UNITED KINGDOM SUPPLIED 80% OF THE IMPORTS IN 1968
2. MAJOR MARKETS FOR EXPORTS ARE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES (25%), UNITED KINGDOM (12%) AND UNITED STATES (22%) (1968 FIGURES)
3. INDUSTRY PROVIDED 82% OF THE GOODS EXPORTED (1968) WITH POLISHED DIAMONDS PROVIDING 33%, WHILE CITRUS FRUITS PROVIDED 14% OF THE TOTAL

### 6 EMPLOYED PERSONS, PERCENTAGES BY ECONOMIC BRANCH

	1967	1968
INDUSTRY	24.6	26.0
PUBLIC SERVICE	24.1	23.8
COMMERCE AND BANKING	13.5	13.3
AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY	12.6	11.2
PERSONAL SERVICES & ENTERTAINMENT	8.1	8.2
CONSTRUCTION AND PUBLIC WORKS	7.6	8.1

1 IMPORTS AND EXPORTS BY MAIN COUNTRIES  
OF PURCHASE AND DESTINATION  
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

	IMPORTS			EXPORTS		
	1966	1967	1968	1966	1967	1968
<u>EUROPE</u>	454.4	421.9	663.7	313.0	334.6	356.7
UNITED KINGDOM	158.3	146.2	216.0	62.2	70.5	70.6
WEST GERMANY	69.1	62.3	114.2	47.3	59.3	57.9
NETHERLANDS	37.9	35.6	51.5	37.2	31.0	32.2
SWITZERLAND	27.8	27.3	36.3	29.2	27.2	29.8
FRANCE	34.2	32.7	52.9	18.9	23.7	30.5
BELGIUM	28.9	26.6	43.1	32.2	36.4	40.2
ITALY	29.9	26.7	54.9	7.5	10.3	8.5
<u>ASIA</u>	30.6	27.3	19.9	65.8	71.9	87.0
JAPAN	20.7	19.3	12.6	18.7	21.2	24.2
HONG-KONG	0.6	1.0	1.6	20.9	21.1	25.1
<u>AFRICA</u>	26.7	27.4	30.2	19.5	24.4	28.3
<u>AMERICA</u>	249.3	215.1	272.6	90.2	104.8	140.6
UNITED STATES	220.3	197.1	245.4	77.5	89.9	119.6

3 GROSS IMPORTS BY ECONOMIC DESTINATION  
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

	1959	1966	1967	1968
<u>CONSUMER GOODS (FOR DIRECT CONSUMPTION)</u>				
FOOD	17.1	42.7	33.3	36.0
OTHER CONSUMER GOODS	12.2	22.9	24.7	35.1
DURABLE GOODS	11.4	22.6	18.5	39.0
TOTAL CONSUMER GOODS	40.7	90.5	76.5	110.2
<u>PRODUCTION INPUTS (RAW MATERIALS)</u>				
INPUTS IN AGRICULTURE	29.4	48.0	52.0	50.9
INPUTS IN INDUSTRY	207.1	304.7	408.0	569.1
BUILDING MATERIALS	17.7	9.8	7.7	15.5
FUEL AND LUBRICANTS	34.7	58.3	55.3	62.7
SPARE PARTS AND TOOLS	25.4	45.2	32.6	56.1
TOTAL PRODUCTION GOODS	314.3	466.0	555.7	754.3
<u>INVESTMENT GOODS</u>				
AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT	6.3	5.5	4.9	6.4
INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT	42.3	65.1	48.7	108.0
SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT	14.2	18.8	34.1	37.8
TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATIONS	6.3	28.2	23.3	31.8
OTHER BRANCHES	5.9	22.0	19.4	23.0
TOTAL INVESTMENT GOODS	75.0	139.6	130.3	206.0
<b>TOTAL IMPORTS</b>	<b>430.0</b>	<b>821.0</b>	<b>762.5</b>	<b>1070.5</b>

5 MAJOR INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT  
(IN MILLIONS OF ISRAELI POUNDS AT 1965 PRICES)

	1966	1967	1968
FOODSTUFFS AND BEVERAGES	1,575	1,691	1,976
TEXTILES AND CLOTHING	935	927	1,208
METALS AND MACHINERY	950	889	1,323
CHEMICALS & PETROLEUM PRODUCTS	542	583	760
PAPER AND CARDBOARD	559	546	748
DIAMOND INDUSTRY	494	480	681

2 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION--SELECTED ITEMS  
(IN TONS, EXCEPT WHERE OTHERWISE DESIGNATED)

	1948/49	1958/59	1967/68
CITRUS FRUIT	272,700	587,600	1,265,000
EGGS (THOUSANDS)	242,500	1,027,000	1,224,000
POTATOES & OTHER VEGETABLES	106,000	358,500	491,000
MILK (KILOLITRES)	85,950	300,800	442,700
SUGAR-BEETS	-	122,100	248,000
POULTRY (LIVE WEIGHT)	5,040	40,650	89,200
GRAPES (TABLE AND WINE)	17,800	57,800	71,950

4 GROSS EXPORTS BY GROUPS OF COMMODITIES  
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

	1959	1966	1967	1968
<u>AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS</u>				
CITRUS FRUIT	46	75	85.3	88.2
OTHER AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS	12	19	22.4	24.9
TOTAL AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS	58	94	107.7	113.1
<u>INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS</u>				
POLISHED DIAMONDS	47	165	193.0	229.5
TEXTILES AND CLOTHING	11	45	51.9	62.7
FOOD PRODUCTS	14	26	36.9	43.5
CHEMICALS	9	16	36.0	42.9
MINING PRODUCTS	7	34	28.8	32.4
OTHER INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS	33	87	100.0	116.1
TOTAL INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS	121	373	446.6	527.1
<b>TOTAL EXPORTS</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>467</b>	<b>554.5</b>	<b>640.2</b>

6 ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTIES IN ISRAEL'S FUTURE

1. RISE OF ISOLATIONIST TENDENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES MAY REDUCE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID BY THE U.S. TO ISRAEL.
2. BREAKTHROUGH ON DE-SALINIZATION OF WATER (ON WHICH MUCH RESEARCH IS NOT TAKING PLACE) WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE.
3. ABILITY OF ISRAEL TO PRODUCE ITS OWN MILITARY EQUIPMENT WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT ECONOMIC (AS WELL AS POLITICAL) CONSEQUENCES.
4. ANY SLACKENING OF CURRENT LARGE CAPITAL IMPORTS WOULD CAUSE SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.
5. RISE IN VIOLENCE MIGHT REDUCE TOURISM AND ECONOMIC INVESTMENTS, WHICH WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE ECONOMY.

## 1 JUDAISM IN ISRAEL

1. PERCENTAGE OF "OBSERVANT" JEWS IS ONLY 30-40% OF THE POPULATION
2. MAJOR POWER AND INFLUENCE OF ORTHODOXY IS IN RELATION TO GOVERNMENT SERVICES
  - A. MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES (AMONG JEWS) ARE PERFORMED ONLY BY ORTHODOX RABBINATI
  - B. BUSES IN CITIES ARE IDLE ON THE SABBATH (SATURDAY)
  - C. JEWISH DIETARY LAWS FOLLOWED IN ALL DEFENSE UNITS, GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
  - D. JEWISH SABBATH AND FESTIVALS ARE OFFICIAL HOLIDAYS
3. RELIGIOUS RIGHTS OF OTHER DENOMINATIONS ARE NOT ACCEPTED

## 3 IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION IN ISRAELI LIFE

"...NEXT TO THE PROBLEM OF SURVIVAL ITSELF, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ISRAEL IS TO BE A SECULAR OR A RELIGIOUS STATE IS THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF ALL"

HAROLD FISCH  
FAITH IN ISRAEL  
COMMENTARY

## 5 ONE VIEW OF ISRAELI SOCIETY

"THERE IS NO JEWISH NATION. THERE IS AN ISRAELI NATION. THE STATE THAT CAME INTO EXISTENCE AS A RESULT OF HERZL'S PROPHECIES IS NOT A 'JEWISH STATE.' THE ISRAELI STATE IS CREATING AN IMPERIOUS NATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT IS CONSCIOUS OF ITSELF, BUT DOES NOT INCLUDE IN THAT CONSCIOUSNESS BELONGING TO A JEWISH PEOPLE."

--GEORGES FRIEDMANN  
THE END OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE?

## 2 JEWISH SECTS IN ISRAEL

1. MAJOR DIVISION IS BETWEEN JEWS FOLLOWING SEPHARDIC AND ASHKENAZIC TRADITIONS
2. SEPHARDIC JEWS ARE MAINLY THOSE FROM ORIENTAL COUNTRIES SUCH AS IMMIGRANTS FROM OTHER ARAB LANDS
3. ASHKENAZIC JEWS ARE THOSE FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OR AMERICA
4. A COMMON LANGUAGE, HEBREW (WITH SEPHARDIC PRONUNCIATION) IS A UNIFYING FACTOR
5. A SMALL NUMBER OF NON-ORTHODOX (REFORM AND CONSERVATIVE) SYNAGOGUES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED
6. EVEN AMONG ORTHODOX JEWS THERE IS A WIDE SPECTRUM OF OBSERVANCE
  - A. "MODERN" ORTHODOX, MAINLY AFFILIATED WITH THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY
  - B. "RIGHT-WING" ORTHODOX, MAINLY AFFILIATED WITH AGUDAH POLITICAL PARTIES
  - C. FOLLOWERS OF VARIOUS HASIDIC "REBBES" WHO HAVE SETTLED IN ISRAEL
  - D. EXTREME RIGHT-WING ORTHODOX (NETURAI KARTAH) WHO DO NOT CONSIDER ISRAEL TO BE THE JEWISH STATE AS PROMISED IN THE BIBLE BECAUSE OF ITS ESSENTIALLY SECULAR NATURE

## 4 RECENT RELIGIOUS TRENDS

1. VICTORY IN SIX-DAY WAR CAUSED TREMENDOUS REVIVAL OF INTEREST AND BELIEF IN JUDAISM
2. CONSIDERABLE CONFLICT OVER THE AUTHORITY OF ORTHODOXY TO DECIDE RELIGIOUS/SOCIAL QUESTIONS:
  - A. "WHO IS A JEW?" (SHALIT CASE)
  - B. SHALL CONVERSIONS TO JUDAISM PERFORMED BY NON-ORTHODOX RABBIS BE RECOGNIZED?

## 6 ANOTHER VIEW OF ISRAELI SOCIETY

"ISRAEL HAS ESCAPED MUCH OF THE MALAISE OF WESTERN SOCIETY. PARTLY OWING TO ITS SMALL SIZE AND THE MISHPOCHE (FAMILY) ATMOSPHERE, IT HAS AVOIDED THE ALIENATION OF MODERN MAN IN GREAT URBAN CONCENTRATIONS. LONELY CROWDS ARE NONEXISTENT AND, DESPITE THE APPALLING BUREAUCRACY, DAILY HUMAN CONTACT USUALLY PRECLUDES GREAT HARDSHIPS... ABOVE ALL, THE FAMILY HAS NOT LOST ITS COHESION AND MEANING."

AMNON RUBINSTEIN, "ISRAEL ASKS, 'MA IHIEH HASSOF? WHAT WILL BE THE END?'," THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, MAY 31, 1970.



① POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF ISRAEL

1. DEMOCRATIC STATE WITH UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE
2. SUPREME POWER RESTS IN THE ISRAELI PARLIAMENT, THE KNESSET, WHICH HAS 120 MEMBERS
3. MEMBERS ARE ELECTED UNDER PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
4. BECAUSE OF A MULTIPLICITY OF PARTIES, ELECTION BY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION HAS RESULTED IN NO ONE PARTY EVER OBTAINING A MAJORITY OF SEATS IN THE KNESSET
5. RULE BY A COALITION HAS REDUCED FLEXIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT
6. LABOR PARTY (FORMERLY MAPAI) HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE LARGEST PARTY, AND HAS BEEN THE DOMINANT PARTY IN EVERY RULING COALITION GOVERNMENT. THIS HAS INSURED A BASIC STABILITY OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES
7. MAJOR PUBLIC CONCERN HAS BEEN ATTAINMENT OF "PEACE" WITH ARAB NEIGHBORS
8. POLITICAL LEADERS, BOTH PAST AND PRESENT, HAVE BEEN MAINLY ASHKENAZI JEWS WHO IMMIGRATED (BEFORE INDEPENDENCE) FROM EUROPE AND AMERICA

③ KNESSET ELECTION RESULTS, 28 OCTOBER 1969  
WITH STATE OF PARTIES AT END OF SIXTH KNESSET

	END OF SIXTH KNESSET	SEVENTH KNESSET VOTES	PERCENTAGE	SEATS
LABOR-MAPAM ALIGNMENT	67	680,024	49.73	60
NATIONAL (MAHLACHI)	1	42,654	3.11	4
HERUT-LIBERAL BLOC (GAHAL)	22	296,294	21.67	26
FREE CENTRE	4	16,393	1.20	2
INDEPENDENT LIBERALS	4	43,933	3.21	4
NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY	11	133,238	9.74	12
AGUDAT ISRAEL	4	44,002	3.22	4
POALEI AGUDAT ISRAEL	2	24,968	1.83	2
NEW COMMUNIST LIST (RAKAH)	3	38,827	2.84	3
ISRAEL COMMUNIST PARTY (MAKI)	1	15,712	1.15	1
HA'OLAM HAZEH (NEW FORCE)	1	16,853	1.23	2
OTHER PARTIES	-	14,845	1.07	-

⑤ THE RADICAL LEFT IN ISRAEL

"WE REGARD OURSELVES AS ZIONISTS AND RADICALS. OUR PHILOSOPHY IS BASED ON SELF-DETERMINATION WITHIN PALESTINE, FOR ARABS AND JEWS. WE REGARD THE SIX-DAY WAR AS A JUSTIFIED DEFENSIVE WAR, BUT BECAUSE (IT WAS THIS), WE ARE AGAINST ANY ANNEXATION AND ANY JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. WE BELIEVE IN THE POSSIBILITY OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL GIVE THE PALESTINIANS THEIR INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND WILL, AT THE SAME TIME, INSURE ISRAEL'S SECURITY. WE ARE ALSO COMMITTED TO THE RADICAL LEFT--NOT IN ITS SOVIET PERVERSION--BUT IN ITS TRUE MEANING. YET WE ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE NEW LEFT IN THE WEST. FIRST, WE, UNLIKE THEM, HAVE TO INSURE OUR NATIONAL EXISTENCE. SECONDLY, OUR WHOLE BACKGROUND AND SOCIETY ARE DIFFERENT FROM THEIRS. BUT WE HAVE THINGS IN COMMON: A BELIEF IN DIRECT ACTION, A REJECTION OF THE OLD DOGMATIC LEFT, A BURNING NEED TO CHANGE THE PRESENT REALITY."

RAN COHEN, MEMBER OF SI'AH, AS QUOTED BY AMNON RUBINSTEIN, "AND NOW IN ISRAEL A FLUTTERING OF DOVES," THE NEW

② PARTY DISTRIBUTION OF MEMBERS OF THE CURRENT ISRAELI CABINET

1. LABOR PARTY - 12 MEMBERS OF THE CABINET INCLUDING:
  - A. PRIME MINISTER - GOLDA MEIR
  - B. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER - YIGAL ALLON
  - C. FOREIGN AFFAIRS - ABRAHAM EBAN
  - D. DEFENSE - MOSHE DAYAN
2. MAPAM - 2 MEMBERS
3. NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY - 3 MEMBERS
4. INDEPENDENT LIBERAL PARTY - 1 MEMBER
5. GAHAL PARTY - RECENTLY RESIGNED FROM CABINET, HAD 6 MEMBERS

③ MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES

1. ISRAEL LABOR PARTY
  - A. UNION (IN 1968) OF MAPAI, ACHDUT HAAVODA, AND RAFI PARTIES
  - B. CONNECTED WITH THE HISTADRUT, LARGEST LABOR GROUP IN ISRAEL
2. UNITED WORKERS PARTY (MAPAM)
  - A. MORE LEFT-WING THAN MAPAI
  - B. FORMED AN ALIGNMENT WITH LABOR FOR THE 1969 NATIONAL ELECTIONS
3. HERUT-LIBERAL BLOC (GAHAL)
  - A. RELATIVELY RIGHT-WING PARTY
  - B. ADVOCATES RETENTION OF MOST LAND CONQUERED IN 1967
4. NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY
  - A. UNION (IN 1956) OF MIZRAHI AND HAPOEL HAMIZRAHI
  - B. REPRESENT RELIGIOUS ZIONIST MOVEMENT
  - C. MEMBER OF THE RULING COALITION GOVERNMENT

④ (RELATIVELY) NEW POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

1. LAND OF ISRAEL MOVEMENT: URGES RETURN TO THE HISTORIC (BIBLICAL) BOUNDARIES OF THE LAND OF ISRAEL, IN PARTICULAR, OPPOSES RETURN OF TERRITORY WON IN 1967
2. MATZPEN: A PRO-FATAH, ANTI-ZIONIST MOVEMENT WHICH URGES RETURN OF ALL CONQUERED TERRITORIES
3. SI'AH: A NEW RADICAL LEFT GROUP WHICH URGES NO ANNEXATION OF CONQUERED TERRITORIES AND A SETTLEMENT WHICH RECOGNIZES EXISTENCE OF A PALESTINIAN ARAB ENTITY

⑥ THE MILITARY AND ISRAELI POLITICS

"ISRAEL, MOREOVER, IS VIRTUALLY ALONE AMONG THE NEW SMALL NATIONS IN THE UNQUESTIONED SUBSERVIENT OF THE MILITARY TO THE CIVILIAN AUTHORITY. THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE IS AN ELITE AMONG ARMIES, YET IT HAS PRODUCED NO MILITARY ELITE TO THREATEN THE INTEGRITY OF ISRAELI DEMOCRACY..."

ROBERT ALTER  
"ZIONISM FOR THE 70'S"  
COMMENTARY, FEBRUARY 1970

EGYPT

# 1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION

1. "EGYPT IS THE NILE"
  - a. REST OF COUNTRY IS DESERT
  - b. ONLY ARABLE LAND IS 2-10 MILES ASTRIDE THE BANKS OF THE NILE--ROUGHLY 3.5% OF EGYPT'S TOTAL AREA
  - c. NEARLY 26 MILLION WEDGED INTO THIS NARROW BELT (TOTAL POPULATION 31.6 MILLION)
  - d. NILE BANKS REPRESENT ONE OF THE MOST DENSELY POPULATED AREAS IN THE WORLD
2. RAINFALL IS NEGLIGIBLE
  - a. CAIRO AVERAGES 1.3 INCHES/YEAR
  - b. AVERAGE FOR SOUTHERN EGYPT IS EVEN LESS
3. RELIGION
  - a. OVER 90% ARE SUNNI MOSLEMS
  - b. ABOUT 7% BELONG TO THE CHRISTIAN COPTIC SECT--LINEAL DESCENDANTS OF THE ANCIENT EGYPTIANS

# 2 MUHAMMAD ALI (RULED 1806-1849)

"FOR FORTY YEARS MUHAMMAD ALI RULED EGYPT, AND EVERY PHASE OF LIFE AND SOCIETY INTERESTED HIM AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER. A NEW GOVERNMENT WAS CREATED; AND A CABINET WITH MINISTERS OF WAR, NAVY, AGRICULTURE, FINANCE, COMMERCE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EDUCATION, AND SECURITY DEVELOPED...NEWSPAPERS PRINTED IN BOTH ARABIC AND FRENCH, NOT ONLY GAVE URBAN SOCIETY A VEHICLE BY WHICH WESTERN IDEAS WERE CIRCULATED, BUT ALSO MADE EGYPT A LEADER IN THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE ARAB WORLD. MUHAMMAD ALI WAS IMPATIENT AND TRIED TO CHANGE SOCIETY RAPIDLY WITHOUT A SUFFICIENT SUPPLY OF SYMPATHETIC OFFICIALS. HIS INNOVATIONS WERE TOO HURRIED AND TOO SHALLOW TO ENDURE...THE AGE OF MUHAMMAD ALI IN EGYPT COINCIDED WITH THE FIRST INDUSTRIAL SURGE IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE PASHA BECAME CONVINCED OF THE VALUE OF SUCH A PROGRAM FOR HIS LAND. HE IMPORTED TEXTILE PLANTS AND BUILT SUGAR FACTORIES. BUT KNOWLEDGE TO KEEP THEM IN OPERATION, SUITABLE LABOR, AND SUPPLIES OF COAL AND IRON WERE LACKING; AND EVEN BEFORE MUHAMMAD ALI DIED, THE FAILURE TO INDUSTRIALIZE EGYPT WAS APPARENT."

THE MIDDLE EAST  
SYDNEY FISHER  
(PP. 284-285)

# 3 SOME MAJOR EVENTS IN EGYPTIAN HISTORY

- 5000 BC - EARLIEST RECORDED HISTORY OF THE COUNTRY
- 3200 BC - COUNTRY UNITED INTO A SINGLE KINGDOM AND RULI BY A SUCCESSION OF DYNASTIES
- 525 BC - CONQUERED BY PERSIA
- 332 BC - CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER THE GREAT
- 30 BC - CONQUERED BY ROMANS. CHRISTIANITY FLOURISHED
- 641 AD - CONQUERED BY MUSLIMS WAGING HOLY WAR AGAINST THE BYZANTINE AFTER THE DEATH OF MUHAMMAD, AND BECAME PART OF ISLAMIC EMPIRE CENTERED IN BAGHDAD. GRADUALLY ADOPTED ARABIC AND ISLAMIC RELIGION
- 1517 - BECOMES PART OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
- 1798 - CONQUERED BY NAPOLEON
- 1801 - BRITISH AND TURKISH TROOPS EVICT FRENCH; OTTOMAN OFFICER BECOMES EGYPTIAN PASHA
- 1869 - SUEZ CANAL COMPLETED
- 1914 - BECOMES A BRITISH PROTECTORATE
- 1936 - BRITAIN AGREES TO WITHDRAW EVENTUALLY FROM ALL OF EGYPT EXCEPT THE CANAL ZONE
- 1948 - HEAVILY INVOLVED IN WAR AGAINST ISRAEL SUFFERED MANY DEFEATS
- 1952 - KING FAROUK OVERTHROWN BY COUP. REPUBLIC IS PROCLAIMED, NAGIB--CONSERVATIVE AND PRO-ISLAMIC--BECOMES PRESIDENT. GOVERNMENT THEN ACTED TO BREAK POWER OF FEEJAL CLASS BY LIMITING LAND OWNERSHIP TO 300 ACRES.
- 1953 - MONARCHY ABOLISHED
- 1954 - NASSER OVERTHROWS NAGIB; BRITISH AGREE TO WITHDRAW FROM CANAL ZONE BY 1956. NASSAR TAKES ACTIVE ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
- 1956 - NASSER FAILS TO RAISE NEW FUNDS FOR ASWAN DAM AND THEN NATIONALIZES SUEZ CANAL. HAVING LOST ANY CONTROL OVER THE CANAL, BRITAIN AND FRANCE WITH ISRAEL ATTACKED EGYPT, SUBSEQUENTLY REPLACED BY U.N. FORCE
- 1957 - CANAL CLEARED OF DEBRIS AND EUROPEAN NATIONS FORCED TO ACCEPT EGYPTIAN CONTROL
- 1958 - FORMS UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC WITH SYRIA
- 1961 - UNHAPPY WITH SUBORDINATION TO EGYPT, SYRIAN ARMY REVOLTS AND WITHDRAWS FROM U.A.R.
- 1962 - NASSER SENDS TROOPS TO YEMEN TO AID REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION
- 1967 - SUFFERS HUMILIATING DEFEAT IN 6-DAY WAR WITH ISRAEL
- 1968 - ANTI-GOVERNMENT STUDENT RIOTS ERUPT
- 1969 - FIGHTING WITH ISRAEL ALONG CANAL CONTINUES; RUSSIAN PRESENCE INCREASES

# 4 EGYPT AND THE WEST IN THE 19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURIES

- A. MUHAMMAD ALI'S "CREATIVE RESPONSE" TO THE WEST
  1. CREATED A RELATIVELY MODERN GOVERNMENT
    - a. ORGANIZED A CABINET AND VARIOUS MINISTRIES
    - b. MODERNIZED THE MILITARY
  2. IMPROVED IRRIGATION
  3. ESTABLISHED RELATIVELY EFFICIENT HEALTH QUARANTINE SYSTEM
  4. CREATED EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
  5. EXPANDED TRADE
  6. MADE FIRST SERIOUS ATTEMPTS AT INDUSTRIALIZATION
  7. MAJOR PROBLEM WITH THE WEST: BRITISH SUPPORT FOR ISTANBUL AGAINST HIS DEMANDS FOR GREATER CONTROL OVER THE NEAR EAST.
- B. ISMAIL'S ULTIMATELY UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO IMITATE THE WEST: 1863-1879
  1. MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS ACHIEVED THROUGH SUCCESSFUL USE OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY
    - a. CONSTRUCTION OF SUEZ CANAL
    - b. CONSTRUCTION OF RAILROADS, TELEGRAPH SYSTEM, SCHOOLS
    - c. CREATION OF SEVERAL MAJOR NEW INDUSTRIES, E.G. SUGAR AND TOBACCO
    - d. INTRODUCTION OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN TECHNIQUES IN BUREAUCRATIC OPERATIONS
    - e. INTRODUCTION OF EUROPEAN STYLES AND OUTLOOK TO EGYPTIAN SOCIETY
  2. MAJOR MISTAKES AND WEAKNESSES:
    - a. HAD THE INSTINCTS OF A WELL-FINANCED, NAIVE PLAYBOY
    - b. ENJOYED THE GLORY OF HIGH OFFICE BUT IGNORED THE BURDEN
    - c. CONFUSED EGYPT WITH EUROPE, E.G. "EGYPT WAS A PART OF EUROPE."
    - d. CONSEQUENTLY DROVE EGYPT INTO ALMOST PERMANENT BONDAGE TO BRITAIN AND FRANCE.
  3. CONSEQUENCES: ANGLO-FRENCH DUAL CONTROL
    - a. ONE FRENCH CONTROLLER, ONE BRITISH, APPOINTED TO ENSURE EVENTUAL REPAYMENT OF DEBT
    - b. CONTROLLERS HAD ULTIMATE SAY IN ALL POLICY DECISIONS OF EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT
    - c. REGARDLESS OF NATIONAL INCOME, EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT RECEIVED "FIXED" ALLOWANCE, REMAINDER DEVOTED TO REPAYMENT OF DEBT
    - d. EGYPTIAN PEOPLE SUFFERED REGARDLESS OF INCREASES IN PRODUCTIVITY
    - e. EGYPTIAN ARMY AND CIVILIAN BUDGETS REDUCED
    - f. INCREASING NUMBERS OF FOREIGN ADMINISTRATORS EMPLOYED IN BUREAUCRACY AT VERY HIGH SALARIES
    - g. FINAL RESULT: BRITISH OCCUPATION IN 1882 AFTER ARMY GAINED CONTROL OF CABINET IN REBELLION AGAINST DE FACTO FOREIGN RULE

①

THE RISE OF EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM  
OR  
THE EMANCIPATION OF EGYPT

- A. FIRST MAJOR EGYPTIAN POLITICAL PARTIES PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I
  1. "WEAK" REACTIONARY PARTY
  2. "VIGOROUS" ISLAMIC MODERNIST PARTY
  3. CONSTITUTIONAL PARTY OF WEALTHY EUROPEANIZED EGYPTIAN LANDOWNERS
  4. ARMY GROUP COMPOSED OF PURE EGYPTIANS
  5. NATIONAL PARTY, AN AGGRESSIVE NATIONALIST PARTY
    - a. LED BY MUSTAFA KAMAL, ONE OF EGYPT'S FIRST GREAT NATIONALISTS
    - b. KAMAL DEDICATED TO NATIONALISM FREE OF RELIGIOUS FANATICISM
    - c. AFTER KAMAL'S DEATH, PARTY DEGENERATED
  6. BECAUSE OF BRITISH POWER, POLITICAL PARTIES HAD ONLY VERY LIMITED EFFECT
- B. MAJOR EGYPTIAN POLITICAL PARTIES AFTER WORLD WAR I
  1. LIBERAL PARTY
    - a. MOSTLY ELDER POLITICIANS DESCENDED FROM OTTOMAN TURKISH FAMILIES
    - b. OFTEN ALLIED WITH THE WAFDIST PARTY
    - c. PARTICIPATED IN SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS
  2. UNIONIST PARTY
    - a. SUPPORTED THE MONARCHY
    - b. HELD POWER BRIEFLY BETWEEN THE TWO WARS
  3. PEOPLE'S PARTY
    - a. LED BY ISMAIL SIDKI PASHA, AGGRESSIVE POLITICIAN
    - b. GENERALLY SUPPORTED THE SAME POLICIES AS THE MONARCHY
    - c. FIERCE RIVAL OF THE WAFD
    - d. HELD POWER ONLY BRIEFLY DURING THE 1930'S
    - e. INCURRED STRONG OPPOSITION OF THE KING WHO FEARED SIDKI AS POTENTIAL RIVAL
  4. SAADIST PARTY
    - a. MOSTLY DISAFFECTED WAFDISTS
    - b. GENERALLY REPRESENTED THE PRO-WESTERN BOURGEOISIE
  5. WAFD PARTY
    - a. MAJOR POLITICAL FORCE UNTIL 1952 REVOLUTION
    - b. FEARED BY THE MONARCHY
    - c. PRO-NATIONALISTIC BUT SOCIALLY CONSERVATIVE
    - d. GENERALLY REPRESENTED NATIONALISTIC MIDDLE AND UPPER CLASSES
    - e. HOWEVER HELD POWER INTERMITTENTLY FOR 7 YEARS BETWEEN 1919-1952
- C. INITIAL BRITISH REACTION: CONSOLIDATION OF CONTROL
  1. 1914 UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF PROTECTORATE OVER EGYPT
    - a. MARTIAL LAW ALSO DECLARED AT THE SAME TIME
    - b. MARTIAL LAW CONTINUED UNTIL 1923
  2. EXILED WAFDIST LEADERS IN 1919 FOR AROUSING NATIONALIST FEELINGS AGAINST LONDON
    - a. RESULTED IN MAJOR SPONTANEOUS REVOLT THROUGHOUT EGYPT
    - b. ALSO RESULTED IN GRADUAL BEGINNING OF MORE LIBERAL BRITISH POLICY
- D. FIRST MAJOR EGYPTIAN VICTORIES
  1. UNDER WAFD PRESSURE BRITISH UNILATERALLY ELEVATED EGYPT TO SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENT STATE IN 1922
  2. AT BRITISH INSISTENCE, IN 1923 THE KING PROHULGATED A NEW CONSTITUTION PROVIDING FOR:
    - a. PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
    - b. POWERFUL MONARCHY WITH POWER TO APPOINT MINISTERS
    - c. MONARCH ALSO EMPOWERED TO DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT BY DECREE
    - d. BRITISH TROOPS AND ADVISERS REMAINED WITH CONTROL OVER DEFENSE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN INTERESTS
  3. EGYPTIAN POLITICS THUS BECAME A THREE-WAY RIVALRY BETWEEN THE:
    - a. MONARCH
    - b. NATIONALISTS
    - c. BRITISH RESIDENT
  4. CONSTITUTION FAILED IN STABILIZING POLITICAL SYSTEM
    - a. UNTIL 1952 EGYPT RULED BY A SUCCESSION OF GOVERNMENTS
    - b. GOVERNMENTS OFTEN LASTED NO LONGER THAN A YEAR
    - c. BY OVERCOMING WAFDISTS, MONARCHY GRADUALLY GAINED A DECISIVE ADVANTAGE OVER POLITICAL PARTIES

## E. ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY OF 1936

1. ORIGINALLY NEGOTIATED BY THE WAFD IN 1921
2. FOR POLITICAL REASONS WAFD THEN LOBBIED AGAINST FINAL APPROVAL ON RETURN TO EGYPT
3. BRITISH RESIDENT RECOGNIZING RISING NATIONALIST FEELING PREVAILED ON LONDON TO DECLARE EGYPTIAN INDEPENDENCE IN 1922
4. WAFD LEADERS RETURNED TO ENGLAND IN 1924 WITH STRONGER DEMANDS AS MEANS OF AROUSING NATIONALIST FEELING AT HOME EVEN FURTHER
5. ETHIOPIAN CRISIS OF 1936 FINALLY LED TO SIGNING OF THE TREATY
  - a. FOLLOWING CRISIS, BRITISH DECIDED TO MOVE REGIONAL NAVAL HEADQUARTERS TO ALEXANDRIA
  - b. MOVE UNITED EGYPTIAN OPPOSITION AS NEVER BEFORE
  - c. WITHOUT FEAR OF RIVAL PARTIES' SUBSEQUENT DISSENT, OPPOSITION DECLARED WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE TREATY
  - d. FINAL TREATY WAS BASED ON DOCUMENT DRAFTED JOINTLY IN 1930
6. PROVISIONS OF TREATY INCLUDED:
  - a. OCCUPATION CHANGED TO 20-YEAR MILITARY ALLIANCE
  - b. MIXED TRIBUNALS AND CONSULAR COURTS TO BE PHASED OUT BY 1949
  - c. THUS FOREIGNERS AND FOREIGN COMPANIES WOULD BE SUBJECT TO ALL EGYPTIAN LAW
  - d. BRITISH TROOPS WOULD REMAIN AROUND THE CANAL PLUS SPECIFIC ADDITIONAL FACILITIES FOR LAND, SEA, AND AIR.

②

SOME ASPECTS OF THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY  
BEFORE THE 1952 REVOLUTION

- A. FOREIGN INFLUENCE (PRIMARILY BRITISH)
  1. EGYPT, IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY, HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS A "GIGANTIC COTTON PLANTATION FOR THE FACTORIES OF LANCASHIRE."
    - a. BRITISH OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES REFUSED TO SUPPORT OTHER SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY
  2. IN 1914 FOREIGNERS OWNED 92% OF THE CAPITAL INVESTED IN EGYPT
    - a. MORE THAN 2/3 OF THIS INVESTED IN LAND, IRRIGATION AND MORTGAGE LOANS
    - b. NO RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN EGYPT
  3. EGYPT ALSO DESCRIBED AS AN "EXTENSION OF THE LONDON MONEY MARKET"
    - a. EGYPTIAN POUND TIED TO STERLING
    - b. LARGE MOVEMENT OF FUNDS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES
  4. LARGE DEBT OWED TO FOREIGN CREDITORS
- B. GROWTH OF ECONOMY
  1. COTTON EXPORTS
    - 1912 - £ 24.9 MILLION
    - 1952 - £147.5 MILLION
  2. TOTAL EXPORTS
    - 1912 - £ 28.1
    - 1952 - £158.6
  3. NATIONAL INCOME
    - 1922 - £200.0 MILLION
    - 1938 - £193.0 MILLION
    - 1945 - £660.0 MILLION
    - 1950 - £858.0 MILLION
    - (1938, 1945, 1950 IN 1950 PRICES)
- C. GREATEST GROWTH PERIOD WAS 1940-1952
  1. NATIONAL INCOME ROSE BY MORE THAN 300%
  2. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
    - 1940 - £13 MILLION
    - 1947 - £18 MILLION
  3. TOTAL EXPORTS ROSE BY MORE THAN 500%
    - 1938 - £ 26.0 MILLION
    - 1952 - £158.6 MILLION
  4. MOST OF NEW INVESTMENT WAS EGYPTIAN, NOT FOREIGN
    - a. BETWEEN 1934-1948, £8.7% OF NEW INVESTMENT WAS EGYPTIAN
    - b. BY 1948, FOREIGN INVESTMENT HAD DROPPED TO ONLY 61% OF TOTAL INVESTMENT
  5. STEADY DECLINE IN PERCENTAGE OF TRADE DIRECTED TO ENGLAND BECAUSE OF INCREASING INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
    - 1913 - 43% OF EGYPTIAN EXPORTS SHIPPED TO ENGLAND
    - 1938 - 32%
    - 1950 - 27%
    - 1912 - 31% OF EGYPTIAN IMPORTS ORIGINATED IN ENGLAND

6. GREATER INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE  
1912 - 15.08% OF TOTAL INVESTMENTS  
1942 - 40.12% " " "

D. MAJOR WEAKNESSES IN EGYPTIAN ECONOMY

1. MONOPOLISTIC CHARACTER OF EGYPTIAN ENTREPRENEURS
  - a. APPROXIMATELY 6% OF THE LANDOWNERS OWNED 65% OF THE LAND IN THE 1940'S
2. TREMENDOUS INFLATION AND POPULATION GROWTH
  - a. COST OF LIVING  
1939 INDEX - 100  
1950 - 329
  - b. POPULATION/LAND CULTIVATED
 

	POPULATION	AREA CULTIVATED (IN FEDDANS, EQUAL TO JUST OVER ONE ACRE)
1897	9,715,000	6,800,000
1937	15,933,000	8,400,000
1952	21,472,000	9,300,000
  - c. PER CAPITA INCOME (IN 1913 PRICES)  
1913 - £12.4  
1937 - £ 8.0  
1945 - £ 7.5  
1948 - £ 8.2
  - d. WHILE WAGES REMAINED STAGNANT, RENTS AND PROFITS ROSE  
PROFITS:  
1942 - £ 7.5 MILLION  
1946 - £20.0 MILLION  
LAND RENTS:  
1942 - £35 MILLION  
1946 - £90 MILLION

E. SOME MAJOR REASONS FOR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE 1940'S

1. POPULATION INCREASED
2. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION DROPPED BY ABOUT 20%; PRICES INCREASED ACCORDINGLY
3. OTHER PRICES, E.G. LAND RENTS, ALSO INCREASED
4. INFUX OF MONEY FROM BRITISH SOLDIERS DURING THE WAR ADDED TO INFLATIONARY PRESSURES

SOURCES: 1. ANOUAR ABDEL-MALEK  
EGYPT: MILITARY SOCIETY  
VINTAGE, N.Y., 1968 (PART ONE)  
2. CHARLES ISSAWI  
EGYPT IN REVOLUTION  
LONDON, 1963  
(CHAPTERS 2-3)

① 11-POINT PROGRAM OF THE LIBERATION RALLY  
(JANUARY 23, 1953)

1. COMPLETE EVACUATION OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS
2. SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE SUDAN
3. NEW CONSTITUTION
4. NEW SOCIAL SYSTEM TO PROTECT PEOPLE FROM UNEMPLOYMENT, DISEASE, OLD AGE
5. ECONOMIC SYSTEM BASED ON THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
6. POLITICAL SYSTEM GUARANTEEING BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS
7. EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM DESIGNED TO DEVELOP FEELING OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
8. FRIENDLY RELATIONS
9. DEVELOPMENT OF A REGIONAL MILITARY FORCE TO REINFORCE THE INFLUENCE OF THE ARAB LEAGUE
10. GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL FRIENDLY STATES
11. ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE U.N.

③ MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE EARLY YEARS  
OF THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION (1952-1956)

1. AGRARIAN REFORM LAW
  - a. LIMITED OWNERSHIP TO 200 ACRES
  - b. BY 1956, HOWEVER, ONLY 200,000 ACRES HAD BEEN AFFECTED
2. LIBERALIZED FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAWS (1952)
  - a. PROPORTION OF EGYPTIAN OWNERSHIP REDUCED FROM 51-49%
  - b. MINORITY EGYPTIAN OWNERSHIP COULD ALSO INCLUDE FOREIGN-OWNED EGYPTIAN COMPANIES
  - c. REVISION OF MINORITY LAW TO ATTRACT GREATER FOREIGN INVESTMENT
3. ELIMINATION OF POLITICAL OPPONENTS
  - a. PURGE OF "CORRUPT" LEADERS FROM POLITICAL PARTIES
  - b. SELECTIVE PURGE OF ARMY OFFICER RANKS
  - c. FAROUK OVERTHROWN AND CORRUPTION OF HIS AIDES EXPOSED
  - d. PERSISTENT CAMPAIGN TO ELIMINATE EXTREME RIGHT, I.E. MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
  - e. SPECIAL TRIBUNALS ESTABLISHED TO CONVICT ARRESTED POLITICIANS, SUCH AS FORMER PRIME MINISTER NAHAS
  - f. AFTER ASSUMING PRESIDENCY NASSER ALSO PLACED NAGIB UNDER ARREST
  - g. IN SHORT, MOST POLITICAL PARTIES WERE EMASCULATED
4. POLITICAL PROGRAM
  - a. MARCH 1953, RCC PROMISED RULE FOR 3-YEAR PERIOD AS TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT
  - b. REPUBLIC DECLARED ON JUNE 18, 1953
  - c. "CONSTITUTIONALLY" ELECTED GOVERNMENT ON JULY 7, 1956
    1. NASSER SUBMITTED NEW CONSTITUTION WHICH WAS APPROVED BY NATIONAL PLEBISCITE
    2. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MET AND ELECTED NASSER PRESIDENT
    3. NASSER CONFIRMED BY PUBLIC VOTE
5. FOREIGN POLICY
  - a. REMOVE BRITISH TROOPS
    1. EGYPTIANS CONVINCED THAT BRITAIN WAS TRYING TO KEEP EGYPT WEAK TO PRESERVE BRITISH MILITARY SUPREMACY
    2. THUS NASSER FELT COMPELLED TO TURN TO THE RUSSIANS
  - b. OBTAIN ECONOMIC AID FROM THE U.S.
  - c. PROMOTE ARAB UNITY
    1. FULFILL EGYPT'S HISTORIC ROLE
    2. "RCC" GROUPS APPEARED IN SYRIA AND JORDAN ESSENTIALLY A POORLY CONCEIVED VERSION OF THE STANDARD "NEUTRALIST" FOREIGN POLICY
6. MAJOR ECONOMIC PROGRAM: ASWAN DAM
  - a. WOULD IRRIGATE 2 MILLION ACRES OF NEW LAND-- INCREASE ARABLE LAND BY 30%
  - b. PROVIDE LIMITLESS ELECTRICAL POWER
  - c. PROVIDE FOUNDATION FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION OF UPPER EGYPT
  - d. RELIEVE POPULATION PRESSURE
  - e. ESTIMATED COST: \$600-900 MILLION
7. MAJOR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
  - a. SUPPORTING ARTIFICIAL PRICES FOR COTTON
  - b. INFLATION INCREASED
  - c. GOLD RESERVES DECREASED
  - d. INFLATION PRIMARILY CAUSED BY GOVERNMENT BORROWINGS TO FINANCE NATIONAL BUDGET

② THE EARLY YEARS OF THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION: 1952-1956

- A. PUBLICIZED OBJECTIVES OF THE REGIME
  1. ELIMINATE CORRUPTION AND BRIBERY IN THE REGIME
    - a. CITED AS MAIN REASON FOR 1948 DEFEAT BY ISRAELIS
    - b. ALSO CITED AS MAIN REASON FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
  2. ELIMINATE FOREIGN INFLUENCES, I.E. THE BRITISH
  3. RESTORE EGYPTIAN INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-RESPECT
- B. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGIME
  1. EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC, ALMOST CHAUVINISTIC
  2. NOBLE IDEALS BUT OFTEN INEFFECTIVE POLICIES
    - a. HIGHLY EXPEDIENT IN ACTION
    - b. OCCASIONALLY RUTHLESS IN ELIMINATING POLITICAL RIVALS
  3. ANTI-COMMUNIST BUT NOT ANTI-RUSSIAN
  4. SEEMINGLY NAIVE AND UNPREPARED FOR LEADERSHIP
    - a. LACKED COHERENT PLAN AFTER SEIZING POWER
    - b. OFTEN ACTED IMPETUOUSLY AND EMOTIONALLY
  5. "CONTRADICTORY" POLICIES DEMONSTRATED INCLINATION TOWARDS IRRATIONAL ACTION
    - a. EXAMPLE: APPEALED FOR WESTERN SUPPORT IN ONE BREATH, DENOUNCED THE WEST IN THE OTHER
  6. NASSER CONCENTRATED MOSTLY ON FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
    - a. MAJOR PRIORITIES: POLITICAL SURVIVAL, BRITISH WITHDRAWAL, AND MILITARY MODERNIZATION
    - b. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT WAS GIVEN ONLY SECONDARY PRIORITY
  7. RELATIONS WITH WEST UNDERMINED BY MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND INADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS
    - a. EXAMPLE: 1956 SUEZ CRISIS

① DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT

EGYPT HAD REMAINED SUBJECTED TO OTHER STATES SUPERIOR TO IT IN POWER AND RESOURCES FOR LONG CENTURIES, AND FOR THAT REASON THE EGYPTIANS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS OF A POLITICAL PUBLIC OPINION OR GIVE THEMSELVES A TRUE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION. IT WAS ONLY AFTER THE FOREIGN POWER HAD WEAKENED THROUGH INTERNATIONAL EVENTS, AND AFTER OUR STRUGGLE AND FIGHT FOR SELF-LIBERATION HAD BROUGHT ABOUT OUR INDEPENDENCE AS A NATIONAL STATE THAT WE GOT AROUND TO ORGANIZING OUR NATIONAL LIFE ON THE MODEL OF THOSE COUNTRIES THAT PRECEDED US TO LIBERTY AND INDEPENDENCE. SINCE THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT WHICH TRANSFORMED ABSOLUTE RULE INTO A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM HAS NOT COMPLETELY TAKEN PLACE IN EGYPT, DEMOCRACY IS A STRANGE SYSTEM WITH US, A SYSTEM TRANSPLANTED TO A MILIEU UNPREPARED FOR IT AND LACKING THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY FOR ITS MAINTENANCE AND GROWTH. DEMOCRACY IS A WEAK SYSTEM AMONG US, INCAPABLE OF REALIZING ALL THAT IS EXPECTED OF IT, FOR THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM HAS NOT YET MET WITH OUR NATIONAL SPIRIT, AND ITS NEW PROCEDURES DO NOT ACCORD WITH THE MENTALITY OF THE PEOPLE. THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF POLITICAL LIFE IN EGYPT IS THE WEAKNESS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES, THEIR DISORGANIZATION, AND THEIR INEXPERIENCE IN MATTERS OF STATE AND DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE.

TAHA HUSSEIN, "THE FUTURE OF CULTURE IN EGYPT" IN THE POLITICAL AWAKENING OF THE MIDDLE EAST, PRENTICE-HALL, 1970, (P. 114).

③ NASSER'S VIEW OF EGYPT'S ROLE IN HISTORY

IT IS NOT WITHOUT SIGNIFICANCE THAT OUR COUNTRY IS SITUATED WEST OF ASIA, IN CONTIGUITY WITH THE ARAB STATES WITH WHOSE EXISTENCE OUR OWN IS INTERWOVEN. IT IS NOT WITHOUT SIGNIFICANCE, TOO, THAT OUR COUNTRY LIES IN NORTHEAST AFRICA, OVERLOOKING THE DARK CONTINENT, WHEREIN RAGES A MOST TUMULTUOUS STRUGGLE BETWEEN WHITE COLONIZERS AND BLACK INHABITANTS FOR CONTROL OF ITS UNLIMITED RESOURCES. NOR IS IT WITHOUT SIGNIFICANCE THAT, WHEN THE MONGOLS SWEEP AWAY THE ANCIENT CAPITALS OF ISLAM, ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION AND THE ISLAMIC HERITAGE FELL BACK ON EGYPT AND TOOK SHELTER THERE. EGYPT PROTECTED THEM AND SAVED THEM, WHILE CHECKING THE ONSLAUGHT OF THE MONGOLS AT AIN JALUT. ALL THESE ARE FUNDAMENTAL REALITIES WITH DEEP ROOTS IN OUR LIVES WHICH WE CANNOT--EVEN IF WE TRY--ESCAPE OR FORGET.

GAMAL ABD AL-NASSER  
EGYPT'S LIBERATION  
IN THE POLITICAL AWAKENING OF THE  
MIDDLE EAST  
PRENTICE-HALL, 1970

⑤ NASSER'S IDEOLOGY

"IN EGYPT, NASSER HAS DEFINED HIS GENERAL GOAL AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 'SOCIALIST CO-OPERATIVE DEMOCRATIC COMMONWEALTH' AND THIS IN A SOCIETY WHICH HAS NEVER KNOWN ANYTHING OF SOCIALISM, COOPERATION OR DEMOCRACY...HERE, TOO, WE HAVE THE STRESS ON 'ARABISM' AS SOMETHING THAT IS SUPERIOR TO BOTH WESTERN DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNISM AND AS DESTINED TO INHERIT THE WORLD AFTER THE MUTUAL DESTRUCTION OF THE TWO MOST POWERFUL WORLD BLOCs...NASSER HAS, THEREFORE, BEGUN TO LOOK FAR BEYOND THE PERENNIAL MISERIES AND WEAKNESSES OF EGYPT TO THE GLITTERING BUT ILLUSORY OPPORTUNITIES ABROAD. HE IS MOVED BY VISIONS OF NATIONAL GRANDEUR, BY AN URGE FOR GREAT POWER STATUS, BY A FANTASTIC AMBITION FOR EMPIRE. ONE OF NASSER'S BASIC THESES IS THAT EGYPT IS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED BOTH BY GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY TO BE THE CENTRE OF THREE OVERLAPPING CIRCLES OF ACTIVITY--THE ARAB CIRCLE, THE ISLAMIC CIRCLE, AND THE AFRICAN CIRCLE. EGYPT'S GREAT DESTINY AND HIS OWN HEROIC DUTY IS TO UNITE THESE THREE GREAT SOURCES OF POTENTIAL POWER INTO ONE GREAT FORCE, CEMENTED BY A SINGLE CREED, THE CORE OF A NEW AFRO-ASIAN EMPIRE, AND ULTIMATELY A NEW FORM OF GLOBAL IMPERIALISM.

ROBERT SINAI  
THE CHALLENGE OF MODERNIZATION  
NEW YORK, 1964 (PP. 96-97)

② THE RISE OF LT. COL. GAMAL ABD AL-NASSER

- JANUARY 26, 1952 - "BLACK SUNDAY": VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE BRITISH
- JULY 23, 1952 - COUP D'ETAT BY REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL (RCC) OSTENSIBLY LED BY MAJ. GEN. MUHAMMAD NAGIB
- JULY 26, 1952 - KING FARUK ABDICATES
- SEPTEMBER, 1952 - NAGIB OFFICIALLY BECOMES PRIME MINISTER
- JUNE 18, 1953 - NASSER, THE REAL LEADER OF THE RCC, BECOMES DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
- FEBRUARY 25, 1954 - AFTER DISAGREEMENT OVER PACE OF DEMOCRATIZING GOVERNMENT, NASSER ANNOUNCES NAGIB'S RESIGNATION
- FEBRUARY 27, 1954 - FACED WITH REVOLT BY THE TANK CORPS, NASSER BACKS DOWN. NAGIB RETURNS TO PRESIDENCY BUT NASSER REMAINS AS PRIME MINISTER
- APRIL 18, 1954 - NASSER AGAIN BECOMES PRIME MINISTER; HAS SEVERAL MAJOR POLITICAL OPPONENTS JAILED OR EXILED; BRINGS 8 RCC MEMBERS INTO THE CABINET
- NOVEMBER 14, 1954 - NAGIB IS RELIEVED OF POWER AND PLACED UNDER HOME ARREST WHILE NASSER BECOMES ACTING PRESIDENT
- JULY 7, 1956 - AFTER PROMISED ELECTIONS, NASSER BECOMES PRESIDENT

④ NASSER AND ARAB NATIONALISM

PRESIDENT NASSER OF EGYPT IS NEITHER THE CREATOR NOR THE CAUSE OF ARAB NATIONALISM: HE IS A SHREWD POLITICIAN WHO HAS CUNNINGLY EXPLOITED THE DISSATISFACTION, POVERTY AND FRUSTRATION OF THE ARAB PEOPLE TO RALLY TO HIS BANNER NOT ONLY INTELLECTUALS AND MEMBERS OF THE URBAN MIDDLE CLASS, BUT EVEN "HEWERS OF WOOD AND DRAWERS OF WATER." NASSER HAS NOT GIVEN EGYPTIANS THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BLESSINGS WHICH HE PROMISED THEM IN 1954. HIS REGIME IS STILL TOTALITARIAN, AND HE HAS SUBSTITUTED THE EMOTIONAL BALM OF NATIONAL PRESTIGE FOR NEEDED LONG-TERM ECONOMIC REFORMS. NASSER HAS TAKEN NO EARNEST STEPS TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DEBILITATING CONFLICTS IN THE AREA: NOR HAS HE ATTEMPTED TO EASE ARAB-ISRAELI TENSIONS. BUT TO THE ARAB NATIONALIST, WHO "PRAYS NOT ONLY FOR HIS DAILY BREAD, BUT ALSO FOR HIS DAILY ILLUSION," NASSER IS THE MAN OF COURAGE WHO HAS SHOUTED HIS DEFIANCE OF WESTERN COERCION AND THREATS.

NASROLLAH FATEME  
THE ROOTS OF ARAB NATIONALISM  
IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST  
(PP. 238-239) NEW YORK, 1965

⑥ NASSER'S VERSION OF "ARAB SOCIALISM"

- A. BY 1965 ALMOST THE ENTIRE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY HAD BEEN NATIONALIZED
  1. INITIALLY JUST THE BANKS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES WERE NATIONALIZED
  2. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS PLACED UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
  3. BY 1962, 90% OF ALL MAJOR BUSINESSES INCLUDING 77 BAKERIES IN CAIRO HAD BEEN NATIONALIZED
  4. SUBSEQUENTLY RICE PRODUCTION, COTTON GINING AND COTTON EXPORTS WERE NATIONALIZED
  5. FOREIGNERS WERE FORBIDDEN TO OWN FARMLAND
  6. PROPERTY OF "422 MILLIONAIRES AND REACTIONARIES" WAS CONFISCATED
    - a. TOTAL WORTH: \$1 BILLION



1

THE BRITISH OCCUPATION

1. ARROGANT BRITISH ADMINISTRATION
  - a. ANY EGYPTIAN MINISTER REFUSING TO FOLLOW BRITISH ADVICE FORCED TO FORFEIT HIS POST
  - b. INCREASING NUMBER OF BRITISH EMPLOYED TO STAFF THE BUREAUCRACY
  - c. NEVERTHELESS COMPETENCE OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS GRADUALLY DETERIORATED
  - d. BUT BRITISH STILL REFUSED TO GIVE GREATER RECOGNITION AND RESPONSIBILITY TO EGYPTIANS
  - e. BRITISH CONSUL-GENERALS, ESPECIALLY LORDS CROMER AND KITCHENER, BECAME INCREASINGLY AUTOCRATIC DURING THEIR TERMS OF OFFICE
2. SOME MAJOR NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE WERE GENERALLY IGNORED
  - a. ILLITERACY STILL REMAINED WIDESPREAD
  - b. FEW EGYPTIANS WERE TRAINED FOR BUREAUCRACY
  - c. HEALTH STANDARDS WERE NOT ALWAYS MAINTAINED
3. ACHIEVEMENTS OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION
  - a. FINANCES IMPROVED
  - b. IRRIGATION SYSTEM ALSO IMPROVED
  - c. ASWAN DAM BUILT
  - d. TRADE AND NATIONAL INCOME ROSE SUBSTANTIALLY
4. EGYPTIAN REACTION TO BRITISH RULE
  - a. RISE OF NATIONALISM
  - b. AND RESENTMENT AGAINST BRITISH HUMILIATION
5. BRITISH MISTAKES FAIRLY OBVIOUS:
  - a. GENERALLY INFLEXIBLE
  - b. REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE OR REWARD EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE AND NATIONALISTIC FEELINGS
  - c. THUS REBELLION BECAME ALMOST INEVITABLE
  - d. INTERESTINGLY, BRITISH WERE FAR MORE UNDERSTANDING OF JORDANIAN DESIRES DURING MID-20TH CENTURY

2

POSTWAR RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN: 1946-1956

- I. OBJECTIVES
  - A. BRITISH DESIRED DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY PRESENCE IN EGYPT
    1. PRIMARILY TO MAINTAIN SECURITY OF THE SUEZ CANAL
    2. EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT KEEPING CANAL OPERATIONAL AT ALL TIMES
    3. CONCERNED THAT EGYPTIAN CONTROL OVER CANAL MIGHT ENDANGER THEIR ACCESS
  - B. EGYPTIANS SIMPLY WANTED ALL FOREIGN TROOPS OFF THEIR TERRITORY -- ALL OTHER OBJECTIVES WERE SECONDARY
- II. MAJOR AGREEMENTS
  - A. 1946 AGREEMENT ON COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH TROOPS BY 1949
    1. 1948 ASSASSINATION OF PRIME MINISTER NUKRASHI DELAYED EVACUATION
    2. BRITISH DEMANDED POLITICAL STABILITY BEFORE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL
    3. BRITISH FORMALLY REQUESTED TO LEAVE IN 1948
    4. STALEMATED NEGOTIATIONS IN 1951 PROMPTED EGYPTIANS TO UNILATERALLY ABOGATE 1936 TREATY
    5. BRITAIN THEN SUGGESTED EGYPT JOIN A MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE COMMAND
    6. THIS RESULTED IN RIOTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS CULMINATING IN "BLACK SUNDAY" ON JANUARY 26, 1952 WITH DAMAGE EXTREMELY EXTENSIVE, MARTIAL LAW WAS DECLARED
    7. IN JUNE, THE JUNIOR ARMY OFFICERS LED BY NAGUIB AND NASSER TOPPLED FARUK
  - B. 1947 AGREEMENT ON REPAYMENT SCHEDULE OF 450 MILLION POUNDS LOANED TO BRITAIN DURING THE WAR
  - C. 1953 AGREEMENT ON SELF-GOVERNMENT FOR THE SUDAN
  - D. SUEZ CANAL ZONE TREATY OF 1954
    1. NEGOTIATIONS TOOK OVER ONE YEAR
    2. ONE OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS; WEARING OF UNIFORMS BY BRITISH TECHNICIANS IN THE CANAL ZONE
  - E. PROVISIONS OF TREATY INCLUDED
    1. COMPLETE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL BY JUNE 1956
    2. BRITISH USE OF EGYPTIAN FACILITIES IN CASE OF ATTACK AGAINST ARAB LEAGUE STATES
    3. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OF THE CANAL
  - F. NATIONALIZATION OF THE CANAL JULY 26, 1956
  - G. ENGLISH-FRENCH-ISRAELI ATTACK ON EGYPT OCTOBER 29, 1956

3

EGYPT BEFORE WORLD WAR II

"THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY OF 1936 GAVE POLITICAL FREEDOM AND SOVEREIGNTY; THE CONSTITUTION ASSURED POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT; THE MONTREUX CONVENTION OF 1937 REMOVED THE BONDS OF ECONOMIC SERVITUDE AND SET THE STAGE FOR INDUSTRIAL, COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE; AND THE NILE WATER AGREEMENT OF 1929 ALLAYED THE FEARS OF THE EGYPTIANS, RICH AND POOR ALIKE, THAT A FOREIGN POWER WOULD BE ABLE TO FORCE A THIRSTY EGYPT INTO SUBMISSION. THE NATIVE EGYPTIAN BELIEVED THAT HE NOW CONTROLLED HIS OWN LIFE AND DESTINY FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THREE THOUSAND YEARS. THE WEALTH OF HIS COUNTRY WOULD BE HIS OWN."

SYDNEY N. FISHER  
THE MIDDLE EAST (P. 461)

4

1956 SUEZ CRISIS

- I. MISCALCULATIONS BY U.S. AND BRITAIN
  - A. FAILED TO REALIZE NASSER'S NEED FOR MILITARY MODERNIZATION
  - B. FAILED TO UNDERSTAND NASSER RISKED POLITICAL ASSASSINATION BY SIGNING CANAL ZONE TREATY
  - C. THUS WHEN ARMS WERE NOT FORTHCOMING, NASSER WAS FORCED TO TURN TO THE SOVIETS
  - D. ALSO DID NOT UNDERSTAND THAT REBUFF ON ASWAN DAM LOAN FORCED NASSER TO ATTEMPT SOME DRAMATIC MOVE
  - E. AND SUBSEQUENT NATIONALIZATION OF CANAL DID INDEED RESTORE NASSER'S PRESTIGE
  - F. FAILED TO RECOGNIZE NASSER'S STRONG DISLIKE FOR COMMUNISM
- II. MISCALCULATIONS BY NASSER
  - A. SIMPLY PUT, HE OVERPLAYED HIS HAND
  - B. DID NOT UNDERSTAND PREVAILING COLD WAR PSYCHOLOGY IN WASHINGTON AND LONDON
    1. BELIEVED HE COULD RHETORICALLY ATTACK THE WEST WITH IMPUNITY
    2. FAILED TO UNDERSTAND VISIBLE INCREASE IN U.S.S.R. PRESENCE WOULD ALIENATE THE WESTERN POWERS
    3. PERHAPS HE MAY HAVE UNWITTINGLY WANTED TO DEFEY THE WEST, DESPITE HIS DISLIKE OF COMMUNISM
  - C. OVERESTIMATED PROFITS FROM CANAL OPERATIONS
  - D. UNDERESTIMATED BRITISH CONCERN OVER SECURITY OF CANAL AND FAILED TO REALIZE BRITISH READINESS TO TAKE ANY ACTION TO PRESERVE THEIR ACCESS TO THE CANAL

## THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (1958-1961)

①

## THE POLITICS OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

## A. GENERAL COMMENTS

1. HASTILY CREATED ON FEBRUARY 1, 1958
  - a. NASSER WAS CAUGHT UNPREPARED BY RUSH OF EVENTS IN SYRIA
  - b. WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO DELAY UNION
2. ABRUPTLY ENDED ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1961 AFTER SURPRISE COUP BY SYRIAN ARMY
  - a. NASSER'S FIRST CONSIDERED QUELLING REBELLION WITH EGYPTIAN MILITARY CADRE IN SYRIA
  - b. AFTER LEARNING THIS WOULD BE FUTILE HE ACCEPTED THE FAIT ACCOMPLI
3. NASSER DOMINATED THE REPUBLIC
4. THE EGYPTIAN ARMY DOMINATED THE SYRIAN ARMY
  - a. SYRIAN ARMY WAS THE MAIN POLITICAL FORCE IN THE COUNTRY
5. UAR UPSET THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST
  - a. TREMENDOUSLY INCREASED PRESSURE ON UNFRIENDLY REGIME IN IRAQ, JORDAN, LEBANON
  - b. PERSUADED THE IMAM OF YEMEN TO ARRANGE A NOMINAL MERGER WITH EGYPT
6. INCREASED EGYPT'S, AND PARTICULARLY NASSER'S INFLUENCE
  - a. NASSER'S AGENTS ABETTED THE 1958 DISTURBANCES IN LEBANON
  - b. INSPIRED THE MEN WHO LED THE JULY 1958 REVOLUTION IN IRAQ
  - c. ALTHOUGH NASSER PROBABLY HAD NO DIRECT HAND IN IRAQ, HE GAINED CREDIT FOR COUP
  - d. NASSER QUICKLY BECAME THE MAJOR INDIGENOUS POLITICAL FORCE IN THE REGION

## B. CAIRO HELD THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE REPUBLIC

1. NASSER WAS PRESIDENT THROUGHOUT, HIS POWER SUPREME
  - a. APPOINTED VICE PRESIDENTS AND CABINET MEMBERS
  - b. APPOINTED HALF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY; STRONGLY INFLUENCED ELECTION OF THE OTHER HALF
  - c. CHOSE LEADERSHIP TO DIRECTLY RUN GOVERNMENT IN DAMASCUS
  - d. VIRTUALLY DICTATED DOMESTIC POLICY FOR SYRIA
2. SUPREMACY OF EGYPT IN ALL JOINT INSTITUTIONS
  - a. EGYPTIANS ALWAYS OUTNUMBERED SYRIANS IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BY MORE THAN 2-TO-1
  - b. MAJORITY OF CABINET POSTS HELD BY EGYPTIANS
  - c. ALL IMPORTANT PORTFOLIOS HELD BY EGYPTIANS
3. COMPLETELY DEMORALIZED SYRIAN ARMY
  - a. COMPLETELY SUBORDINATED TO EGYPTIAN OFFICERS WHO INITIATED LITTLE CONTACT WITH THEIR SYRIAN COUNTERPARTS
  - b. SYRIANS MAINTAIN EGYPTIANS ORGANIZED "COLLECTIVE LIQUIDATION" OF THE SYRIAN OFFICER CORPS
  - c. OFFICERS WERE RETIRED OR TRANSFERRED TO CIVILIAN MINISTRIES
  - d. ATTEMPTS WERE ALSO MADE TO PHASE OUT CIVILIAN SYRIAN OFFICIALS FROM THEIR OWN MINISTRIES
4. SYRIAN POLITICAL PARTIES WERE COMPLETELY BYPASSED, PERSECUTED AND DENIED ANY INFLUENCE
  - a. ADMINISTRATION RUN BY COLONEL SARRAY: NASSER LOYALIST, FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICER--AND EGYPTIAN FIELD MARSHAL ABD AL-HAKIM AMER
  - b. AMER WAS CHIEF OF THE GOVERNMENT
  - c. NASSER DESIGNED ELECTORAL SYSTEM FOR NATIONAL ASSEMBLY COMPLETELY BYPASSED POLITICAL PARTIES
  - d. CANDIDATES FOR NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WERE CHOSEN FROM 40,000 COMMITTEEMEN, ORIGINALLY SELECTED FOR NON-AFFILIATION TO POLITICAL PARTIES

②

## UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC: THE TWO PERSPECTIVES (1958-1961)

## A. EGYPTIAN MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES:

1. PROMOTE ARAB UNITY
2. EXTEND EGYPTIAN POWER
3. CREATE NUCLEUS FOR UNION OF ALL ARAB STATES UNDER EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP
4. ESTABLISH EGYPTIAN POLITICAL SUPREMACY IN THE REGION
5. COUNTER FEDERATION OF JORDAN AND IRAQ
6. DETER INCREASE OF WESTERN OR TURKISH INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
7. ENHANCE NASSER'S OWN POLITICAL IMAGE AND PRESTIGE

## B. SYRIAN MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES:

1. LONG-STANDING DESIRE FOR FEDERATION WITH EGYPT
2. NASSER HAD GREAT SPIRITUAL INFLUENCE OVER THE JUNIOR ARMY OFFICERS
3. BECAME INCREASINGLY LEFTIST DURING THE LATE 1950'S
4. UNION MOSTLY SUPPORTED BY YOUNGER OFFICERS
5. ARMY AND GOVERNMENT DEMORALIZED BY FACTIONAL RIVALRIES AND THREATENED BY CIVIL STRIFE
6. SYRIA ALSO TROUBLED BY PRESSURES FROM NEIGHBORING ARAB STATES
7. MANY WERE ALSO CONCERNED BY THE POSSIBILITY OF DISMEMBERMENT OF SYRIA BY HOSTILE NEIGHBORS
8. THUS MANY OFFICERS AND POLITICIANS FELT SYRIA'S ONLY SALVATION WAS IN UNION WITH EGYPT

③

## THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC: EFFECTS ON SYRIA

1. SUBORDINATION TO CAIRO
  - a. SYRIAN DEFENSE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND BUREAUCRATIC APPOINTMENTS ALL CONTROLLED BY CAIRO
  - b. TRADE AND ECONOMICS WERE ALSO CLOSELY WATCHED BY CAIRO
  - c. BUDGETS, FINANCES, CURRENCY WERE TO HAVE MERGED AFTER 5 YEARS
2. DOMESTIC EFFECTS
  - a. POLITICAL PARTIES DISSOLVED
  - b. LAND REFORM INSTITUTED--MAXIMUM OF 740 ACRES PER LANDOWNER
  - c. SEPARATE TRIBAL LAW FOR 250,000 BEDOUINS ABOLISHED
  - d. POWER OF ESTABLISHED GROUPS AND FAMILIES UNDERMINED
3. EGYPTIAN PRESENCE PROVIDED A MEASURE OF STABILITY FOR SYRIA
  - a. PETTY POLITICAL FUNDING ENDED
  - b. INDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRESSED FASTER
  - c. UNLEASHED NEW SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FORCES
4. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
  - a. COUNTRY EXPERIENCED SEVERE DROUGHT AND CROP FAILURES FROM 1958-1960
  - b. FAMINE AVOIDED BY \$26.6 MILLION FOOD SHIPMENTS FROM U.S.
  - c. ECONOMY ALSO SUPPORTED BY FUNDS FROM CAIRO AND \$7.5 MILLION CREDIT FROM THE I.M.F.
  - d. EXPORTS WERE PARTICULARLY AFFECTED BY POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH LEBANON
  - e. \$300 MILLION EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY PROJECT STARTED
  - f. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INCREASED "REMARKABLY"
  - g. U.S.S.R. AGREED TO SUBSIDIZE 20 DEVELOPMENTAL PROJECTS TOTALING \$300 MILLION



# 1 THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC: NASSER'S ROLE

TIME MAY SHOW THAT PRESIDENT NASSER'S RULE GAVE SYRIA A SALUTARY THREE-YEAR BREATHING SPACE FROM THE TURBULENCE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS. PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WERE PUT INTO THE HANDS OF TECHNICIANS. LAND REFORM WAS CARRIED THROUGH WITHOUT THE VINDICTIVENESS AND BLOODSHED WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE ACCOMPANIED IT...

PRESIDENT NASSER'S FAILURE IN SYRIA WAS IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE, THAT OF STATECRAFT. HE FAILED TO DEVISE A FORMULA FOR GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD BOTH SATISFY THE SYRIANS AND ENCOURAGE OTHER ARAB STATES TO JOIN THE U.A.R. FROM FIRST TO LAST, HIS RULE IN SYRIA BORE THE MARKS OF IMPROVISATION AND UNCERTAINTY... TO THE SOPHISTICATED SYRIAN PUBLIC, IT WAS NEVER AN EFFECTIVE SUBSTITUTE FOR THEIR DISSOLVED POLITICAL PARTIES... INDEED HIS POLICY APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN TO DESTROY ANY CENTER OF AUTHORITY IN SYRIA WHICH MIGHT HAVE RIVALED HIS OWN. THE RESULT WAS THAT HE WAS LEFT TO RUN A COUNTRY IN WHICH ALL INDIGENOUS POLITICAL LEADERSHIP HAD BEEN ELIMINATED, HIS SOLUTION WAS EMPIRICAL, UNIMAGINATIVE, EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS, BUT IN THE SHORT RUN, SAFE. GOVERNMENT WAS CONCEIVED IN TERMS OF KEEPING ORDER RATHER THAN AS A CONSTRUCTIVE EXPERIMENT IN HARNESSING SYRIAN TALENTS AND ENTHUSIASM IN THE CAUSE OF THE UNION.

PATRICK SEALE  
THE BREAKUP OF THE UNITED ARAB  
REPUBLIC  
IN THE MIDDLE EAST READER  
PEGASUS, NEW YORK, 1969 (PP. 3,4,5)

# 3 THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE U.A.R. THE SYRIAN VERSION

"FROM THE VERY FIRST DAY WE WANTED UNITY TO BE REPRESENTED BY AN EXCHANGE OF OFFICERS FROM BOTH REGIONS. OUR YOUTHS WENT, FULL OF VITALITY AND ARABISM TO THE SOUTH. WHAT WAS SENT US FROM EGYPT? ALL THE EVILS AND SINS COMMITTED UNDER THE NAME OF UNITY STARTED FROM THIS POINT. THEY SENT US OFFICERS WHO TOOK UP POSITIONS IN THE INTELLIGENCE MACHINERY BEFORE ANY OTHER MACHINERY. THEY CAME TO US WITH THE MENTALITY OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND NOT WITH THE NATIONALIST SPIRIT WITH WHICH WE FACED THEM, NOR WITH THE ARAB BROTHERLINESS WHICH INSPIRES SINCERITY AND CONFIDENCE. THESE PEOPLE BEGAN SPREADING LIKE OCTOPUSES INTO THE VARIOUS MACHINERIES, POKING THEIR NOSES INTO THE VARIOUS AFFAIRS AND IMPOSING THEMSELVES ON ALL OCCASIONS...

BROADCAST BY THE SYRIAN  
REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND  
OCTOBER 2, 1961

# 4 SOME REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

1. NASSER HAD NO REALISTIC PLAN FOR UNITING THE TWO COUNTRIES.
2. BOTH COUNTRIES WERE PUSHED INTO THE UNION BEFORE EITHER WAS REALLY PREPARED FOR IT.
3. SYRIANS DEEPLY RESENTED NASSER'S COMPLETE DOMINATION, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR OWN DOMESTIC, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS.
4. EGYPT MADE FEW ADJUSTMENTS WHILE SYRIA MADE MANY AND WAS REWARDED ONLY WITH HUMILIATION.
5. NASSER GRADUALLY ALIENATED ALL THE MAJOR POWER GROUPS IN SYRIA--ARMY, POLITICIANS, AND LAND OWNERS.
6. IN SHORT, UAR WAS VIRTUALLY A ONE-WAY AFFAIR THAT WAS BOUND TO PROVOKE THE SYRIANS INTO REBELLION.

# 2 SOME GENERAL COMMENTS ABOUT PRESENT-DAY EGYPT

1. STILL VISIBLY EMERGING FROM THE SHOCK OF COLONIAL RULE AND INDEPENDENCE
  - a. ANTIPATHY TOWARDS THE WEST
  - b. USE OF THE WEST AS A SCAPEGOAT FOR ITS PROBLEMS
  - c. ESSENTIALLY UNSTABLE GOVERNMENT
  - d. INSTITUTIONS STILL IN FORMATIVE STAGES
  - e. ADOPTION OF SUPERFICIALLY NON-WESTERN IDEOLOGY
  - f. MAJOR PROBLEMS OF COLONIAL PERIOD STILL CRITICAL TODAY
2. WITH SO MANY OF ITS PROBLEMS UNSOLVED, AND NASSER'S SUCCESSION UNRESOLVED, A MAJOR CONVULSION AGAINST THE DEVELOPED WORLD MAY YET OCCUR
3. ITS BEHAVIOR TOWARDS ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS HAS CHANGED LITTLE SINCE THE TIME OF MOHAMMED ALI
  - a. UNION WITH SYRIA WAS THE REALIZATION OF THE AMBITIONS OF MANY OF EGYPT'S RULERS
  - b. STILL ATTEMPTING TO EXERT COMMANDING LEADERSHIP OVER THE ARAB WORLD
  - c. IN OTHER WORDS, ITS HISTORIC AMBITION OF SUCCEEDING THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AS THE MAJOR FORCE IN THE REGION IS STILL STRONG
  - d. UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED BECAUSE OF CHRONIC DISUNITY IN THE ARAB WORLD, ITS OWN PERSISTENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND MILITARY INEFFECTIVENESS
4. EGYPT'S ONLY SUCCESSFUL RULERS HAVE BEEN MILITARY MEN
  - a. POLITICIANS HAVE USUALLY LACKED WIDE SUPPORT AMONG THE PUBLIC
  - b. POLITICIANS HAVE ALSO BEEN TRADITIONALLY UNABLE TO CONTROL THE ARMY
  - c. POLITICIANS HAVE ALSO BEEN CHRONICALLY DIVIDED AMONG THEMSELVES
  - d. CONSEQUENTLY POLITICIANS HAVE NEVER BEEN EFFECTIVE RULERS AND WERE BLAMED PRIOR TO 1952 FOR MUCH OF EGYPT'S TROUBLES
  - e. PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY ACCORDINGLY SEEM DIM
5. NASSER HAS BEEN EGYPT'S FIRST EFFECTIVE RULER AND POLITICIAN, IN CONTEMPORARY TERMS, IN EGYPT'S HISTORY
  - a. FIRST EGYPTIAN TO RULE THE COUNTRY FOR ANY SUBSTANTIAL LENGTH OF TIME
  - b. HAS BROUGHT EGYPT GREATER STABILITY THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE MOHAMMED ALI
  - c. ADMITTEDLY HE HAS ALSO PRODUCED SEVERAL DISASTROUS DEFEATS
  - d. BUT HE HAS MAINTAINED FAIRLY EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER BOTH THE POLITICIANS AND THE MILITARY
  - e. IN THE PROCESS HE HAS UNITED THE COUNTRY TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN EVER BEFORE
  - f. LACKING RESULTS HE HAS RARELY LACKED FOR WORDS: A GIFTED DEMAGOGUE IN THE SUKARNO TRADITION
6. OBVIOUS SIMILARITY BETWEEN NASSER AND SUKARNO SUGGEST THAT THE SUCCESSION WILL NOT BE EASY
  - a. MILITARY SEEM LIKELY SUCCESSORS; POLITICIANS DO NOT HAVE THE CONSTITUENCIES OR THE POWER
  - b. GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS CUSTOM-DESIGNED FOR NASSER'S NEEDS AND NOT LIKELY TO ENDURE HIS PASSING WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT UPEHAVAL AND CHANGE
  - c. DISSENSION STIFLED BY NASSER'S RULE SHOULD EMERGE AS SERIOUS PROBLEM DURING SUCCESSION PROBLEM
  - d. SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT COULD WELL BE EXTREMIST AND CHAUVINISTIC
7. OF COURSE, NASSER'S PASSING MAY BE AIDED BY SEVERAL POSSIBLE FACTORS
  - a. ANOTHER DISASTROUS DEFEAT BY ISRAEL
  - b. DISSIDENT MILITARY INFURIATED BY ATTACKS AND PURGES FROM NASSER
  - c. DISSIDENT MILITARY HUMILIATED BY ANOTHER DEFEAT ON THE BATTLEFIELD
  - d. FOREIGN PRESSURE, I.E. RUSSIAN, EXERTED BECAUSE OF DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT

JORDAN AND IRAN

1

SOME MAJOR EVENTS IN JORDAN'S HISTORY  
PRIOR TO 1946

- 500 B. C. - ARABIAN TRIBE OF NABATEA ESTABLISHES CAPITAL IN PETRA, NOW SOUTHERN JORDAN
- 400 B. C. - NORTHERN HALF OF JORDAN INCORPORATED INTO THE SELEUCID EMPIRE OF SYRIA
- 105 A. D. - PETRAEAN EMPIRE ABSORBED INTO THE ROMAN EMPIRE
- 550 - AFTER 50 YEARS OF ANARCHY DURING WHICH THE BYZANTINES, PERSIANS, AND LOCAL RULERS COMPETED FOR POWER, TRANSJORDAN WAS ABSORBED INTO THE ISLAMIC EMPIRE
- 1500 - AFTER CENTURIES OF RELATIVE ANONYMITY AS PART OF SYRIA, AND THUS UNDER THE RULE OF EGYPT, IT WAS CONQUERED BY THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
- 1916 - FRANCE AND BRITAIN DIVIDE OTTOMAN HOLDINGS WITH TRANSJORDAN ALLOCATED TO THE BRITISH
- 1920 - BRITAIN IS AWARDED THE PALESTINE MANDATE, SEPARATING TRANSJORDAN FROM SYRIA WHICH HAD JUST DECLARED ITS INDEPENDENCE
- 1921 - AMIR ABDULLAH RECOGNIZED AS THE DE FACTO RULER OF TRANSJORDAN, BEGINNING THE HASHEMITE DYNASTY
- 1922 - TRANSJORDAN'S AMBIGUOUS STATUS WAS RESOLVED BY THE BRITISH AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS WHO DECIDED TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT STATE, SEPARATE FROM THE PALESTINE MANDATE
- 1923 - BRITAIN FORMALLY RECOGNIZED TRANSJORDAN AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE UNDER BRITISH TUTELAGE
- 1928 - TREATY SIGNED WITH BRITAIN AFFIRMING INDEPENDENCE WHILE RESERVING FINANCIAL AND MILITARY MATTERS FOR THE ADVICE OF THE BRITISH RESIDENT. TREATY PERMITTED GREATER HOME RULE INCLUDING A CONSTITUTION, PROMULGATED THE SAME YEAR, AND A LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, WHICH CONVENED A YEAR LATER.
- 1934 - BY SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT, BRITAIN ALLOWED TRANSJORDAN TO APPOINT CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVES TO NEIGHBORING ARAB STATES.
- 1939 - BRITAIN AGREED TO THE CONVERSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL TO A FORMAL CABINET OF MINISTERS
- 1945 - ACTIVE IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND BECAME ONE OF THE ORIGINAL MEMBERS OF THE ARAB LEAGUE.

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SOME MAJOR EVENTS  
IN  
JORDANIAN HISTORY SINCE 1946

- 1946 - DELAYED BY THE WAR, TRANSJORDAN'S FORMAL INDEPENDENCE WAS FINALLY GRANTED, ABDULLAH WAS PROCLAIMED KING, AND A NEW CONSTITUTION WAS PROCLAIMED
- 1948 - BRITISH MANDATE ENDS, FIGHTING WITH ISRAEL BEGINS
- 1949 - ARMISTICE SIGNED WITH ISRAEL; COUNTRY NOW BECOMES "HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN."
- 1951 - KING ABDULLAH ASSASSINATED BY FANATICS OPPOSED TO HIS "GREATER SYRIA" POLICY OF UNITING JORDAN, SYRIA, PALESTINE AND IRAQ INTO A SINGLE STATE. EGYPT, FOR ONE, WAS OPPOSED TO ANY STRENGTHENING OF THE HASHEMITE HOUSE. ABDULLAH SUCCEEDED BY HIS ELDEST SON, TALAL
- 1952 - BECAUSE OF HIS MENTAL CONDITION, TALAL STEPS DOWN TO TO BE SUCCEEDED BY HIS SON HUSSEIN, WHO GOVERNS FOR A YEAR UNDER A REGENCY UNTIL HE IS CROWNED 1953
- 1956 - GLUBB PASHA DISMISSED AS HEAD OF JORDANIAN ARMY AS PART OF CAMPAIGN TO RID MILITARY OF ALL FOREIGN INFLUENCES. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENTS SIGNED WITH ARAB NEIGHBORS. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SUEZ INCIDENT, HOWEVER, THE ANGLO-JORDANIAN TREATY OF 1949 WAS ABROGATED AND NEW FINANCIAL AID WAS ACCEPTED FROM THE ARAB STATES
- 1957 - AT CONFERENCE IN CAIRO, SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA, AND EGYPT AGREED TO GIVE JORDAN OVER NEARLY 13 MILLION POUNDS ANNUALLY OVER A 10 YEAR PERIOD. MEANTIME, A NEW ANGLO-JORDANIAN TREATY WAS SIGNED AND THE LAST BRITISH TROOPS WERE WITHDRAWN. BUT TO EMPHASIZE JORDAN'S BASIC NEUTRALITY, HUSSEIN FORCED THE RESIGNATION OF THE PRO-SOVIET PRIME MINISTER WHICH RESULTED IN CABINET CRISES, DEMONSTRATIONS AND RIOTS BEFORE A NEW GOVERNMENT WAS FORMED. THE U. S. THEN ANNOUNCED ITS DETERMINATION TO GUARANTEE JORDAN'S INDEPENDENCE.
- 1958 - AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH ISRAEL ON MOUNT SCOPUS (OLD JERUSALEM) DEMILITARIZED ZONE; JOINS ARAB FEDERATION WITH IRAQ WHICH WAS SHORTLY DISSOLVED AFTER THE REVOLUTION IN IRAQ. THE FEDERATION HAD BEEN FORMED IN RESPONSE TO THE CREATION OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC. THE JORDANIAN VICE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATION WAS KILLED IN BAGHDAD DURING THE REVOLUTION AND A PLOT AGAINST HUSSEIN WAS UNCOVERED. RELATIONS WITH EGYPT WERE SUSPENDED.
- 1959 - RELATIONS WERE RESUMED WITH EGYPT IN AUGUST BUT INCIDENTS OCCURRED FREQUENTLY ALONG THE BORDER WITH SYRIA.
- 1960 - BOTH THE KING AND THE PRIME MINISTER CONDEMNED THE ARAB LEADERS' POSITION ON PALESTINE AND OFFERED CITIZENSHIP TO ALL REFUGEES. OBJECTIVE WAS TO SEEK FORMAL RECOGNITION OF HER OWNERSHIP OF THE WEST BANK TERRITORIES. EGYPT FAVORED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINE ARAB GOVERNMENT. THEN THE PRIME MINISTER WAS ASSASSINATED BY A TIME-BOMB IN HIS OFFICE IN AN INCIDENT ATTRIBUTED TO EGYPT
- 1961 - RELATIONS IMPROVED WITH EGYPT UNTIL JORDAN RECOGNIZED SYRIA WHEN RELATIONS WERE AGAIN BROKEN OFF. KING MARRIED AN ENGLISH GIRL, SYMBOLIZING THE STRENGTH OF HIS THRONE.
- 1964 - HUSSEIN ATTENDS CAIRO CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS JORDAN WATER DISPUTE AMID RUMOURS ISRAEL WOULD TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION. FIRST SIGN OF IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH EGYPT WHICH CONTINUED ON THIS SAME COURSE THROUGHTOUT THE YEAR
- 1965 - KING'S BROTHER, HUSSAN, APPOINTED CROWN PRINCE, EXCLUDING HUSSEIN'S OWN SON FROM SUCCESSION. HUSSEIN ATTENDS ANOTHER ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN EGYPT ON THE JORDAN WATER PROBLEM.
- 1966 - RELATIONS DETERIORATED WITH SYRIA AMID CHARGES THAT EACH GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING TO SUBVERT THE OTHER. SUPPORT ALSO WITHDRAWN FROM THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (P.L.O.) WHILE SYRIA AND THE P.L.O. CALLED FOR HUSSEIN'S OVERTHROW.
- 1967 - CLASHES ALONG THE JORDANIAN-SYRIAN BORDER; P.L.O. BOMBINGS IN JORDAN. RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AGAIN DETERIORATED. HOWEVER THE PROSPECT OF WAR WITH ISRAEL FORCED HUSSEIN TO RESOLVE HIS DIFFERENCES WITH EGYPT AND FLY TO CAIRO TO SIGN A DEFENSE AGREEMENT. AFTER THE DISASTROUS 6-DAY WAR, HUSSEIN ASSUMED DIRECTION OF JORDAN ARMED FORCES AND THE RIVALRY WITH AL FATAH BEGAN.
- 1968 - IN NOVEMBER, ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE BALFOUR DECLARATION, SERIOUS FIGHTING ERUPTED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE GUERRILLAS. CIVIL WAR SEEMED IMMINENT UNTIL BOTH SIDES BACKED DOWN.
- 1969 - CONSTANT FIGHTING ALONG THE BORDER WITH ISRAEL. IN JUNE ISRAELI COMMANDOS BLEW UP THE DIVERSION SYSTEM OF THE GHOR CANAL, JORDAN'S PRINCIPAL IRRIGATION PROJECT.

### 1 JORDAN AND THE BRITISH: THE COLONIAL PERIOD

GREAT BRITAIN GOVERNED JORDAN WITH FAR GREATER UNDERSTANDING AND SENSITIVITY THAN IT DEMONSTRATED IN MOST OF ITS OTHER COLONIES. BEGINNING IN THE EARLY 1920'S, THE BRITISH GAVE THE JORDANIANS INCREASING RESPONSIBILITY OVER THEIR OWN AFFAIRS UNTIL COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE WAS GRANTED IN THE 1940'S. AFTER THAT, THE BRITISH CONTINUED SUBSIDIZING THE HASHEMITE GOVERNMENT WITH SEVERAL MILLION POUNDS A YEAR.

BUT WHILE BRITISH POLICY WAS SOMEWHAT ENLIGHTENED, IT ALSO WAS BOTH PRACTICAL AND EXPEDIENT.

1. JORDAN WAS AN IMPORTANT BASE FOR BRITAIN BOTH REGIONALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY.

1. BRITISH-TRAINED ARMIES PROTECTED THE OIL PIPELINE THAT RAN FROM IRAQ TO PALESTINE.
2. ALSO PROTECTED IRAQ, PALESTINE AND JORDAN BORDERS FROM ATTACK BY HASHEMITE ENEMY IBN SAUD OF SAUDI ARABIA.
3. MAINTAINED BRITISH POSITION IN THE ASIAN PART OF THE ARAB WORLD.

#### II. STEPS TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

1. JORDAN AWARDED TO HASHEMITE PRINCE ABDULLAH IN 1921 WITH A MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

a. RELATIONSHIP WITH BRITAIN WAS CONFIRMED BY A TREATY IN 1928.

b. BRITISH SUBSIDIES DURING THE 1920-39 PERIOD TOTALLED \$500,000 - \$1,000,000/YEAR.

2. ABDULLAH GIVEN GREATER CONTROL OVER INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION IN 1946 TREATY.

a. FOLLOWED SHORTLY BY A CONSTITUTION IN 1947.

b. CONSTITUTION FOR AN ELECTED CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES AND AN APPOINTED COUNCIL OF NOTABLES.

c. ABDULLAH STRONGLY CRITICIZED BY OTHER ARAB STATES FOR AGREEING TO REMAIN SUBSERVIENT TO LONDON.

d. NEVERTHELESS REMAINED BRITAIN'S BEST ALLY IN RETURN FOR GENEROUS ANNUAL SUBSIDIES.

3. INDEPENDENCE DECLARED IN JUNE, 1949 AFTER THE WAR AGAINST ISRAEL.

a. HATED BY THE PALESTINE REFUGEES ABDULLAH WAS MURDERED ON JUNE 20, 1951 BY A MEMBER OF AN EXTREMIST REFUGEE GROUP.

### 3 POPULATION

#### I. BEFORE THE 1948 WAR

1. POPULATION: 450,000
2. AREA: 34,500 SQUARE MILES

#### II. AFTER THE 1948 WAR

1. 1949 POPULATION: 1.36 MILLION
2. AREA: 36,500 SQUARE MILES
3. 1961 POPULATION: 1.7 MILLION

A. WEST BANKERS AND REFUGEES WERE A MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION

B. REFUGEES THROUGH NATURAL INCREASE ROSE FROM 470,000 IN 1952 TO 631,000 IN 1961--37% OF THE POPULATION

4. MIGRATORY PATTERN WAS DEFINITELY EASTWARD

A. NEARLY 900,000 OF 1.7 MILLION POPULATION LIVED ON THE EAST BANK

5. URBANIZATION ALSO INCREASED RAPIDLY

A. BY 1961, 38% OF THE POPULATION (650,000) CONCENTRATED IN NINE TOWNS OR CITIES WITH MORE THAN 20,000 INHABITANTS EACH

B. TWO-THIRDS OF THIS GROUP WERE ON THE EAST BANK

C. POPULATION OF CAPITAL OF AMMAN INCREASED FROM 30,000 IN 1948 TO ABOUT 250,000 IN 1961.

### 2 JORDAN, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

#### I. RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN SINCE INDEPENDENCE

1. ANNUAL SUBSIDIES UP TO 1956

a. SEVERAL MILLION POUNDS ANNUALLY FOR BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMY.

b. AID DISCONTINUED, TROOPS WITHDRAWN IN 1957.

2. BRITISH PRESSURE TO JOIN BAGHDAD PACT REBOUNDED ON LONDON (DECEMBER, 1955).

a. BRITISH SOON HAD SIMILAR EXPERIENCE IN IRAQ ITSELF.

b. RIOTING FORCED PRO-WESTERN GOVERNMENT OUT OF OFFICE.

c. ALSO RESULTED IN DISMISSAL OF GLUBB PASHA AND ELECTION OF LEFTIST, NATIONALISTIC GOVERNMENT.

d. RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST NATIONS IMPROVED.

e. WITHDRAWAL OF ALL BRITISH TROOPS NEGOTIATED (FEBRUARY-MARCH, 1957).

f. SITUATION CONTINUED DETERIORATING UNTIL KING HUSEIN PERSONALLY DISMISSED PRO-SOVIET PRIME MINISTER.

3. BRITISH INTERVENTION IN JULY, 1958 THWARTED ATTEMPT BY JORDANIAN LEFTISTS IN CAIRO TO OVERTHROW GOVERNMENT.

a. IRAQI REVOLUTION RESULTED IN MURDER OF IRAQI AND JORDANIAN LEADERS OF ARAB FEDERATION.

b. GENERAL KASSIM ABROGATED THE UNION.

c. THREAT OF COUP AND ASSASSINATION OF KING.

d. BRITISH PARATROOPERS SENT FROM CYPRUS PREVENTED OVERTHROW.

4. IT SEEMED THAT WITHOUT OUTSIDE SUPPORT JORDAN WOULD SIMPLY BE ABSORBED BY ITS NEIGHBORS.

#### II. AID FROM BRITAIN AND THE U.S. AFTER 1957.

1. EVEN AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL BRITISH TROOPS, JORDAN CONTINUED TO RECEIVE AN ANNUAL STIPEND FROM LONDON.

a. BY 1964 THIS AMOUNTED TO ONLY \$6 MILLION.

b. BRITISH MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP ALSO STATIONED IN JORDAN.

c. TOTAL BRITISH AID 1960-1968: \$64.3 MILLION.

2. U.S. AID BECAME SIGNIFICANT IN 1957 WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE.

a. U.S. ANNUAL DIRECT CONTRIBUTION IN 1965

TOTALLED \$44 MILLION, DOWN FROM A HIGH OF \$51 MILLION IN 1960.

b. IN 1969, TOTAL U.S. A.I.D. COMMITMENTS TOTALLED \$1,491,000.

c. 1969 MILITARY AID TOTALLED \$209,000.

d. TOTAL "FOOD FOR PEACE" GRANTS AMOUNTED TO ROUGHLY \$3 MILLION.

3. U.S. AID WAS REDUCED DRASTICALLY AFTER AUGUST 1967 KHARTOUM CONFERENCE.

a. KUWAIT, LIBYA AND SAUDI ARABIA PROMISED OVER \$100 MILLION ANNUALLY.

b. THIS AID IS STILL IN EFFECT AND NONE OF THE COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN DELINQUENT IN THEIR PAYMENTS.

### 4 THE HASHEMITES OF JORDAN

"ABDULLAH WAS THE SON OF AN OTTOMAN PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, AT HOME IN ISTANBUL AND IN MECCA BY EDUCATION AND PUBLIC SERVICE. HIS BROADENED OUTLOOK HAD ENABLED HIM TO BECOME AN EFFECTIVE MEDIATOR BETWEEN BRITAIN AND HIS TRANS-JORDAN SUBJECTS. WHEN HE INCORPORATED ARAB PALESTINE INTO THE REALM, HIS DOMESTIC PROBLEM WAS COMPOUNDED BY THE NEED TO RULE TWO SEEMINGLY IMMISCIBLE COMMUNITIES WHILE ATTEMPTING TO WIELD THEM INTO ONE.

...HUSEIN MADE HIS FIRST EXPERIMENTS WITH A POLICY OF COMPROMISE, DESIGNED TO WIN THE ALLEGIANCE OF HIS RECALCITRANT PALESTINIAN SUBJECTS AND THEIR EXTERNAL ARAB PATRONS. A CONTEST ENSUED...

AFTER A YEAR OF MOUNTING HOSTILITY STIRRED BY PROPAGANDA FROM EGYPT AND SYRIA AND GENEROUSLY FINANCED BY SAUDI ARABIA, PALESTINIAN AMMANIS STAGED THEIR FIRST SUCCESSFUL STREET POLITICS AT THE TURN OF 1956. THE ARAB LEGION FORCIBLY RESTORED ORDER. BUT THE STREET POLITICIANS BROUGHT DOWN THREE GOVERNMENTS IN A MONTH AND WON THEIR POINT..."

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JORDAN AND HER ARAB NEIGHBORS

1. LEAST HOSTILE OF THE MAJOR ARAB STATES TOWARDS ISRAEL.
  - A. HAS USUALLY WAGED THE BRUNT OF THE BATTLE AGAINST THE ISRAELIS
  - B. HAS GENERALLY SUFFERED THE MOST IN DEFEAT
  - C. YET HAS BEEN ACCUSED BY OTHER ARAB STATES OF LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THE PERIODIC CRUSADES
  - D. HAS ALSO BEEN THE LEAST ABLE TO AFFORD THE COST OF THESE CONFLICTS
  - E. AND HAS ONLY RECEIVED A FRACTION OF THE AID PROMISED BY MORE PROSPEROUS ARAB NATIONS UNTIL RECENTLY
2. FEARFUL OF DISMEMBERMENT, ATTACK OR SUBVERSION BY NEIGHBORING HOSTILE ARAB NATIONS
  - A. SUFFERED ALMOST CONTINUOUS CAMPAIGN OF INVECTIVE FROM EGYPT, SYRIA AND IRAQ
  - B. SAMPLE: IN 1963 JORDANIANS WERE URGED TO "TEAR THE DWARF IN PIECES AND HANG HIM ON THE GATES OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY." THE "DWARF" WAS KING HUSEIN
  - C. EGYPT AND SYRIA HAVE ATTEMPTED ON AT LEAST THREE SEPARATE OCCASIONS TO OVERTHROW HUSEIN
  - D. SYRIAN TROOPS HAVE BRIEFLY OCCUPIED JORDANIAN TERRITORY ONCE
  - E. MORE SUCH ATTEMPTS WERE FRUSTRATED BY BRITISH OR AMERICAN INTERVENTION
  - F. JORDAN HAS PROBABLY BEEN SAVED FROM EXTINCTION AT LEAST ONCE BY FOREIGN INTERVENTION
  - G. ASSURANCE OF JORDAN'S SOVEREIGNTY HAS ALSO COME FROM ISRAEL:
 

ISRAEL HAS THREATENED TO SEIZE JORDAN IF ITS EXISTENCE WAS THREATENED BY OTHER ARABS
  - H. JORDAN SEEMINGLY IN POSITION OF HAVING ITS "BEST FRIENDS" AS ITS WORST ENEMIES
3. JORDAN REPRESENTS LAST SURVIVING HASHEMITE THRONE IN MIDDLE EAST AND IS ACCORDINGLY HATED BY THE FAMILY'S MANY ENEMIES
  - A. BOTH SYRIA AND IRAQ HAVE OVERTHROWN HASHEMITE THRONES AND DESIRE TO TOPPLE A THIRD
  - B. RULING FAMILY OF SAUDI ARABIA HAVE OLDEST FEUD WITH HASHEMITES
  - C. POSITION OF SAUDI ARABIANS HAS CHANGED TO SUPPORT SINCE ATTACKS BY LEFTISTS ON ALL ARAB MONARCHIES
  - D. HASHEMITE FAMILY HAS ALWAYS BEEN REGARDED AS A THREAT BY POLITICALLY AMBITIOUS ARAB LEADERS
  - E. HASHEMITES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN MORE SUCCESSFUL IN COEXISTING AND ACCOMMODATING THE WEST
  - F. AS ASSASSINATION OF ABDULLAH DEMONSTRATED, THIS HAS NEVER BEEN APPRECIATED BY LESS ENLIGHTENED ARAB LEADERS
4. RELATIONS WITH EGYPT HAVE BEEN BOTH GOOD AND BAD
  - A. RELATIONS HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED SEVERAL TIMES
  - B. ARAB FEDERATION WITH IRAQ INFURIATED EGYPT
  - C. EGYPT HAS REGARDED JORDAN AS A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO ITS AMBITIONS FOR REGIONAL HEGEMONY
  - D. EGYPT HAS GENERALLY SUPPORTED THE PALESTINIANS AGAINST THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT--AT LEAST COVERTLY
  - E. EGYPT HAS ALSO SUPPORTED ATTEMPTS TO OVERTHROW HUSEIN
  - F. HOWEVER SINCE THE 1967 WAR RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSEIN AND NASSER HAVE IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY
  - G. NASSER IS RELIABLY REPORTED TO HAVE A STRONG ADMIRATION FOR HUSEIN
  - H. AND EGYPT HAS FOR THE MOMENT CEASED ITS EFFORTS TO OVERTHROW THE PRESENT JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT
5. KHARTOUM CONFERENCE: AUGUST 1967
  - A. FOLLOWING THE SIX-DAY WAR, LIBYA, KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA PROMISED OVER \$100 MILLION IN AID
  - B. AID WAS TO CONTINUE UNTIL "THE EFFECTS OF THE AGGRESSION ARE ELIMINATED"
  - C. AID PRIMARILY FOR MILITARY EXPENDITURES
  - D. REPLACED BUDGETARY SUPPORT GRANTS FROM THE U.S. AND LOSS OF INCOME FROM TOURISM
  - E. KEPT JORDAN ECONOMICALLY VIABLE AND CREATED "FALSE PROSPERITY"
  - F. MUCH OF THE MILITARY BUDGET IS SPENT INTERNALLY ON WAGES, ETC., WHICH HAS IN TURN PRODUCED THE "FALSE PROSPERITY"
  - G. KHARTOUM AGREEMENTS PROVIDED HIGHLY VISIBLE SHOWCASE FOR ARAB UNITY WHICH HAS NOT REALLY IMPROVED SINCE 1967 WAR

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SOME GENERAL COMMENTS ON JORDAN

1. KING HUSEIN
  - A. MOST SYMPATHETIC TO THE WEST OF ALL THE MAJOR ARAB LEADERS, ALTHOUGH FOREMOST AN ARAB NATIONALIST
  - B. PERSONALLY COURAGEOUS
  - C. NOT RUTHLESS (ALLOWED GENERAL NUWWAR TO ESCAPE TO EGYPT IN 1957)
  - D. ACTS AS A MODERATING FORCE ON NASSER
  - E. HAS SURVIVED THROUGH ABILITY TO CONTROL THE ARMY
2. RACIAL ELEMENT HAS BEEN CRITICAL IN SURVIVAL OF HASHEMITE THRONE
  - A. HUSEIN COMMANDS LOYALTY OF SOUTHERN JORDANIANS WHO SPEAK THE ARABIAN PENINSULA DIALECTS--MOSTLY BEDOUINS
  - B. OTHER MAJOR RACIAL GROUP: NORTHERN JORDANIANS WHO SPEAK THE SYRIAN DIALECTS
  - C. MOST LOYAL ELEMENTS OF ARMY HAVE BEEN SOUTHERN JORDANIAN UNITS
3. CONFLICT WITH PALESTINIANS SEEMS LIKELY TO CONTINUE
  - A. DATES BACK TO 1948 WAR WITH ISRAEL
  - B. SOME PALESTINIAN GROUPS SEEM DETERMINED TO OVERTHROW HUSEIN
  - C. QUESTION REMAINS AS TO WHETHER PALESTINIAN GUERRILLAS ARE INDEED STRONGER OR SIMPLY MORE ACTIVE AND VISIBLE
4. STRONG RULER SEEMS MANDATORY TO PRESERVE NATIONAL INTEGRITY
  - A. FACTIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL FORCES WOULD PROBABLY DRIVE COUNTRY INTO CHAOS, OR WORSE, WITHOUT UNIFYING FORCE OF STRONG LEADER
  - B. FACTIONALIZATION WOULD ALSO SEEM TO DOOM ANY ATTEMPTS AT DEMOCRATIZING THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
  - C. LEFTIST-TYPE DICTATORSHIP WOULD PROBABLY ARISE IF HUSEIN WAS OVERTHROWN
5. MAJOR PROBLEMS SUGGEST CHRONIC INSTABILITY FOR JORDAN AT LEAST IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE:
  - A. CONFLICTS BETWEEN SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN JORDANIANS
  - B. CONFLICT BETWEEN JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS
  - C. DANGER FROM ANTAGONISTIC ARAB NEIGHBORS
  - D. FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
  - E. POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER DISASTROUS WAR WITH ISRAEL PROVOKED BY EGYPT OR SYRIA
6. HUSEIN'S PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL WILL DEPEND ON HIS ABILITY TO CONTROL THESE PROBLEMS AND
  - A. CONTINUED DIVISION AMONG PALESTINIAN GUERRILLA GROUPS
  - B. CONTINUED SUPPORT FROM THE WEST
  - C. PROGRESS IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
  - D. IMPROVEMENT IN TRADE
  - E. SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL OF REFUGEE PROBLEM.

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KING HUSEIN

HUSEIN'S STYLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ABSOLUTISM HAD THE MERIT OF ENCOURAGING ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE MODERNIZATION AND, ABOVE ALL, OF PROVIDING A DURABLE REGIME, GIVING THE TWO POPULATIONS ON THE EAST BANK AN OPPORTUNITY ECONOMICALLY AND SOCIALLY TO BEGIN TO FUSE INTO A SINGLE COMMUNITY, SO THAT THE EAST-WEST DIVISION WAS TAKING A NEW SHAPE. BUT THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF THE PALESTINIANS, IN THE SENSE OF THEIR ACQUIESCING IN HASHEMI RULE AND POLICIES, SEEMED ALMOST AS REMOTE IN 1967 AS IT HAD BEEN IN 1949. THE KING AND HIS OPPONENTS HAD BECOME PRISONERS OF THE PALESTINIANS' PREOCCUPATIONS WITH SUBVERTING THE REGIME AND THEIR SEEMING INABILITY TO FORM A LOYAL OPPOSITION. CONSEQUENTLY, HUSEIN COULD ABIDE ONLY A PLIANT PARLIAMENT STRUCTURED BY ELECTIONS WITHOUT POLITICAL PARTIES.

SOURCE: J.C. HUREWITZ  
MIDDLE EAST POLITICS:  
THE MILITARY DIMENSION  
PRAEGER, 1969 (pp. 322-323)

## THE JORDANIAN MILITARY

1

## THE JORDANIAN MILITARY

## I. THE ARAB LEGION UNDER GLUBB PASHA

## 1. BRITAIN PAID ALMOST THE ENTIRE BUDGET

A. BY 1955 THIS AMOUNTED TO ROUGHLY \$30 MILLION ANNUALLY

B. THIS WAS ONLY A FRACTION OF WHAT A BRITISH FORCE IN THE AREA WOULD HAVE COST

C. LEGION BUDGET WAS CONTROLLED ALMOST ENTIRELY BY GLUBB PASHA UNTIL HIS DISMISSAL

## 2. FORCE CONSISTED OF SOLDIERS, POLICE AND NATIONAL GUARD

A. POLICE OUTNUMBERED SOLDIERS BY 3-1 IN THE MID-1940'S

B. LEGIONAIRES WERE SUBMITTED TO EXHAUSTIVE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCEDURES TO ASSURE POLITICAL RELIABILITY

C. NUCLEUS OF OFFICER CORPS WAS BRITISH

## 3. ACTED AS STABILIZING FORCE IN THE REGION

A. ESPECIALLY SO AFTER THE DEATH OF ABDULLAH

B. BECAUSE OF HIS CLOSENESS TO THE KING, GLUBB BECAME ONE OF THE MAJOR FORCES AFTER ABDULLAH'S DEATH

## II. THE MILITARY AFTER GLUBB PASHA

## 1. LEFTIST PERIOD UNDER NUWWAR AND NABULSI

A. NEW MEN IN TOP COMMAND WERE OF QUESTIONABLE LOYALTY AND UNCERTAIN ABILITY

B. NUWWAR ORGANIZED A GROUP OF "FREE OFFICERS" PATTERNED AFTER THE NASSER GROUP IN EGYPT

C. PURGE OF "LEFTIST" OFFICERS FOLLOWED NUWWAR'S FLIGHT TO REFUGE IN CAIRO

## 2. SINCE THEN THE MILITARY HAS REMAINED A LOYAL DEFENDER OF THE THRONE AND A STEADFAST OPPONENT OF THE EXTREMISTS

A. IN THE MOST RECENT CONFRONTATION WITH PALESTINIANS, HUSEIN WAS FORCED TO DISMISS THE ARMY'S COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, BECAUSE OF HIS STEADFAST OPPOSITION TO THE GUERRILLAS.

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## THE JORDANIAN MILITARY: FORCE LEVELS

	FORCE LEVELS	POPULATION
1941	1,350	450,000 (APPROX.)
1945	8,000	450,000
1947	6,000	450,000
1948	10,000	450,000
1956	23,000	1,400,000
1960	36,500	1,700,000
1965	45,000	1,900,000

SOURCE: J.C. HUREWITZ

MIDDLE EAST POLITICS:  
THE MILITARY DIMENSION  
PRAEGER, 1969 (P. 325)

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## THE JORDANIAN MILITARY: MILITARY EXPENDITURES

	DEFENSE AND INTERNAL SECURITY (IN MILLIONS)	DEFENSE AS % OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES	DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AS % OF GNP
1953	28.6	60.4	27.0
1954	28.3	56.1	21.0
1955	29.4	59.3	23.0
1956	37.8	63.4	21.0
1957	37.5	56.1	21.0
1958	46.5	56.7	23.0
1959	50.4	58.6	18.5
1960	51.5	55.6	18.0
1961	52.4	57.0	15.0
1962	53.5	51.1	15.0
1963	56.8	53.6	15.5
1964	56.8	50.1	13.2
1965	56.8	46.6	12.0

J.C. HUREWITZ  
MIDDLE EAST POLITICS:  
THE MILITARY DIMENSION  
PRAEGER, 1969 (P. 325)



## 1 MAJOR EVENTS IN IRANIAN HISTORY PRIOR TO 1900

- 533 BC - FIRST PERSIAN EMPIRE, ACHAEMENID, FOUNDED BY CYRUS. DOMINANT RELIGION ZORASTRIANISM
- 331 BC - EMPIRE OVERTHROWN BY ALEXANDER AFTER MAJOR CONQUESTS IN THE CAUCASES AND EGYPT
- 250 BC - ANTI-HELLENIC REACTION BEGINS WITH THE RISE OF THE PARTHIAN EMPIRE IN THE NORTHERN STEPPE, LATER SUCCEEDED BY THE SASANIAN, WHO RULED UNTIL THE 7th CENTURY A.D. BOTH EMPIRES WERE PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH RESISTING THE ROMANS FROM THE WEST AND THE ASIAN NOMADS FROM THE EAST
- 637 AD - PERSIA IS DEFEATED AND THEN GRADUALLY ABSORBED INTO THE MUSLIM ARABIC EMPIRE. LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IS LARGELY CONTROLLED BY THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION BUT THE ARAB INFLUENCE GRADUALLY PRODUCED A NEW PERSIAN CIVILIZATION
- 750 AD - THE PERSIAN ABBASID EMPIRE BEGAN TO DISINTEGRATE LEADING TO SEMI-INDEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT DYNASTIES THROUGHOUT PERSIA
- 1000 - BY THIS TIME ISLAM HAD BECOME THE DOMINANT RELIGION AND THE PERSIAN LANGUAGE HAD ADOPTED THE ARABIC SCRIPT
- 1100 - GHUZZ TURKS INVADE PERSIA, ESTABLISH AN EMPIRE, AND PRODUCE A MAJOR CHANGE IN THE ETHNIC BALANCE. SUBSEQUENTLY THE TURKS WOULD BE SECOND ONLY TO THE PERSIANS IN BOTH NUMBERS AND INFLUENCE. BY THE 12th CENTURY THE GHUZZ TURKS WERE SUCCEEDED BY MONGOLS WHO GRADUALLY ASSIMILATED. BY 1400, HOWEVER, PERSIA WAS NO MORE THAN A COLLECTION OF RIVAL STATES
- 1502 - SAFAVID EMPIRE FOUNDED, FRONTIERS SECURED AND PERSIA RE-EMERGED AS AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ENTITY. SAFAVIDS MADE GREAT EFFORTS TO DEVELOP NATIONAL UNITY AND IDENTITY
- 1600 - SAFAVID EMPIRE REACHED ITS ZENITH AS PERSIA ENJOYED THE GREATEST POWER AND PROSPERITY IN ITS HISTORY. RELATIONS WITH EUROPE WERE ALSO BEGUN DURING THIS PERIOD
- 1772 - AS SAFAVID EMPIRE DECLINED, AFGHANS, TURKS AND RUSSIANS ALL OCCUPIED PARTS OF PERSIA FOR VARYING PERIODS
- 1779 - RISE OF QAJAR DYNASTY WHICH RULED UNTIL 1925
- 1800 - PERSIANS CONCLUDE TREATY WITH BRITISH AS LONDON AND PARIS COMPETE VIGOROUSLY FOR DOMINANT INFLUENCE. BRITISH CONCERNED FRENCH WOULD USE PERSIA AS BASE FOR INVASION OF INDIA
- 1801 - RUSSIA ANNEXES GEORGIA AND PERSIANS BEGIN ULTIMATELY DISASTROUS CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE RUSSIANS
- 1807 - PERSIANS SIGN TREATY OF ALLIANCE WITH THE FRENCH
- 1809 - THROUGH BRITISH PRESSURE, FRENCH AID PROHIBITED
- 1813 - PERSIANS END CAMPAIGN WITH RUSSIA, FORCED TO SURRENDER GEORGIA AND 8 OTHER PROVINCES
- 1814 - PERSIANS SIGN MILITARY AID TREATY WITH BRITAIN WHO PROMISE ASSISTANCE IN CASE OF RUSSIAN ATTACK
- 1825 - PERSIAN-RUSSIAN WAR RECOMMENCES BUT BRITISH ACT ONLY AS PEACEMAKERS
- 1828 - WAR ENDS WITH PERSIA CEDING TWO ADDITIONAL TERRITORIES TO RUSSIA
- 1834 - PERSIANS ATTACK AFGHANISTAN BUT RETREAT AFTER WARNINGS OF BRITISH. LATER PERSIANS REINVADE AFGHANISTAN DESPITE BRITISH THREATS
- 1856 - ANGLO PERSIAN WAR ERUPTS
- 1857 - WAR ENDS BY TREATY OF PARIS
- 1889 - RUSSIANS OBTAIN RAILWAY CONCESSION, ONE OF MANY GRANTED TO SUBSIDIZE EXTRAVAGANCES OF THE COURT. BELGIANS TOOK CONTROL OF CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION
- 1890 - TOBACCO CONCESSION GRANTED TO BRITISH SUBJECT AND THEN RESCINDED AFTER WIDESPREAD ANTI-WESTERN (AND RUSSIAN) STRIKES AND RIOTS ERUPT.

## 2 MAJOR EVENTS IN IRANIAN HISTORY AFTER 1900

- 1900 - RUSSIAN GRANT LOAN, ONE OF MANY THAT TOTALED ROUGHLY \$36 MILLION BY 1906
- 1906 - CONSTITUTION IS GRANTED AFTER 12,000 PEOPLE HAD TAKEN SANCTUARY IN THE BRITISH LEGATION DURING WIDESPREAD DEMANDS FOR REFORM
- 1908 - ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION SIGNED DEFINING EACH NATION'S SPHERE OF INTEREST IN PERSIA. PERSIANS FELT BRITISH HAD SACRIFICED PERSIAN INTERESTS IN RETURN FOR RUSSIAN SUPPORT IN A EUROPEAN WAR
- 1909 - CIVIL WAR; SHAH OVERTHROWN, AND RUSSIANS BEGIN OCCUPYING NORTHERN PERSIAN TOWNS
- 1911 - NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SUSPENDED AS RESULT OF RUSSIAN CONQUESTS
- 1919 - BRITISH AGREE TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE BUT TREATY GOES UNSIGNED BECAUSE OF OPPOSITION IN U.S., FRANCE AND PERSIA
- 1921 - SOVIET-PERSIAN TREATY SIGNED GIVING RUSSIANS RIGHT TO INVADE PERSIA TO PREVENT ANY THIRD COUNTRY ATTACK ORIGINATING ON PERSIAN SOIL.
- 1923 - REZA KHAN BECOMES PRIME MINISTER AFTER 1921 COUP D'ETAT
- 1928 - ALL EXTRA-TERRITORIAL AGREEMENTS TERMINATED AND MANY CONCESSIONS RESCINDED IN NEW BURST OF NATIONALISM. AIMING AT MODERNIZATION AND AUTARKY, REZA KHAN MADE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS, EDUCATION, THE MILITARY. LATER THE REGIME BECAME INCREASINGLY TOTALITARIAN.
- 1941 - DURING PRE-WAR YEARS GERMANY ACQUIRED CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE AND SO PERSIA DECLARED HERSELF NEUTRAL WHEN WAR BEGAN. ALLIES INVADED AFTER PERSIANS REFUSED TO EXPEL ALL GERMANS NON-ESSENTIAL TO THEIR ECONOMY. AFTER 2 DAYS REZA ABDICATED IN FAVOR OF HIS SON MUHAMMAD, THE PRESENT SHAH OF IRAN
- 1942 - TRIPARTITE TREATY SIGNED BY BRITAIN AND RUSSIA WHO AGREE TO RESPECT PERSIAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN RETURN FOR PROMISE OF ASSISTANCE BY PERSIANS. IN PERSIAN ZONE OF OCCUPATION, PERSIAN AUTHORITIES WERE DENIED FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT.
- 1944 - PERSIANS RESISTED PRESSURE FROM BRITISH, U.S. AND RUSSIAN OIL COMPANIES FOR CONCESSIONS
- 1945 - RUSSIANS ESTABLISH AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT IN AZERBAIJAN (INCLUDES OIL FIELDS OF BAKU), FORCING IT TO SECEDE FROM PERSIA
- 1947 - MILITARY AID AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH THE U.S.
- 1951 - BECAUSE OF INCREASING NATIONALISTIC FERVOR, LUCRATIVE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT WITH THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL COMPANY REJECTED AFTER DR. MUSADDIQ BECOMES THE PRIME MINISTER. DESPITE APPEALS TO THE U.N. THE COMPANY WAS FORCED TO CEASE OPERATIONS. OIL INDUSTRY NATIONALIZED
- 1952 - RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN SUSPENDED OVER QUESTION OF COMPENSATION
- 1953 - SERIOUS DISAGREEMENTS ARISE IN RULING CLIQUE IN ADDITION TO WIDESPREAD POPULAR PROTESTS OVER DETERIORATION OF DOMESTIC CONDITIONS. SHAH DISSUADED FROM GOING INTO EXILE WHILE U.S. ANNOUNCES CESSATION OF AID UNTIL OIL PROBLEM IS RESOLVED. A COUP DEPOSES MUSADDIQ, WHO IS JAILED, AND U.S. GRANTS EMERGENCY AID
- 1954 - NEW OIL AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH CONSORTIUM PLUS COMPENSATION TO ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL COMPANY
- 1955 - IRAN JOINS BAGHDAD PACT AND SHAH BEGINS TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE COUNTRY'S ADMINISTRATION
- 1957 - SHAH VISITS RUSSIA, SIGNS PROTOCOLS DEFINING FRONTIERS. EXPOSITION "PEOPLE'S PARTY" FORMED
- 1958 - GOVERNMENT "NATIONAL PARTY" FORMED
- 1960 - FIRST ELECTIONS HELD BUT OPPOSITION PROTESTS ALLEGED IRREGULARITIES
- 1961 - SHAH LAUNCHES "REVOLUTION FROM THE THRONE" AND ORDERS NEW ELECTIONS WHICH ELICIT NEW CRITICISM AND SUBSEQUENTLY PRIME MINISTER RESIGNS
- 1962 - THIRD GOVERNMENT SINCE 1960 RESIGNS AS RESULT OF DISORDERS FOLLOWING POSTPONEMENT OF NEW ELECTION NEW GOVERNMENT TAKES OFFICE, PROMISES MAJOR REFORMS

IRAN: GENERAL BACKGROUND

- 1963 - NEW ELECTIONS RETURN PROGRESSIVE PRIME MINISTER WHO PROMISES TO SUPPORT SHAH'S REFORM PROPOSALS. HAVING DISTRIBUTED ALL HIS LAND TO THE PEOPLE OVER THE PREVIOUS 13 YEARS SHAH PROPOSED RADICAL ECONOMIC LAND REFORM. PRIME MINISTER RESIGNS REPLACED BY ANOTHER PROGRESSIVE ALSO PLEDGING SUPPORT FOR THE SHAH'S PROGRAM
- 1965 - PRIME MINISTER FATALY WOUNDED BY EXTREMISTS OPPOSING GOVERNMENT'S LIBERAL PROGRAM. ATTEMPT ALSO MADE ON THE SHAH'S LIFE BY MEMBERS OF MILITANT COMMUNIST SECT
- 1967 - SHAH CORONATED 26 YEARS AFTER HIS ACCESSION THEN CROWNED QUEEN FARAH, TO SYMBOLIZE THE EMANCIPATION OF IRANIAN WOMEN. POINT FOUR AID FROM THE U.S. TERMINATED BECAUSE OF IRAN'S PROGRESS
- 1968 - RELATIONS WITH ARABS AFTER BRITISH ANNOUNCE WITHDRAWAL FROM PERSIAN GULF BECAUSE OF LONG-STANDING IRANIAN CLAIM TO BAHRAIN. SHAH DE-EMPHASIZED CLAIM, VISITED SAUDIA ARABIA
- 1969 - IRANIS CHALLENGED IRAQI CONTROL OVER WATERWAY SEPARATING THE TWO COUNTRIES. RELATIONS ALSO STRAINED BECAUSE OF IRAN'S GOOD RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND ALLEGED SUPPORT FOR KURDISH REBELS IN IRAQ. ALSO, WESTERN OIL CONSORTIUM SIGNS AGREEMENT, INCREASING IRAN'S OIL REVENUES

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IRAN  
BASIC ECONOMIC DATA-1968

1. GNP--\$8,245 MILLION
  - A. CURRENT GROWTH RATE--10.8%
  - B. 1961 GNP--\$4,729 MILLION
2. GNP/CAPITA--\$306
  - A. CURRENT GROWTH RATE--6.9%
  - B. 1961 GNP/CAPITA--\$206
3. ORIGIN OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT:
 

A. AGRICULTURE, ETC.	20.8%
B. MINING	34.7%
C. MANUFACTURING	8.9%
D. CONSTRUCTION	2.2%
E. TRANSPORTATION, ETC.	7.2%
F. TRADE & FINANCE	7.0%
G. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DEFENSE	10.7%
H. OTHER	8.5%
4. TRADE TOTAL--\$3,265 MILLION
  - A. TRADE SURPLUS--\$493 MILLION
  - B. PETROLEUM ACCOUNTED FOR 89% OF EXPORTS
  - C. TRADE SURPLUS CONSISTENT SINCE AT LEAST 1958
  - D. EXPORTS HAVE RISEN 150% SINCE 1958
  - E. EXPORTS TO U.S. ROUGHLY 4% OF TOTAL EXPORTS
5. OFFICIAL GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES--\$292 MILLION
6. PRINCIPAL EXPORTS (EXCLUDING OIL):
  - A. CARPETS--\$49 MILLION
  - B. RAW COTTON--\$37 MILLION
  - C. FRUIT--\$21 MILLION
  - D. HIDES & LEATHER--\$12 MILLION
7. MAJOR SUPPLIERS--1967-1968
  - A. WEST GERMANY--\$275 MILLION
  - B. UNITED STATES--\$212 MILLION
  - C. GREAT BRITAIN--\$139 MILLION
8. MAJOR CUSTOMERS--1967-1968 (EXCLUDING OIL)
  - A. U.S.S.R.--\$29 MILLION
  - B. WEST GERMANY--\$27 MILLION
  - C. UNITED STATES--\$20 MILLION

SOURCES: NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA  
ECONOMIC GROWTH TRENDS  
U.S. A.I.D. JANUARY 1970  
THE MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA--1969-1970  
LONDON, 1969 (P. 265)

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GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF COUNTRY AND PEOPLE

1. UNHOSPITABLE TERRAIN HAS FORCED MOST PEOPLE TO LIVE IN SMALL, WIDELY SEPARATED "OASES"
  - a. YET 70% OF POPULATIONS ARE FARMERS
  - b. 75% LIVE EITHER IN SMALL VILLAGES OR ARE NOMADS
  - c. INCREASING EMPLOYMENT IN OILFIELDS IS BEGINNING TO CHANGE THE BASIC HABITS OF THE NOMADS
2. POPULATION: 25,781,090 (1966)
  - a. NEARLY 3 MILLION IN CAPITAL OF TEHERAN
  - b. LITERATE POPULATION: 40% (EST.)
3. AREA OF THE COUNTRY: 627,000 SQUARE MILES
  - a. ONLY ABOUT 10% IS ARABLE
  - b. ABOUT 40% USED FOR ROUGH GRAZING
  - c. ABOUT HALF OF THE COUNTRY HAS NO AGRICULTURAL VALUE

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RACE AND LANGUAGE

1. DOMINANT RACE: IRANIS (PERSIANS OR IRANO-AFGHANS)
  - a. SHI'ITE MOSLEMS
  - b. SETTLED MOSTLY IN THE CENTRAL PLATEAU
2. MANY SMALL GROUPS IN THE MOUNTAINS
  - a. SOUTHWEST: ARABS AND KURDS--BOTH SEMI MOSLEMS
  - b. NORTHWEST: ARMENIANS
  - c. EAST: AFGHANS AND BALUCHIES
3. MORE THAN 98% OF THE POPULATION MOSLEM
  - a. MORE THAN 93% SHI'ITES
4. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: PERSIAN
  - a. TURKISH DIALECTS SPOKEN BY MINORITIES